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Preface 
It is a hot weekday morning at trendy Kith Café in Dhoby Ghaut, close to Singapore’s 
central nightlife districts. The sun is already burning the asphalt surface of the streets. 
Kith’s air-conditioned interior is fully occupied by fashionable Singaporeans whereas 
just a few foreign customers sit on the spacious wooden terrace. Andras arrives late, and, 
having ordered a café latte grande with double espresso, introduces himself as a 36-year 
old Hungarian with “a quite interesting childhood.” Over more than two hours he tells 
me his story – a mobility story whose elements form the heart of this dissertation.  
Andras’ childhood in 1980s communist Hungary ended with his diplomat father’s 
delegation to the US. When the family returned to ex-socialist Hungary four years later, 
the ten-year old boy experienced a culture shock and since then dreamt of life overseas. 
In his early twenties, Andras went to the United States for voluntary work and for an 
exchange term to Finland. After his bachelor in tourism and hospitality management, 
the young Hungarian started his dream career in a luxury hotel chain in Budapest. A 
year later the relationship with his girlfriend broke apart. Andras decided to finally 
embark on an international career. This marked the starting point of a life “always on 
the move” as he reflected over coffee on that hot day in Singapore. 
His first journey led him to Paris with the same employer. The planned year in 
Paris turned into four. Yet the promotion he was hoping for did not materialize. At the 
time, Andras first heard about Singapore. Fascinated by his image of tropical Asia and 
encouraged by Singapore’s supposedly welcoming attitude towards foreign talent 
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Andras wanted to move.
1
 However, as a junior employee he did not qualify for internal 
transfer within the hotel system.  
An unexpected vacancy as a local hire in the Maldives brought him one step 
closer to Asia and via another 3-year detour, he finally came to Singapore in 2011. The 
move put an end to his already strained distance relationship with his French girlfriend, 
but the excitements of his new life helped Andras to get over the emotional loss. 
Starting anew for the third time felt almost like a routine, and yet, Singapore was 
different. Singapore was the “toughest place.” Most expats, Andras told me, preferred to 
stay among same-country nationals or the international expatriate community.
2
 Andras, 
who came to Singapore for his interest in the country and the people, struggled to 
befriend Singaporeans. As a Caucasian foreign talent, Singaporeans seemed to regard 
him as a temporary, affluent stayer.  
Again, Andras felt as an outsider. When we first met in 2015, the relationship with 
his Filipino girlfriend was becoming closer. However, the couple struggled with life as 
foreign workers in Singapore. Andras coped with a 12 - 14 hour work day, completing 
an MBA course next to his full-time job at the hotel. He hoped that the business degree 
would enhance his employability. Ever rising requirements for the professional visa in 
Singapore meant that Andras constantly worried about his legal status in the country. 
During our conversation, I came to understand how geographical and professional 
mobility run like a golden thread through Andras’ life. Looking ahead, the question of 
mobility became predominant again for Andras and urged him to reflect on his 
migratory trajectories. After years of a “gypsy lifestyle”, Andras felt worn down. 
                                                             
1
 “Foreign talents” is the official term in Singapore for highly skilled foreigners.  
2
 Foreign professionals in Singapore are commonly referred to as expatriates, or short, expats. 
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Despite everyday frustrations, the stability in his current life made Andras regard 
Singapore as a positive experience which he became reluctant to easily discard.  
Andras has grown accustomed to his mobile lifestyle – it has become part of his 
life and of himself. When we talked via Skype in 2017 again, the couple had married 
and left Singapore. With an MBA degree, work experience in several countries and 
fluency in three languages, Andras was finally able to leave the taxing conditions of 
hospitality work and entered the Hong Kong branch of a leading technology 
multinational. His geographical mobility now spans three continents and seven 
countries, his organisational mobility several positions and industries. Andras’ “worklife 
pathways” in Asia and probably elsewhere in the world are bound to continue as our 
Skype conversation and follow-up emails revealed. How we can understand the life 
paths young Europeans forge in Asia and what this means for both their sense of self 
and the movement of skilled labour in times of a changing global power balance are the 
issues I wish to explore in this dissertation.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Approaching Generation Erasmus’ Mobilities  
“Europe is my home and I don’t think that will change.  
Europe as a place to be – I am not sure…“ 
(Sandra, Singapore) 
At a time when few days pass without headlines on mass immigration into Europe such 
a statement seems misplaced. But the young European woman who confided these 
words was very aware of their meaning. And she is not the only one. Over the past four 
years, I have followed a group of young Europeans who moved to work in Asia’s global 
cities Singapore and Tokyo. This is a dissertation on them, a numerically small but 
theoretically significant mobility phenomenon of young tertiary educated Europeans in 
Asia. Their presence in Asian global cities heralds one of the potential outcomes of the 
pursuit of middle-class life paths in a world of changing power structures. 
In this dissertation, I use the concept of ‘Generation Erasmus’ to introduce a new 
mobility phenomenon of young highly educated Europeans’ migration beyond Europe. 
These young adults, part of the so-called millennial generation, embark on their 
overseas work experience with an idealized, sometimes orientalist image in mind and 
hunger for adventure.  Being highly educated and fairly well off they seem to have all 
options in life. However, amidst rising precariousness and insecurities in the post-
Lehman European Union (hereafter EU) and their longing for professional challenges 
and individual biographies we see a restless generation. Their middle-class families and 
Brussels bureaucrats’ Europeanisation policies raised them to embrace mobility, 
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tolerance and cosmopolitan ideals. These young adults aim high and feel urged to 
compete for the numerous chances lying ahead and to avoid constraints on their local 
labour markets. After exploratory stints as travellers, students, or interns in Europe, Asia 
and elsewhere, they increasingly engage in strategic practices to continue their life 
abroad, forming part of the world’s skilled migrant population.  
These young Europeans use geographical mobility as a tool to access professional 
jobs and build a career that offers a middle-class lifestyle abroad and as such upward – 
or at least not downward – social mobility. However, these young adults are not the 
ideal careerists or neoliberal selves who live for the job or form part of the world’s 
business elite. The modest outcome of their cases is striking: a middle-class life with 
family, friends and jobs which happens to unfold 10,000 kilometres away from their 
places of birth. What is at stake here, I suggest, is a new form of individualism which is 
put forward by a generation that considers mobility as at least an option, if not a normal 
way of life. 
Before I explain the objective of this dissertation, I wish to make a note on the 
context and my approach to doing this research. The lens I adopt and the arguments I 
present throughout the chapters below have emerged from my experience in the field. 
During my first personal encounters with Asia – especially, Singapore, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Hong Kong and Tokyo – as a tourist, undergraduate student, and trainee in a 
private company, I noticed the presence of young Westerners who live and work in these 
Asian cities.
3
 More than that, overhearing conversations and discerning accents, I 
noticed that many of these migrants were not native English speakers but rather seemed 
to come from different corners of Europe. Being myself from a European country and 
                                                             
3
 I broadly define the West in this study as Europe, the United States and Canada and Australia/New 
Zealand. Chapter two discusses the racial aspect of the label Westerner. 
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new to Asia, my knowledge was limited to the recent colonial and postcolonial history, 
as well as Asia as it is portrayed by Eurocentric or Western-centric media.  
From my first ventures into two different scholarly fields with focus on Asia, 
migration and international human resources, I had not heard of independent young 
Europeans’ migration to Asia. What I knew from my previous training was that an 
expatriate assignment at the age of the people I met on the streets of Tokyo or Singapore 
was highly unlikely and so I assumed that they had forged their journey to Asia via 
different routes. This gap between scholarship and media representation on one side and 
my own local observations on the other side aroused my interest. It also explains why 
one will search in vain for comprehensive statistics on this population. As to my 
knowledge, they do not exist which leaves one with assembling statistical information 
piecemeal, by referring to ethnographers’ and demographers’ estimations as well as 
numbers on specific populations compiled by journalists.  
I will explain my approach to the field and sampling procedures in chapter three 
but here I wish to briefly provide an overview of what has been brought together by 
ethnographic studies and journalistic work on the phenomenon at stake. One of the few 
but extensive research projects on Westerners in an Asian global city is Farrer’s 
forthcoming book on Shanghai. The author speaks of a “population of roughly 90,000 
Western expatriates living in Shanghai at the time of the 2010 census, whose most 
common countries of nationality were the USA (24,358), France (8,238), Germany 
(8,023), Canada (7,306), Australia (6,165), and the UK (5,591) (2019:5).” The numbers, 
compared with that of Shanghai’s total foreign resident population of 170,000, 
demonstrate that almost half of the foreigners in the Chinese city are Westerners. This 
roughly matches the statement of another online article published in The World of 
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Chinese.com (Koshoibekova 2014) according to which Americans (34 per cent) and 
Europeans (28 per cent) make up about 60 per cent of the foreign population in China. 
In Tokyo, where fairly detailed statistics on the foreign resident population as of 
2017 are published, the European population consisted of roughly 75,000 whereas 
Europeans and North Americans taken together accounted for approximately 146,000 
(Ministry of Justice 2017a).
4
 I will look into the composition of this population in more 
detail later (see chapter five) but here I wish to refer to a few more sources which give 
us some idea of the phenomenon in focus. As for Singapore, we know that 
approximately 12 per cent or 198,000 of the total non-resident population in Singapore 
in 2017 were so-called skilled migrants (National Population and Talent Division 
Singapore 2018). Their countries of origin used to be mainly Western countries, 
especially Britain, and Japan, though recent years have shown an influx of skilled 
migrants from Asia (Coe and Kelly 2000; Yang, Yang, and Zhan 2017). 
An Irish Times article on young French fleeing their country quotes the minister 
delegate for the French overseas at the time, Ms. Conway-Mouret, when writing that 
“French graduates are moving in especially large numbers to Asia, where they often 
enjoy greater responsibility and higher salaries than in France. The average age of the 
3,000 French in Kuala Lumpur is 29” (Marlow 2013). Insightful, albeit based on a 
micro-study of young Londoners in Beijing, is also Knowles (2015), who cites an 
estimate of a foreign population of 500,000 in the Chinese capital of who only 5,000 are 
from the UK and consequently, even less make up the young British featured in her 
                                                             
4
 Throughout the dissertation, the numbers on Europeans in Japan consist of Europeans from all over 
Europe and not only the EU. The numbers for the non-EU Europeans who are included do however in 
proportion roughly reflect those of the EU citizen population. This is especially true for the statistics of 
visa categories presented in chapter five. There, too, the number for Russians who are, among the non-EU 
Europeans, the by far largest group in numerical terms, proportionally reflects that of the EU population. 
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research. That said, we can see that if assembled, the population of young Europeans 
across Asian global cities might be on the rise and as a total number is likely to consist 
of several tens of thousands of young people.   
As surveying the scarce resources on the phenomenon shows, one arrives at best 
at some very rough estimates of either independently moving European youth or 
Western skilled migrants in some of the metropolitan centres of Asia, but they always 
remain mutually exclusive. This, however, should not constrain the objective of this 
dissertation. My purpose is to study the meaning of the migration phenomenon at stake 
and how it enhances our understanding of how a part of the European millennial 
generation constructs their life narrative in the globalized world.  
Having entered graduate school in Japan and thus being “on-site” I decided to 
devote my graduate training to this type of largely unrecognised new form of migration. 
Inspired by Howard Becker to “[develop] concepts [. . .] in a continuous dialogue with 
empirical data” (1998:109), I started from a ‘blank sheet’ and allowed my attention to 
be drawn to poorly researched dynamics I found in the field. Soon, distinctive 
characteristics shared by the people I encountered crystallized. These eventually 
prompted me to frame this as a dissertation on young European migrants who I call 
Generation Erasmus. As I will elaborate in chapter three, common traits that I found 
among these European youth are shared cultural capital, attitudes and orientations, 
internalized by the distinctive way of growing up as the millennial generation of an 
enlarging European Union. Based on this ethnographic approach, I suggest that the 
generational perspective opens up intriguing research avenues for a study on the mobile 
“worklife pathways” of the privileged yet at the same time precarious European youth 
(Krings et al. 2013a:89).  
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The dissertation is rooted in migration scholarship and inspired by the mobilities 
turn. It is interested in how mobilities research can inform us about new ways of 
managing the self in a globalized world. As such, it is not merely a study on migration 
per se as it is a study on young adults’ responses to globalisation through “chosen 
biographies” (Beck 1994:15). With focus on EU citizens, and an arguably specific group 
within them, I will demonstrate how these youth’s decisions about where and how to 
lead their lives are shaped by global processes and how these processes diminish 
distinctions between the young European adults in focus and their middle-class peers 
around the globe. In the conclusion, I assess the implications of my findings and discuss 
how the newly gained insights can enhance our understanding of managing a life 
characterised by mobility and multiple identities in a globalized world. 
 
1.2 The “Worklife Pathway” Perspective 
Now, how to make sense of the different dimensions that seem to influence the mobility 
phenomenon at stake? There is Europe as the cradle of democracy, the birthplace of 
Enlightenment and the venue for workers’ fight for rights and social protection. But 
there is also the Europe of imperialism and colonialism, the nest of two World Wars full 
of atrocities and a continent whose economic and political role in the global world order 
has slowly declined since the second half of the 20
th
 century. Then there is Asia with its 
at least as turbulent history, producer of some of the world’s earliest great civilisations 
but also as a colonial subject and alienated as periphery in Western dependency 
discourse. Lately, however, Asia is more often addressed as the rising global power 
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under China’s lead. In their midst, young adults in an enlarged European Union search 
for orientation and some turn to Asia as a route to design their own biographies.  
A study of migrants’ socio-economic background in the sending countries 
(Europe) and their positioning in their home societies, for instance in terms of class, can 
reveal a lot about the outcomes of their migration. Only by assessing both sides of the 
migration continuum are we to understand these migrants’ choice of the Asian global 
cities and their career expectations and life strategies. That said, the EU consists of 28 
member states with great differences in culture, language, even living standard and the 
labour market – between each other but also internally.  
In order to make the case for a generation of its own, I am drawing from recent 
scholarly advances in research on Europeanisation, European mobilities and 
cosmopolitanism. I propose to define this youth as a distinctive generation which has 
adopted a European, if not global, standpoint on issues of career, the labour market and 
mobility (Jensen 2015). While these young Europeans seldom renounce identification 
with their home country they direct employment strategies and plans for the future 
along a European and gradually along a global scale. Thus, I call the young migrants 
Generation Erasmus, without denying internal differences within the group. At times, 
my data pointed to particularities of the home country labour markets or the migration 
channels through which the Europeans moved. I thus examine to what extent such 
differences between Europeans countries matter in migrants’ employment strategies and 
socialising patterns abroad. 
I suggest that there are two salient realms in which these migrants move and 
construct meaning. These are work and social world which constitute interrelated 
processes rather than static separate spheres of life. Work and non-work, referred to as 
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private life, leisure or the like, are often treated as dichotomies (Krings et al. 2013b). I 
argue instead that standing alone, none of the two dimensions is convincing enough to 
explain Generation Erasmus’ mobilities. Their pathways are product of forging a life 
made up of and woven together through work, leisure and socialising practices. In an 
analytical move, I adopt Krings et al.’s (2013b) concept of “worklife pathways” as a 
useful tool for understanding this new form of young adults’ a-typical mobilities.  
Krings et al. (2013a; 2013b) developed the “worklife pathway” concept in their 
research on Polish migration to Ireland post-2004, the year when Poland entered the 
European Union. The authors place their study in the emerging mobilities literature, 
drawing from Urry and colleagues’ postulation to acknowledge a “‘new mobilities’ 
paradigm” in today’s increasingly interconnected world (Sheller and Urry 2006:208). 
Krings et al. (2013b) coined the “worklife pathways” concept to examine “new 
mobilities” of young Europeans in the European Union. The authors suggest that, “in 
the light of a greater emphasis on movement, it might be analytically more appropriate 
to treat contemporary forms of migration as a subcategory of mobility (ibid:8).”  
Crediting the authors, I use the term mobility for the phenomenon in focus. I do 
not deny that these Europeans are migrants, and that their moves could be called 
migration as well (which is why I sometimes use movement or migration 
interchangeably). What the concept mobility does however confer more strongly than 
migration is the temporary, circular, repeated, vague, contingent, and crisscross aspects 
of the kinds of movements on which this dissertation focuses. Krings et al.’s (2013b) 
main argument is that motivations for migration and the ongoing process of being a 
migrant are not merely driven by aspects of work. While undeniably playing a 
significant role, “economic motives” (ibid:21) are just one aspect. “Non-economic” 
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motives, concomitant features of reflexivity and individualisation (Giddens 1990) or 
projects of self-realisation (Kennedy 2010:480) are likewise essential. Prominent 
examples of this are lifestyle migration (Benson and O’Reilly 2009), transnational 
urbanism (Conradson and Latham 2005) and choosing “creative” cities for work in 
innovative industries or the arts (Florida 2002).   
The interrelatedness of work and life spheres lies at the heart of understanding the 
mobility phenomenon in focus here. More than that, Krings et al. (2013b) propose a 
nuanced understanding of “economic motives” in the “worklife pathways” concept. 
Economic motives mean more than just salary or linear intra-company career 
advancement. They include intrinsic meanings of work such as creativity, self-
development and flexibility among others (ibid:22). In short, “worklife pathways refer 
to individuals’ professional and personal life journeys (ibid:22).” The concept is a tool 
that enables us to unravel the complexity of contemporary migrants’ migratory decision 
makings, migrants’ perceptions of their migration experience and their subsequent 
practices, strategies and goals. As the term implies, the concept pays attention to 
(repeated) movement and does not draw artificial lines between the different dimensions 
of the migration experience.  
Now, why – and how – to operationalise this concept for European migration to 
Asia? Krings et al. (2013b) point to differences in people’s “worklife pathways” 
depending on their motivations, networks and skill sets. According to the authors, intra-
European migrants share the freedom to move which enables them to flexibly cross 
geographical and organisational boundaries without the need for a visa. This is 
obviously different in Europeans’ migration to Asia. Nevertheless, I argue that the 
concept is suitable to theorize the migration phenomenon in focus. 
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I contend that Generation Erasmus, having internalized the rhetoric of flexibility, 
mobility, and myriad opportunities, perceive the Asian destination countries as another 
potential place to work and live. Despite Singapore’s and Japan’s tight immigration 
regulations, this generation rationalises along a logic of the necessity and opportunity of 
self-actualization and are able to manoeuvre the foreign labour market and immigration 
regulations to a considerable degree. This ability is contingent upon their “motility” 
(Kaufmann, Bergman, and Joye 2004:750), a concept I introduce in chapter five. 
 
1.3 Objectives and Structure of the Dissertation 
Given the regional rather than national scale and the lack of both comparable and 
reliable emigration statistics, the size of their population in Asia is unknown.
5
 Certainly, 
Europeans’ total number in Asia is small compared to many other ethnic migrant groups.  
However, studying young independent European migrants in Asian global cities 
makes us aware of economic and social changes across the globe, of recent 
developments tied to the globalisation of labour markets and with it to the emergence of 
new anchors and social networks by which people construct both their life paths and 
their identities. In such a context, young European citizens weigh their options. They 
consider not only the next bigger city, or their home country’s capital city as an 
opportunity for building a middle-class life which satisfies their cosmopolitan and 
transnational aspirations. Nor do they limit themselves to the EU territory. The fact that 
there is an outflow of young Europeans beyond the EU hints at a redefinition of taken-
                                                             
5
 See Nowok, Kupiszewska, and Poulain (2006) for a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of available 
international migration statistics.  
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for-granted life paths and a contestation of old power structures. Young adults who 
embark on overseas “worklife pathways” are intrigued by the idea of life trajectories 
different from the conventional ones which older generations and their peers in Europe 
are pursuing.  
The young people I studied represent a cohort that, given their middle-class 
background in developed countries, have until recently barely been considered as 
having incentives to permanently leave their home countries. Western graduates’ 
overseas sojourns have been theorised as “rites of passage” (Haverig 2011) or as a form 
of extended travel with links to consequential mobility (Frändberg 2014). Even 
nowadays, it is only a minority of young Europeans who follow the pathways I examine 
below. However, as I illustrate in chapter four, the practice of migration is no longer an 
extreme exception or the rejection of hegemonic middle-class values. Rather, the young 
adults pursue pathways which are, though framed by a rhetoric of individualisation, in 
line with European middle-class ideals. Furthermore, among those who leave an 
increasing number are ‘ordinary’ people who might stumble into their migratory 
pathway rather than exerting a meticulously planned move.  
The following chapter reviews the scholarship on atypical migration and 
European migration to Asia. I conclude that a logic of self-management is useful to 
understand young educated Europeans’ “worklife pathways” to Asia. Chapter three 
outlines the research design, methods and access to the field and discusses my 
positionality as a researcher in the fieldwork and writing process.  
Chapter four to eight deal with the main questions that guided my research. In 
chapter four, I portray Generation Erasmus and examine their motivations for moving to 
Asia as they emerged in the context of the enlarging EU. Through four ideal types, I 
  21 
explore what sparks the idea of Asia as a destination and migration to Singapore and 
Tokyo in particular. The chapter illuminates how the idea of migration translates into 
action and demonstrates the salience of contingency. By doing so it pays attention to the 
networks, knowledge and institutions that are involved in the steps that lead to 
migratory decision making. 
Chapter five turns to Generation Erasmus’ employment conditions in Asia. I 
briefly outline the development of the labour market in Singapore and Japan and 
provide an overview of the legal and institutional framework for skilled migration in 
both destinations. Based on this, I identify the channels through which Generation 
Erasmus move. The analysis detects the role of these Europeans’ distinctive motility, or 
potential to move, for initiating migration and accessing jobs. Mapping migrants’ 
occupational profiles I propose a causal relationship between each of the four migration 
motivations and the type of firm and employment conditions migrants enter.  
In chapter six, I engage the meaning of work and career. By migrants’ 
employment practices and strategies, I explore the link between pre-employment 
expectations and the way employment trajectories unfold. I ask if migrants are able to 
pursue what they deem a career and how they negotiate adverse conditions. How does 
the work experience shape their hopes, plans and perception of the future? In my 
discussion, I identify social categories like race and gender to affect Generation 
Erasmus’ work experiences in the Asian global cities. 
In chapter seven, I assume that work and life cannot be separated. Depicting 
migrants’ social world in Asia, I delve into their daily life and socialising behaviour. 
Who are their peers, who do they confide in, who do they consciously avoid? How do 
place and friendships affect migrants’ perception of life in the host society? Through the 
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concept of boundary making I tackle issues of bonding and alienation and ask in which 
way inter-ethnic relations in relation to intra-ethnic relations shape Generation Erasmus’ 
social world. This angle allows me to address salient notions of race and ethnicity but 
also to look beyond these social categories and to incorporate gender, class, and 
generation into my analysis.  
Finally, romantic relationships influence how migrants develop feelings of home 
and belonging and construct their identity. This is the focus of chapter eight. I first 
discern different forms of romantic relationships (or lack thereof) and then connect 
migrants’ emotional and intimate experiences to the issue of mobility. The chapter 
serves as a direct transition to the conclusion where I zoom out and consider the broader 
implications of my findings. After discussing the interlinkages of migration motivations, 
employment conditions and experiences, social world and romantic relationships, I 
reflect on the meaning of European millennials’ mobilities in different socio-cultural 
contexts. 
This migration phenomenon is embedded in young adults’ pursuit of a self-
governing middle-class life in a world marked by precariousness and social change. I 
conclude that the “worklife pathways” to Asia might enable migrants to construct a 
coherent narrative of their multiple identities as European millennials, citizens of the 
world and middle-class professionals and by this has the potential to challenge old 
ethnic boundary making practices to some extent. Yet, the mobile self does not come 
without sacrifice. While this migration phenomenon has opened up new pathways of 
middle-class reproduction its consequences for the home countries and individuals 
themselves are questionable.  
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2. In Pursuit of what is Lacking: New Mobility Patterns 
2.1 Atypical Migration   
In 1993, Castles and Miller coined our times the Age of Migration. Movement has 
always been part of human existence but rapid social change in the late 20
th
 century late 
modernity has triggered new social processes, waves of new movement and, which is 
even more important, an increased awareness of these developments across the globe. 
Media and technology allow people around the world to witness such changes, 
something unthinkable just a few decades earlier. There is a variety of ways to react to 
or even participate in these phenomena of movement while they are unfolding. In this 
study, I only look at the educated middle-classes. They choose to become actors – or 
choose to not do so – by commenting on online blogs on an event that concerns them on 
the other side of the globe, by maintaining transnational alumni networks with peers 
from their study time abroad, by moving abroad for a professional opportunity or 
because of romantic issues. Rightly, one can argue, these examples do not represent 
conventional forms of migration. Castles and Miller, too, concentrate on the more well-
known forms of movements – refugees, economic migration, and ethnic migrant 
minorities, to name just a few – and devote little space to discuss new forms of 
movement.  
The point here is that migration and what we understand behind the term is 
changing. This study is a modest attempt to contribute to the understanding of new 
contemporary movements and their embeddedness in the globalising world of the 21
st
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century. It only looks at a small, particular group of individuals on the move. However, 
such new forms of movements have tremendously increased in scope and scale since the 
first edition of the Age of Migration, and knowledge about them has enhanced our 
understanding of people’s, labour markets’ and state authorities’ diverse, creative and 
shifting responses to the globalising world.  
 
2.1.1 Lifestyle and Neoliberal Self-Management in Transnational Lives 
Different authors have argued for a proliferation of the forms and varieties of movement 
around the globe. While the majority of people on the move continue to flee adverse 
conditions in their home countries – war, environmental disasters, political persecution 
and the like – there is also a rising number of migrants who choose to move. Choice, 
however, does not preclude constraints, anxieties, or personal dilemmas. Often, “free 
movers” (Favell 2008b:247) have been considered privileged and have been juxtaposed 
with the above distressed movers. However, such oversimplification obscures social 
changes on the way and downplays precarious employment, emotional insecurities and 
unfulfilled expectations which a growing number of the educated middle class are 
facing. Ignoring those who choose to move is thus to ignore fundamental changes under 
the condition of reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994). It obstructs 
deeper understanding of how people construct new life paths in the 21
st
 century.  
In this light, scholarship on new forms of movement, “atypical migration” (Favell 
2014:xiii) or “extraordinary movements” (Favell and Recchi 2009:7) – new forms of 
educated, middle-class labour migration within the EU – has flourished.  Savage, 
Bagnall and Longhurst in Globalization and Belonging (2005:45) speak of “‘elective 
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belonging’” among some social groups in Europe. Upper middle classes, the authors 
suggest, have more agency to choose to engage in practices in different territories, an 
argument which has found support from empirical studies by mobility researchers in 
Europe (Mau 2010; Fligstein 2008).  
Intra-European mobility is characterized by cross-border commuting, circular, 
back-and-forth and temporary labour migration (Ralph 2015; Mullohand and Ryan 
2014; Kennedy 2010; Frändberg 2014; Krings et al. 2013b). While difficulties of labour 
market access and waves of youth migration after the 2008 Lehman shock are one side 
of the coin (e.g. Lafleur and Stanek 2017), authors stress the need to acknowledge non-
economic factors (Krings et al. 2013a) such as lifestyle considerations (O’Reilly 2007), 
love (Trundle 2009), language acquisition (Burrell 2010), and “self-realisation” 
(Kennedy 2010:472). Nevertheless, Andreotti, Le Gals and Moreno Fuentes (2010:2) 
argue that even upper middle-class managers in European cities use “partial exit-
strategies” at best and do not become fully de-territorialized. For this study, it will be 
worth examining if the young and non-managerial Europeans’ practices of belonging 
and engagement with the local align or contrast with that of the upper middle classes in 
Europe.  
An important new field of inquiry has opened through the lens of lifestyle 
migration. Generally speaking, lifestyle migrants are middle-class and educated but they 
exchange structured everyday life in their developed home countries – and sometimes 
stable employment – for the freedom of living abroad under rather unstable or even 
precarious circumstances. Benson and O’Reilly (2009:608) define lifestyle migration as 
“the decision to migrate based on their belief that there is a more fulfilling way of life 
available to them elsewhere.” At the core of the phenomenon lies the assumption that 
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one can build a satisfactory life elsewhere by pursuing a “counter-hegemonic practice 
and lifestyle (ibid:609-10).”  
Developed from a European perspective but lately adopted by academics around 
the globe, lifestyle migration scholars argue that lifestyle and leisure considerations 
have prompted a range of new forms of movement. Conceptually, the focus lies on the 
motivations for migration and thus research on lifestyle migrants encompasses a 
heterogeneous group of people such as retirement migration (e.g. Ono 2009; Toyota and 
Ono 2012; Green 2014; Casado-Diaz 2009), seasonal or climate-related movements 
(Lundström 2014; O’Reilly 2000), global nomadism (D’Andrea 2006), working holiday 
makers (Haverig and Roberts 2011; Wilson, Fisher, and Moore 2009; Kawashima 2010), 
cultural migration (Fujita 2009; Sooudi 2008; Debnár 2016) and romantically 
(Lundström 2014; Trundle 2009) or sexually motivated movement (Hirano 2014; 
Paquin 2014). Student or educational migration, although seldom labelled lifestyle 
migration, has in fact often similar motivations (Szelenyi 2008; Liu-Farrer 2011a; King 
and Raghuram 2012). 
International students have long been ignored in migration research because they 
do not have a working visa. Recently, scholars have pointed to the close linkage 
between international students and migration, as students stay on after graduation and 
directly enter the host country labour market (e.g. Soong 2015; Liu-Farrer 2011a; 
Szelenyi 2008). They activate the networks and the resources they accumulated during 
their sojourns as students. Given their age and lack of work experience, these young 
migrants usually find themselves in the middle of the occupational strata and, depending 
on the socio-cultural and economic context of the host labour market, in certain 
occupational niches (Liu-Farrer 2011b; Soong 2015). 
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Other research has stressed the role of global cities in lifestyle migration, 
especially for young migrants (Sooudi 2008, 2014; Tseng 2011; Fujita 2009; Haverig 
2011; Griffiths and Maile 2014; Ho 2011) who seek adventure and experimentation in 
the dynamic hubs or, with a clear professional focus, among the “creative class” 
(Florida 2002). In Sooudi’s (2008:97) words on her young Japanese informants in New 
York, these lifestyle migrants have a “desire for salvation—from a mediocre life, and 
potential regret for abandoned, unexplored selves, different possible identities that could 
have been lived.”6 The term “mediocre” might be key to understanding particularly the 
young and well-educated migrants from developed countries who choose to relocate in 
order to find that something which frees them from the mediocre, or mundane, an aspect 
I will take up again below. Lifestyle migration, then, embodies the idea of freedom from 
social pressures and competitive labour markets. More often than not, lifestyle migrants 
drop out of what they perceive as an overly stressful life in their highly developed home 
countries or an anticipated standard life course whose meaning they question.  
Lifestyle migration’s assumption of a better life elsewhere has a critical 
component. It foregrounds that these middle-class movers lack something in their 
countries or cities of origin. In this respect, Scott (2006) has talked about city dwellers’ 
search for peace, authenticity and nature in Europe’s idyllic rural settings. Similar forms 
of international counterurbanisation (Buller and Hoggart 1994) point to the significance 
of this phenomenon beyond the migration discourse but for the role which place, nature 
                                                             
6
 Sooudi’s 2014 book is a creative ethnographic study of Japanese lifestyle migrants’ transnational 
practices in New York, sparked by their desire to experience the authentic global and in their eyes most 
Western city of all. While the ideas of this book and its methodological approach have inspired this study, 
I use Sooudi’s 2008 doctoral dissertation when citing the author verbatim since she phrases migrants’ 
desires only then in the above used important words.  
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and the longing for authenticity play (Osbaldiston 2012, 2014; Benson 2010; 2011; 
Korpela 2010).
7
 What some commentators write off as luxury problems is attributed to 
lack of orientation by others.  
Globalisation scholars argue that the institutions that defined and structured 
modern life have become vague (Giddens 1991; Beck 1994; Bauman 1998). Beck 
(1994) sees in individualisation a direct product of reflexive modernity; an era that, 
along with unfolding globalisation and its social, economic and political changes, has 
replaced modernity in late 20th century. Modern institutions, which used to guide 
citizens of industrialized countries through their lives, have lost validity. Among others, 
the erosion of the social contract of stable employment and dependable pension schemes 
in many social welfare states, the disruption of the institution of family as we knew it, 
the increasing demand for flexibility, constant upgrading of one’s skills and 
competitiveness for jobs (Sennett 1998; 2006) and as a result of these, the rise in 
precarious living conditions among the established middle classes (Hayes 2014) all 
serve to threaten and sometimes even to uproot people. While social welfare states are 
more applicable to Western societies, the meaning and constellation of the family as 
well as the nature of modern workplaces and employment have shifted throughout 
industrialized countries, with Japan as an instructive example (Kawashima 2017; 
Roberts 2016; Matsutani 2015; Nakano 2015). In Post-Mao China, too, we see “new 
practices of professional career planning” (Hoffmann 2008:176). Young employees 
“believe in the idea of career mobility as a source of professional and social growth” 
(ibid) and by this display similar attitudes to the ones I found among the young 
Europeans in Singapore and Tokyo. 
                                                             
7
 See also Gosnell and Abrams (2009) on the related concept of amenity migration. 
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In this respect, Beck (1994) refers to “chosen biography” as a new attitude 
towards life as a project. Featherstone (1991:86) detects a “no rule, only choices slogan 
of the ever-renewable lifestyle.” He proposes to understand lifestyle as a “life project” 
which allows people to reflexively “display their individuality e.g. through experiences 
and practises”, rather than “unreflexively adopting a lifestyle through tradition” 
(ibid:86). Individualisation brought freedom, greater opportunities, and choice. For the 
individuals this means the ability to actively steer their lives. This, however, requires the 
individual to take responsibility for success and failure. In a neoliberal logic, such 
rhetoric has led to a constant search for the better, a celebration of creativity, novelty 
and flexibility (Sennett 1998; Lane 2011; McGuigan 2014). New attitudes not only 
towards managing the self (Beck 1992) but also towards work have proliferated. 
Entrepreneurialism and start-ups are keywords (McGuigan 2014) and new work styles 
such as remote work and the “boundaryless career” (Arthur 1994) feature high.  
 The access to mobility, or potential of becoming mobile which is called motility 
(Flamm and Kaufmann 2006), is a form or privilege and thus only open to a few. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to equal mobilities with “frequent-flying, fast-line, 
global elites” (Favell et al. 2008:2). As Favell (2008b) notes, educated movers are a 
heterogeneous group in terms of occupational industry, age, gender and job position and 
should therefore not, from the outset, be assumed to be privileged or unconstrained by 
national policies, the job market or visa regulations (see also Baas 2017). Rather, lack of 
security and precarious employment cause a notion of temporariness in migrants’ lives. 
They often maintain a security net in their home countries, such as property, a pension 
scheme or even their health insurance which they regard as a back-up plan or as a 
facilitator for their future return (Favell 2008a; Lundström 2014).  
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For such middling transnationals (Conradson and Latham 2005a), place and 
locality continue to be important. Conradson and Latham (ibid:228) are critical of 
recently popular terms like Castells’ (1996) “space of flows” or Bauman’s (1999) 
“liquid modernity” which, without much empirical grounding, postulate a borderless 
fluid world void of meanings of place. Contributions in a special issue on middling 
transnationalism reveal how migrants, through their everyday practices, negotiate 
friendship networks, their national identity and kinship in their transnational life-worlds 
(Voigt-Graf 2005; Friesen et al. 2005; Conradson and Latham 2005b).  
Despite the insightful arguments that the research mentioned and quoted above 
has produced, it suffers from either an overemphasis on travel and leisure or an essential 
understanding of lifestyle in a binary sense as everything ‘non-work related’. In a 
similar vein, Benson and O’Reilly (2016:21) recently proposed that the role of lifestyle 
in lifestyle migration should be reconsidered to “illustrate that the concept of lifestyle 
migration does not preclude the possibility of economic factors.” Giddens (1991:5-6), as 
early as in the 1990s, claimed that lifestyle patterns do not only arise from material 
affluence and decisions for specific actions but are also reactions to “material 
constraints” and “rejection.” Thus, much of the research on lifestyle migration 
insufficiently discusses how migrants manoeuvre closed labour markets or other 
structural barriers which deny them to continue or foster their professional career.  
The priority of lifestyle and leisure issues in lifestyle migration on the one hand 
and social integration and friendship networks in middling migration on the other hand 
obstruct a more systematic analysis of career and employment issues. Furthermore, 
neither approach sufficiently accounts for the “multi-transitional manifestations of 
[lifestyle] mobility (Cohen, Duncan and Thulemark 2015:156). A research design that 
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studies locality and emplacement or the more conventional focus of lifestyle migration 
on movement between home and host country hardly enhances our understanding of 
repeated, non-linear moves as feature of many contemporary forms of mobility. 
 
2.1.2 Conceptualising Mobility as “Worklife Pathways”  
Recent studies have tackled the lacunae of research between the ‘poles’ of economic 
motivations and lifestyle motivations (Ralph 2015; Mulholland and Ryan 2014; Ryan 
2015; Kõu, van Dijk, and Bailey 2015; Kennedy 2010; Haverig 2011; Frändberg 2014). 
Based on a mobilities perspective (Sheller and Urry 2006), the studies investigate both 
employment-related and employment-unrelated motivations for moving. They recognise 
repeated or circular movements rather than theorising migration as a one-off event 
which leads to a status of permanence or immobility in the host country.  
Hannam, Sheller and Urry (2006:1) famously argued for a “mobility turn” which 
highlights mobilities and movement rather than settlement, boundaries and national 
frameworks as defining features of the rapidly globalising world around the turn of the 
century. The mobility perspective allows for a more adequate theorisation of the vague 
terms “lifestyle” and “career” which are not given, static and uncontested (Krings et al. 
2013a; 2013b). While the studies recognise migrants’ education, qualifications, class 
position, ethnicity and country of origin, the mobility perspective directs attention to 
meanings imbued in career and lifestyle in the light of migrants’ contextual and 
situational experience. Such research demonstrates how “free movers”’ (Favell 2008a) 
priorities shift to exercising their right of mobility in the European free movement space. 
For instance, a conventional career which entails geographical movement might turn 
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into an overseas experience with a greater emphasis on culture or romantic issues, or the 
reverse (Krings et al. 2013b).  
In this respect, Krings et al. (2013b) propose to conceptualize migrants’ 
movements as “worklife pathways.” In their research on Polish migration to Ireland 
post-2004, the year when Poland entered the European Union, the authors suggest that, 
“in the light of a greater emphasis on movement, it might be analytically more 
appropriate to treat contemporary forms of migration as a subcategory of mobility 
(ibid:8).” Their main argument is that motivations for migration and the ongoing 
process of being a migrant are not merely driven by aspects of work. While undeniably 
playing a significant role, “economic motives” (ibid:21) are just one aspect among 
others. They are complemented by “non-economic” motives which are concomitant 
features of reflexivity and individualisation (Giddens 1991) or projects of self-
realisation (Kennedy 2010).  
While lifestyle migration (Benson and O’Reilly 2009) or research on middling 
migration (Conradson and Latham 2005a) put forward similar arguments, Krings et al.’s 
(2013a; 2013b) concept enables us to explore how the economic and non-economic 
motives are firstly not contradictory but complementary. Secondly, they show how these 
motives shift over time and are contingent on the context.  
Besides the emphasis on the interrelatedness of work and life spheres, the nuanced 
understanding of “economic motives” in the “worklife pathways” concept is 
illuminative. Economic motives mean more than just salary or linear intra-company 
career advancement. They include intrinsic aspects such as creativity, self-development 
and flexibility (Krings et al. 2013b:22) as well as expansion of professional networks, 
the desire for international work experience and better working conditions (Doherty, 
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Dickmann and Mills 2008; Khoo, Hugo, and McDonald 2008; Guth and Gill 2008; 
Harvey 2011). In short, “worklife pathways refer to individuals’ professional and 
personal life journeys (Krings et al. 2013b:22).” The concept thus serves as a tool for 
unpacking the complexity of contemporary migrants’ migratory decision makings, 
migrants’ perception of their migration experience and their subsequent practices, 
strategies and goals.  
The authors strengthen their thesis by matching the “worklife pathways” with 
another concept that stresses the multiple dimensions of migratory pathways. That is, 
the “boundaryless career”, coined by Arthur (1994). The term “career” deserves 
clarification since it is often associated with an organisational career that involves 
upward mobility or career advancement (Arthur and Rousseau 1996:5). However, 
Krings et al. (2013b) distinguish such a meaning of a linear, in-house career from 
careers in contemporary societies. The former definition of career developed at a time of 
industrialisation and long-term employment with one employer. With reference to 
changing employment contexts in the 21
st
 century, the authors contend that “what 
defines a career is the sequential and therefore cumulative work experience of the 
individual over time, not any assumed hierarchy of positions through which there is 
progression (ibid:18).” I agree with this definition of career as more suitable to theorise 
contemporary work, especially since it recognises different potential dimensions of 
mobilities.  
With the “boundaryless career”, then, Krings et al. (2013b:18-20) refer to the 
boundaries the European migrants cross; these are geographical (national), 
organisational (firms) and even industry-specific (from one occupational industry to 
another) boundaries. While European migrants pursue different “worklife pathways” 
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depending on their motivations, networks and skill sets, they share the right to freely 
move within the European free movement space. This enables them to flexibly cross 
geographical and organisational boundaries without the need for a visa, as Favell’s 
“Eurostars” demonstrate (2008a).  
The EU’s borderless zones (Mulholland and Ryan 2014) have significantly 
facilitated such movement, and cross-border commuting has proliferated (Ralph 2015; 
Gottholmseder and Theurl 2007; Huber and Nowotny 2013; Van der Klis and Karsten 
2009). While these new forms of mobility involve repeated, circular and frequent 
movements, Ralph (2015) points to the complex interdependencies of both upward and 
downward social mobility and spatial mobilities. Social inequalities, glass ceiling and 
wage differentials remain just a few of the obstacles, even in the so-called borderless 
zone of the EU (Black et al. 2008; Recchi 2015; Csed  2008). 
This is obviously different in Europeans’ migration to Asia. Nevertheless, further 
below I will argue that the concept is suitable to theorise the migration phenomenon in 
focus. Generation Erasmus, having internalised the rhetoric of flexibility, mobility and 
myriad opportunities, perceive the Asian destination countries as another potential place 
to work and live, though more challenging to enter than the EU. As I will show in the 
next chapters, despite struggles to obtain a visa or to be recognised as a professional, 
they often find ways to overcome such barriers and if not, they move to another Asian 
(and sometimes altogether different) country. Generation Erasmus rationalise along a 
neoliberal, self-governing logic in order to manoeuvre the foreign labour markets and 
immigration regimes. This, importantly, is contingent upon their cultural and symbolic 
capital which directs the discussion towards Asia. In the following section, I review 
influential work on Westerners, Europeans, and explicitly white people in Asia and 
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discern arguments that might be useful for understanding or might be challenged by the 
young Europeans’ presence in Singapore and Tokyo.  
 
2.2. European Migration to Asia 
What does Europeanness mean in Asia? With this question, I do not imply that all 
Europeans define themselves over their regional rather than national or local or any 
other identity. However, there is a dominant notion of Westerners and Europeans in Asia 
as well as a persisting orientalising discourse of Asians in Europe and the U.S. (Said 
1978; Yu 2001). Without these we cannot understand Generation Erasmus’ migration to 
Asian cities. No matter how the young Europeans think of Asia, Asians and their own 
positioning in Asia subjectively, the major discourse of Asia among Europeans in Asia 
as well as Asians’ dominant views of Europeans will undeniably leave their mark on the 
migrants. To unpack the meaning and origins of such discourse, one has to turn to 
history.  
 
2.2.1 Colonial Legacies: Behind the Expatriate Label  
European presence in Asia took on different forms but two issues stand out. These are 
colonialism and in relation to it the notion of whiteness. Colonialism, imperialism and 
white supremacy have shaped modernity to such an extent that until today power 
relations and racial tensions determine our everyday lives. Whiteness, in the past as 
today, functions as an “invisible knapsack” (McIntosh 1989). It is deeply imbedded in 
the institutional structures which organize everyday life and confers unearned power, 
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authority, and respectability to its bearers. Many whites do not acknowledge this, others 
reject and challenge the privileges of whiteness. More often than not white people avoid 
the issues of race for which both multiculturalism and neoliberalism have provided 
them with a convenient ‘liberal’ narrative. 8  Critical whiteness studies attempt to 
deconstruct the colour-blindness of whiteness but in doing so have they been accused of 
reproducing the very-same distinctions (Chen 2017; Satzewich and Liodakis 2010).  
Race, here mainly addressed in relation to white race, affects people’s experiences 
depending on the social context differently (Proudford and Nkomo 2006; Fechter 2016; 
Leonard 2010). Whiteness continues to be associated with power in Asian societies, but 
its significance and influence have altered and diversified, especially since the dawn of 
globalisation. Europeans in Asia, then, constituted a prototypical example of (white) 
colonialists.  
India was under the British crown, as were tiny but strategically important centres 
of trade and infrastructure in the region, among them Singapore. The bulk of Southeast 
Asia was divided between Dutch, Spanish and French (and later US and to a very 
limited extent German and Portuguese) supremacy. Japan was the rising Asian power in 
the region and for a long time the only one (excluding Thailand which, though not 
officially colonized, was regarded as neutral territory by the British) to defy Western 
colonial power. In 1853 however, the “black ships” and with them US landing in Japan 
ended Japanese hegemony on the continent (Krieger 2003).  
                                                             
8
Scholars have argued that multiculturalism has encouraged avoidance rather than acknowledgement of 
white privilege and racial inequality. Platt (1992) for instance argued that multiculturalism conceptualises 
race as universal and thus does not allow for a racial analysis of structural inequality. Neoliberalism, for 
its part, blames failure on the individual and has been used as an argument to downplay or negate the 
persistence of structural (racial) inequality (Robbins 2009). 
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Over the Meiji period and the early twentieth century, Japan adopted a complex, 
ambiguous position towards the West and white people. Ching (2006) and Iida (1997) 
have discussed how Japan in the process of modernisation attempted to distinguish itself 
from an ‘inferior’ Asia while at the same time perceiving itself as inferior in relation to 
Western hegemonic powers. As a result, an ambivalent Japanese identity emerged. In 
the post-war decades, surveys found that Westerners are the preferred foreign ethnicity 
in Japan. Nevertheless, according to a survey cited by Debnár (2016), Japanese citizens, 
asked to hierarchically classify themselves in comparison to other ethnicities, more 
often than not feel superior rather than inferior when they compare themselves to 
Westerners. 
In Singapore and other postcolonial Southeast Asian states, Europeans and white 
people occupied the top of the social hierarchy for a long time. At the same time, and 
similar to Japan, whites were also seen as non-citizens. This is despite the fact that 
Europeans have constituted a significant minority among the category “Other” among 
Singaporean citizens in the second half of the 20
th
 century. While in colonial Singapore 
whiteness had primarily signalled political power and a temporary sojourn in the 
country for administrative duties, in post-colonial Singapore white people appeared in 
forms of corporate managers, again mostly on a temporary basis. Their presence thus 
did not break the continuity of privilege and power: The business elite replaced the 
colonialists and reproduced their forebears’ lives by settling in segregated, luxurious 
expatriate communities (e.g. Meier 2006; Beaverstock 2011).  
It is necessary to look at the term “expatriate” here more closely. An expatriate is 
understood as an employee on a home-country contract who is sent abroad for a 
previously determined period of time on a corporate assignment. The contract usually 
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specifies re-integration into the parent company after his or her return. Highly paid and 
receiving all kinds of benefits, expatriates are often associated with an elite or privileged 
status (e.g. Andresen, Bergdolt and Margenfeldt 2013; Colic-Peiscer 2010). Scholars 
find that the limited duration of the assignment, usually 2 - 3 years, discourages many 
expatriates to invest time into studying the host country language or socialising with 
locals (Peltokorpi and Froese 2011; Whitehill 1991; Ford and Honeycutt 1992).  
Examining the geographical direction of expatriate assignments foregrounds 
postcolonial legacies. Cohen (1977:77) claimed that “expatriates in the post-colonial 
world are less and less merely private persons abroad […] Their organisational 
attachments are a major influence on their behaviour, and on their ecological, 
institutional and social accommodation abroad.” More recent studies confirm this (e.g. 
Findlay et al 1996; Beaverstock 2005). Beaverstock (2002; 2011) illustrates in his 
research on British expatriates in Singapore that expatriate managers mostly socialise 
with the host-country’s international expatriate community where they can 
communicate in English and share similar living conditions.  
In sum, scholars illustrate how an affluent lifestyle, concerns over status, 
networking opportunities and a similar cultural background allow and induce 
expatriates to socialise in international communities of similar living standard. This 
lifestyle shelters them from many hardships other foreigners encounter and therefore 
enables them to fully concentrate on their job. At the same time, it denies deeper 
involvement with the host society (e.g. ibid; Yeoh and Khoo 1998; Yeoh and Willis 
2005; Lundström 2014; Meier 2006; Fechter and Walsh 2010; Cohen 1977; Peltokorpi 
and Froese 2009). 
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The brief outline on expatriates demonstrates that they differ substantially from 
the subjects of this study. Generation Erasmus do not have elite status, financial benefits 
and are not on a definite assignment abroad on a home-country contract. More 
importantly, however, the label “expatriate” is not neutral and more than “post-colonial”, 
it is racially imbued. A special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
(2010) engages with expatriates’ postcolonial identities in cities like Dubai and Hong 
Kong. Coles and Walsh (2010) for instance argue that religious differences between the 
Emirati locals in Dubai and British expatriates act as a barrier for socialising, especially 
after 9/11 and Britain’s recent immigration history. Leonard (2010) attributes the 
societal divisions to the interlinkages of race and colonialism rather than religion. In her 
study on Caucasian Westerners in Hong Kong she concisely supposes that “all white 
expatriates are to some extent positioned by the legacy of empire” (ibid:1260).  
Such studies point to the underlying association of “expatriate” with “white” and 
“Western.” They confirm the segregation of Western (and white) expatriate communities 
and demonstrate that even in the 21
st
 century race still matters. Importantly, segregation 
and alienation are two-way processes. Research on Westerners in Asia confirm this. In 
expatriate studies, given the business perspective, the notion of knowledge transfer is 
inherent. What Said (1978) coined Orientalism almost half a century ago is still very 
much relevant to the contemporary Western perception of Asia and Asians. Western 
expatriates use the rhetoric of Asia as a late developing region and thus the need to 
implement business development top-down. Similar notions also surface in expatriates’ 
accounts on their interactions with and notions of Asians. They portray Asian societies 
as more traditional, exotic, sometimes religious than what they see as the opposite, their 
Western background and its roots in Enlightenment, democracy and individualism (e.g. 
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Lundström 2014). This can lead to both, a hegemonic attitude as well as one of 
admiration and fascination. In either case, such orientalist discourse leads to an othering 
and the construction of boundaries that prove hard to overcome.  
Al Ariss (2013) seizes the problem of terminology. He critiques the binary 
distinction between the somehow elite and racialised term “expatriate” and the 
stigmatised term “migrant.” Andresen et al. (2013) add insights from an international 
business perspective, a field that has often enough dissociated its focus phenomenon 
expatriates from the more sociological and political term migrants. The authors 
investigate the underlying assumptions that have led to the black-and-white distinction 
between the two. They find that among the more tangible criteria of distinction are the 
question of citizenship of the host country, the motivation for relocation and the 
disciplinary perspective. The authors identify the concept of expatriation as looking at 
the crossing of borders in an organisational context, whereas the concept of migration 
focuses on the more general context of crossing geographical borders. Therefore, the 
former is mainly studied by economists and scholars of international human resource 
management, targeting highly educated people who are sent abroad as managers or 
specialists by their companies (Findlay et al. 1996). In contrast, migration research is 
often equalled to studying less educated or poor people who see the need to relocate 
rather than the opportunity to choose (Andresen et al. 2013).  
 
2.2.2 Intersectional Approaches to Western Migrants in Asia 
The literature on Westerners’ presence in postcolonial Asia underlines the need to 
carefully reflect on the different terms and to question the uncritical adoption of the 
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label “expatriate” in order not to fall into slippages that mark racial, cultural or class-
based notions of demarcation.  Despite such calls the association of white people abroad 
with the term “expatriates” and non-whites abroad with the label “migrants” sticks. 
Even in non-postcolonial contexts, whites have “odd feeling[s]” when they are labelled 
migrants (Lundström 2014:149).  
It is therefore welcoming to see recent studies on Europeans or Westerners in Asia 
referring to their subjects as “migrants” (e.g. Collins 2016; Lan 2011; Tzeng 2010). 
Globalisation has changed movements in the context of both home and host country and 
scholars recognise a more heterogeneous group of moving subjects from Western 
countries to Asia. Also, the image of foreign business people has changed in Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Chinese first tier cities in recent years. With policies to welcome 
‘global talent’ (Goh 2009), Singapore has attracted a more diverse group of foreign 
professionals with a rising share of ethnic Asians. Moreover, China’s rapidly growing 
influence on world business and Singapore’s close ties to the People’s Republic of 
China have unsettled white people’s undisputed status in these Asian countries (e.g. Ye 
and Kelly 2011; Farrer 2018).  
In this respect, research on the intersections of gender, sexuality, race and class are 
significant for their attempt to explain how such complexities have caused dominance to 
endure (Twine and Gallagher 2008; Leek and Kimmel 2015). Several qualitative studies 
highlight the continuity of racial privilege but also, disputing the very same, its loss and 
contestation. Farrer (2011) for example argues the continuing dominance of global 
whiteness by his study of “ethnosexual encounters” between whites, Chinese Americans 
and Chinese in Shanghai nightclubs. He finds a competition between racialised 
masculinities, where white men’s “economic and national status” (Farrer 2011:756) 
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grants them popularity with local women. And yet, only a minority of women are 
attracted to white men. Those who can afford the exclusive VIP areas in Chinese clubs 
and enjoy the highest status are the newly rich young Chinese men. This is a powerful 
account of the local implications of a changing global power balance.  
Debn r (2015a; 2015b; 2016) offers another. His examination of non-managerial 
white Europeans in Japan points to a loss of privilege. Many white migrants end up in 
precarious or unpromising careers. Only a few “immigrant niches” such as teaching 
English – a low-status, unstable and decreasingly well-paid occupation – offer relatively 
easy access to jobs, a finding that positions the white migrants on a similar level as 
other immigrant groups. While Debn r is clear about these Europeans’ positive 
discrimination in many non-occupational aspects of life, he also problematises such a 
questionable privilege. Some of the migrants want to settle in Japan but their continued 
Othering by Japanese society nourishes disappointment and ambivalence.  
More complex even is white women’s position in Asia (Fechter 2016; Lundström 
2014; Leonard 2010; Napier and Taylor 2002). Studying Euro-American women in 
Indonesia, Fechter (2016) portrays these women’s ambiguous empowerment: They 
enjoy a certain status as well-paid corporate employees but their femininity is 
challenged by a perceived reduced sexual desirability among their male foreign 
counterparts. The author claims that orientalist discourses “feminise both Asian men and 
women” (Fechter 2016:69) and at the same time cast masculine qualities on these 
Western women in Indonesia.
9
 Similar arguments have been put forward by Lan (2011) 
on Taiwan and Kelsky (2001) on Japanese women and white men.  
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 See also Cheng (1999) on a discussion of “Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity.” 
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Here, Lundström’s (2014) comparative study of Swedish women in Spain, the US 
and Singapore is illuminating. The women’s whiteness is contextual and situational with 
different meanings in each country. While the women are upper-class in both the US 
and Singapore, and in the latter case live in typical affluent expatriate communities, 
whiteness is not hegemonic in Singapore. Lundström strikingly illustrates how the 
Swedish do not represent normative whiteness in this Southeast Asian context, as this 
status is reserved to Eurasians (ibid:120). White Swedish women, on the contrary, are 
“deviant” (ibid:116) and do not consider themselves beautiful or attractive, a finding 
that echoes Lan’s (2011) and Fechter’s (2016) arguments.  
From a slightly different view but with insights of high value in terms of the 
migrant group in focus, Knowles (2015) portrays young British migrants who swap 
London with Beijing. These youth, displaced by dim job opportunities and incremental 
living costs in London forge their way to unstable, less comfortable but temporarily 
more satisfying lives in the idealised hutongs, the residential area of Beijing’s old and 
narrow back streets. Here, too, the postcolonial still matters. Migrants’ narratives are 
full of orientalist imaginations: the hutongs as nostalgic symbols of Chinese tradition 
and culture and the old way of life. Whiteness is a subjective as well as objective 
marker which entails that they live “beside rather than in [the Chinese community]” 
(ibid:10). However, these highly educated but very young group of independent 
migrants are insecure and anxious and have to navigate border controls as other 
migrants do. This stands in contrast to the “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair 2001) 
who is often thought of as white and privileged. It rather supposes, in line with the idea 
of this dissertation, that the new European generation of a globalised world emigrates 
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from a very different situation and maybe with points of view quite different from their 
forebears.  
With reference to such recent contributions from migration studies, I decided to 
adopt the inclusive term migrants for the subjects of this dissertation. I do however use 
the term (young) Europeans interchangeably since I argue that they represent a group 
which, although internally diverse, can be conceptualised along a few common 
parameters. Race, though most of my informants are in fact Caucasian, is not part of 
these determinants nor was it a requirement for recruitment.  
In focus of this dissertation are rather migrants’ upbringing and socialisation as 
middle-class EU millennials, as outlined above and explained in more detail in chapter 
four. Before graduation from university, the young adults either experienced mobility 
themselves or internalised it as something normative. This shapes their rationale when 
they weigh their options on the enlarged EU labour market. 
Undeniably, none of the available terms can be employed neutrally. My reasoning 
for the use of the term migrants is the baseline distinction of them crossing national (and 
other) borders – primarily for work, not leisure - as opposed to those who do not. This is 
what drew my attention to them as a migrant group. On the contrary, I did not set out to 
study a postcolonial phenomenon, or write a dissertation embedded in critical whiteness 
studies, which would have been a possible, yet different approach to this study. This is 
not to say I ignore or reject the significance of race or post-colonialism. As above 
literature shows, both concepts do matter, and using the literature review as a theoretical 
grounding scholarship helps me to analyse participants’ narratives. However, as I will 
argue in the last section of this chapter, my perspective, coming from a generational 
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migration phenomenon that is rooted in new forms of mobility, enables me to ask new 
questions and look at the social phenomenon at stake from a fresh perspective.  
On a second note, most of my informants did not mention either of the two terms 
expatriate or migrant. In Singapore, “expatriate” has become fairly common among 
‘skilled’ visa holders, including non-Caucasians, and a few interviewees referred to 
themselves as such. More often, however, informants described their workplace and 
their reasons for living abroad rather than applying a distinct categorical term for 
themselves and their way of living. They seemed to avoid the two stigmatised terms 
expatriates and migrants. This avoidance, I suggest, is an important sign of their 
ambiguous feelings about labels and race and an issue I will return to throughout the 
dissertation. 
 
2.3 A Corrective to the Post-colonial Lens  
How do the two bodies of literature – atypical migration with its innovative 
conceptualisation of mobility as “worklife pathways” on the one hand and the changing 
notion of whiteness and the West in European migration patterns to Asia – contribute to 
this study? My thesis is that bringing together these different theoretical strands allows 
for a new perspective on the migration phenomenon at stake. Sooudi (2008:97) 
contends that Japanese lifestyle migrants’ “desire for salvation - from a mediocre life” 
brought them to New York. I suggest that individualisation theory and its derivative 
concept of the “chosen biography” (Beck 1994) can illuminate the mechanisms which 
produced an attitude towards actively shaping and altering one’s life path.  
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The demolition, critique and redefinition of many of the social institutions that 
defined and stabilised life in modernity has increased people’s reflexivity and awareness 
of new risks. It was individualisation and choice that came with reflexive modernity. 
Choice causes insecurity. Reflexive individuals are responsible for their actions 
regardless the outcome. Reflexive individuals, then, manage life like a project, 
including all consequences of success and failure (Beck 1992).  
In a neoliberal logic, such rhetoric has led to a constant search for the better, 
making efforts and sacrifices, a celebration of creativity, novelty, and flexibility. New 
attitudes not only towards managing oneself but also towards work have proliferated. 
Entrepreneurialism and start-ups are keywords, and new work styles such as remote 
work and the “boundaryless career” (Arthur 1994) feature prominently. In sum, the 
more self-initiative the better. It is not surprising then that one of the many outcomes of 
such “chosen biographies” (Beck 1994) – and one of the potential answers to (the need 
or attraction of) distinguishing oneself, improving one’s life, and constructing one’s own 
unique personal life project – is migration. Subsumed under the collective term 
“lifestyle migrants”, an impressive number of new studies has depicted middle-class, 
highly educated, often young movers. While they choose to migrate this is not merely 
out of leisure considerations or because they reject capitalism.   
A Eurocentric approach, using concepts developed within and for the situation in 
Europe or the West cannot adequately explain the situation in Asia. It risks, as Beck 
(2016) notes, to simply reproduce Western hegemonic ideas and to fall into 
methodological nationalist frames (or regionalist, for this matter). It is, however, 
important to acknowledge recent developments in Europe in order to understand the 
roots of the young Europeans’ migration to Asia. In chapter four, I elaborate on social, 
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economic and political changes as they were unfolding in the European Union along 
with this youth’s childhood and socialisation by European institutions. This approach 
enables me to link their upbringing to the motivations to move to Asia and to identify 
commonalities and variances within the group. 
While the West went through a time of questioning many of those values and 
institutions that had defined its leading role in the past, reflexive modernity took a 
different form in East Asia. From various angles authors studied features of 
“compressed modernity” in Southeast Asian and East Asian countries (Chang 2010). 
Chang and Song argue (2010) that individualisation took place without individualism in 
Korea. Zhang, Yeoh, and Ramdas (2017:7) depict neoliberal “self-fashioning” as a 
strategy and attitude of a flexible skilled workforce in Singapore and both Ong (2008) 
and Hoffmann (2008) demonstrate how highly educated Chinese’ reflexive practices of 
managing the professional self do not undermine but emerge along with socialist 
authoritarianism.  
Soysal (2015) suggests that a transnational perspective has the potential to unravel 
changing practices, social and political transformations in East Asian societies. She 
argues that it is necessary not to treat East and West as binary and as global and national 
respectively as it has been done all too often. In an edited volume, Soysal and 
colleagues unravel such transformations from a range of perspectives. For instance, 
Nakano (2015) demonstrates how women in East Asian cities contest some of the 
gendered and marital social norms. Specifically on migration, Skrentny and Lee 
(2015:131) claim that “East Asian states do not succeed in preserving some presumed 
ethnic homogeneity” (as in the case of Japan and South Korea), “nor does their 
particular mix of ethnicities remain unchallenged” (as in the case of Singapore and 
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Taiwan). As such, it is necessary to acknowledge “the individualization of life-course 
strategies” (Soysal 2015:9) as it takes place in both European and Asian countries as 
well as in the transnational spaces in-between.
10
 What do unfolding individualisation 
tendencies in the West but also their Asian equivalents tell us about new possible life 
projects? Liu-Farrer and Yeoh (2018:6) speak of a “flourishing of new patterns of 
migration” in the Asian context. Exercising mobility and independence, for instance in 
the course of a move to Asia, could open up new ways for managing the self. With the 
help of the comparative case of Singapore and Tokyo, this study will attempt to 
illuminate the context-dependent outcomes of such mobility.  
Beck (2016) suggests that an increasing number of those who are young and 
middle-class, which matches the Europeans of this dissertation, are more likely to be 
self-reflexive and adopt a “cosmopolitan vision,” because they face global risks such as 
poverty even though they are highly educated. Cosmopolitanism expresses an 
orientation of “willingness to engage with the Other” (Hannerz 1990:239), which 
involves plural others and therefore not just one specific alien idea or people. Vertovec 
and Cohen’s (2002:13) definition of cosmopolitanism as a practice which involves the 
“personal ability to make one’s way into other cultures, through listening, looking, 
intuiting and reflecting” (Vertovec and Cohen 2002:13) might be helpful to explain 
these European migrants’ dispositions. In Young, Diep and Drabble’s (2006:1688) 
words, a cosmopolitan can be thought of as someone with a “set of competences or 
skills based on an ability to engage with otherness.” This should however not detract 
from the alienation of the cosmopolitan experience. As Hannerz (1996) points out, 
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 While I use British English in this dissertation, many of the disciplinary terms are more commonly used 
in American English. When I quote directly, quotes are in the original spelling as used by the author. Thus, 
some inconsistencies may arise throughout the dissertation. Furthermore, Singapore and Japan differ in 
their use of American and British English and thus I adopted context-specific terms at times.  
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“there may be a feeling of detachment, perhaps irritation with those committed to the 
local common sense and unaware of its arbitrariness (ibid:110).” 
The young Europeans in focus here, being reflexive of global changes around the 
world, might feel pressure to distinguish themselves, to live up to the cosmopolitan, 
mobile, unique or creative ideal along which they have been raised and have received 
higher education. Asia, then, could be both a path to ‘glory’ and an escape, a way to 
differentiate oneself from the masses but also a way to escape others’ judgement, for 
instance concerning employment in the familiar European labour market and being an 
adult in contemporary Western societies. The young Europeans who migrate to Asia 
seem to fit into this discourse on individualisation and the “chosen” biography as they 
do on the neoliberal management of the self. How do they consider, imagine, plan and 
rationalise their mobility decisions and practices?  
At the point of raising such questions, one needs to recognise the context of the 
destination countries. After all, motivations and reasons for migratory decisions have 
their origin in a range of factors embedded in both the countries of origin and the 
destination countries, including economic factors, quality of life, but also images, 
cultural appeals, and the like (e.g. Fujita 2009; Knowles 2015; Nagatomo 2014).  
Given European powers’ imperialist endeavours, the colonial history and artificial 
distinctions of East and West in an orientalist fashion, it is clear that postcolonial history 
does matter. Europeans, in their geographical mobility to Asia, enter a realm where 
postcolonial power structures persist and where their nationality, ethnicity, race and 
class matter in different ways than they do in Europe. As I discussed above, authors 
have rightly addressed the varying meanings and enactments of whiteness in 
postcolonial settings. Such research has contributed insights of tremendous value to our 
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understanding of the production and perpetuation of inequalities as well as 
circumstances in which race is contested by contextual and situational intersections with 
other social categories. 
This unravels the complexity of the power structures these young Europeans enter 
in the Asian global cities. While they hold Western passports and most of them are white, 
two critical components of (historically) conferred status, power and privilege, they are 
also young, inexperienced in the job, and have limited social and economic capital. 
How do these complexities play out in the migratory decision making, the process of 
moving and settling in, but also over time as migrants in the host society? I hold the 
point that in the light of reflexive modernity and the need to “choose” and “manage the 
self”, a mobility perspective, operationalised by the “worklife pathway” concept, helps 
to understand the empirical phenomenon I observed. 
To put it differently, while I recognise race and inherent power structures, I do not 
adopt a racial lens to analyse my data. A number of insightful studies have done so and I 
do not wish to pose the same questions and again to provide a similar discussion (e.g. 
Fechter 2016; Lundström 2014; Lan 2011; Leonard 2010; Tzeng 2010). Nor do I ignore 
the significance of the context, Asian global cities, or study this group with the 
hegemonic claim to apply theories developed in or for Europe in the ‘periphery’ as it is 
all too often done (Calhoun 2010). Rather, I follow Beck who postulates that to research 
the global we have to adopt an approach of “reflexive cosmopolitanization” (2016:260). 
A cosmopolitan sociology, then, attends to the risks in contemporary societies across the 
globe without denying or overlooking the differences between (East) Asian and 
European risk society.  
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What does this mean for young Europeans’ migration to Asia in the realm of the 
social, cultural, political and economic transformations in both Europe and Asia in 21
st
 
century? Over the course of the following chapters, I suggest that the distinctive 
characteristics of the particular group have led these youth to adopt mobility as a tool, 
and increasingly as part of their identity, to respond to and navigate life in reflexive 
modernity. Asia, and its global cities in particular, constitute the place where realising 
oneself, one’s life project, seems possible. They offer the labour market conditions, 
living standard, and socio-cultural contexts to distinguish oneself. At the same time Asia 
allows these youth to be different but does so without the need to exit from a career and 
the ideals of their middle-class upbringing and higher education.  
Once migrants have started to put down roots, to build networks and to work on 
their career, the complexities of this mobility appear. Their expectations and goals, their 
professional and cosmopolitan aspirations and their national, ethnic, racial, class and 
gender identities clash and again, the perspective through which to understand their 
practices and strategies is one of mobility. In the following chapter I introduce the 
research design of this dissertation and explain how I operationalise the mobility 
perspective with its grounding in “worklife pathways” and the project of the self. 
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3. Methodology  
3.1 Research Design: The Multi-sited Ethnography  
In this subchapter, I explain my focus on Asia and, within it, on the global cities 
Singapore and Tokyo. While I postulate that the migration flows depicted in this study 
might be part of a larger phenomenon of a generational migration trend in the 21
st
 
century, the geographical component – Asia from the perspective of European migrants 
– and the particularities of the two destinations are necessary for the understanding of 
the phenomenon in focus. Recent literature on skilled migration in Europe and from 
Europe to Asia illustrates the emergence of unconventional migration flows to the Asian 
continent. Yet, it also demonstrates how little we know about these flows, especially 
about the younger and independent movers.  
Furthermore, since most studies examine just a single location, they often 
generate the picture of a linear movement: Migration from one country to one other 
country, with the outcome of either settlement or, supposedly more typical for the case 
of skilled Europeans, return to their home country. The asset of choosing two migration 
destinations, and taking into account the movement to, from and between these and 
other (Asian) destinations, enables us to understand the phenomenon as a more complex 
and less straight-forward, or singular, form of movement. The multi-method 
ethnographic approach of this study enabled me to map movement patterns including 
certain directions of movement, among them intra-Asian inter-city mobilities.  
The question remains why Asia, and why Singapore and Tokyo. Chapter four 
provides an in-depth analysis of Europeans’ imaginations of, touchpoint to and eventual 
motivation for moving to Asia. Here, it suffices to point to a shared European 
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perspective among the migrants. The destinations appeal to the young Europeans in a 
similar way. Those cities’ attractiveness, as I show below, lies in the images of an 
‘exotic’ far-away continent and, at the same time, favourable conditions for migration. 
Singapore and Tokyo might well represent other aspiring global Asian cities which form 
part of the net that spans Asia and links them to other nodes around the globe. Other 
qualitative studies and my data illustrate the flow of Europeans to not only Singapore 
and Tokyo but also other centres in Asia and beyond. Shanghai and Hong Kong are 
often mentioned in the same context, but Dubai, Taipei and Beijing are among the other 
destinations that have received a temporary influx of young, highly educated but 
independently-moving European migrants (e.g. Lan 2011; Knowles 2015; Leonard 
2010; Tzeng 2010; Stanley 2013; Collins 2016).  
I suggest that a comparative research design can best reveal the process of 
Europeans’ physical mobility across Asia. Furthermore, this approach allows to identify 
common patterns and links between the destination cities. Firstly, images of places 
(Urry and Larsen 2011) are salient when it comes to potential migrants’ destinations. 
Later, (un)met expectations in the new host country inform migrants’ plans and 
influence their long-term trajectories. At that time, the bonds migrants develop to people 
and places and networks and established routes between these places again affect their 
decisions and plans towards future mobility. Last but most important, the comparison 
highlights the significance of place and by this the problems Japan as an ‘immigrant 
country’ in the making faces with incorporating skilled migrants in its labour market.  
The mobility perspective thus enables the researcher to discern variances among 
the Europeans. Different localities appeal to the young migrants in different ways. The 
approach captures the generational migration phenomenon as part of broader social 
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processes, that is, as a phenomenon of young Europeans’ individualisation in the 
increasingly precarious post-Lehman shock era. As the cases of Singapore and Tokyo 
reveal, individualisation and the quest for more rewarding life paths becomes possible 
for everyone in different socio-cultural and economic contexts. The methodological 
choice thus directs the focus of the study: The dissertation does not concentrate on 
migrants’ integration in the host society but aims at understanding a phenomenon that is 
difficult to grasp because it cannot be situated in one migration destination only. Neither 
is it enough to only look at the linkages between country of origin and country of 
destination. Rather, we can understand Asia through the role it plays in these Europeans’ 
eyes: as a continent geographically and culturally distant from their origins, and thus, as 
counterpart to ‘familiar’ Europe (see chapter four).  
Singapore and Tokyo represent almost two opposite poles in terms of composition 
of society and immigration history. Singapore is a young immigrant country which 
recognises four major ethnic groups and presents itself as multicultural, multiracial, 
multilingual and multi-religious. Immigration is intertwined with the city-state’s history 
and given its lack of natural resources labour migration is one of the main pillars of the 
national economy (Velayutham 2007). Since its independence from Britain, the country 
has struggled to define its nation and create a national identity. People, including my 
informants, often call Singapore a city-state, a term which underlines the tiny state’s 
standing in the world. At the same time, however, it contributes to the image of 
Singapore as an attractive cosmopolitan city, particularly in comparison to Japan, which 
has a stronger national character. Tokyo is the capital of Japan, rich in history, and Japan, 
a country that has for long denied – and still denies – immigration (Roberts 2018). 
Japan has often claimed homogeneity of its population. Furthermore, there is its 200-
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year history of seclusion from other countries as well as its pride of being the first 
developed country in Asia and the only Eastern power until recently. This fostered a 
strong national consciousness but also difficulties with dealing with anything “foreign” 
(e.g. Iida 1997; Ching 2007).  
Despite these differences, Singapore and Tokyo have something in common if we 
look at the two cities from an outsider, particularly form a European perspective. In 
brief and elaborated in chapter four, Europe has a history of othering Asia in both 
negative and positive terms. The European civilisation traces its roots to the Greek and 
Roman empires and later developed a narrative of Enlightenment and democratic values. 
Imperialism and colonialism stabilised European domination. With the horrors of the 
World Wars in the back of their minds, post-war European leaders advocated 
Europeanisation and human rights but the Eurocentric perspective, especially on the 
periphery, has stuck. 
One of the keywords in this discourse - positively coined but not unquestionable - 
is exoticism. Exotic Asia, like different, unfamiliar and unknown Asia, has always 
attracted Europe and Europeans like a magnet. Singapore is tropical and multicultural 
and Tokyo allegedly more homogeneous but both are often portrayed as inherently 
different from Europe (Said 1978; Barthes 1983; Clifford 1997; Werbner and Modood 
1997). Arguably, Singapore and Japan adopted European institutional models and use of 
European languages in various spheres of life.
11
 However, this has neither led to 
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 Singapore, as a former British colony, has adopted numerous British bureaucratic structures as well as 
English as one of its four official languages (e.g. Turnbull 2009; Velayutham 2007). Japan has drawn 
from Western civilisation for its own modernisation (Iida 1997). Examples range from its first modern 
constitution, medicine and military as well as the high arts, especially classical music (e.g. Jansen 2000; 
Beasley 1995).   
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replacing their own official language by European languages nor have they 
predominantly adopted European religions or value systems.  
In the aim of nation building, Singaporean and Japanese statesmen have sought to 
differentiate themselves from Western countries and stressed their “Asian” or 
“Confucian” roots.12 As a matter of fact, traditions, religion, familial relationships and 
the like are practiced quite differently than in Western (Christian) civilisation. From a 
European perspective, then, Singaporean and Japanese social and cultural everyday life 
appear to be ‘unfamiliar.’ Asia as a construct of ‘traditional’ versus ‘sophisticated’, 
which is particular prominent in Europe’s image of Japan, attracts Europeans’ attention 
even nowadays. 
What makes cities like Singapore and Tokyo stand out then is what Europeans 
consider to be an intriguing contradiction. In Eurocentric eyes, the cities’ features of the 
supposedly ‘traditional’ Other co-exist with an (often referred to as Western) capitalist 
system, sophisticated labour market, strong economy, cutting-edge institutions, 
technology and infrastructure, and architecture, subcultures and arts projects that from a 
European perspective look futuristic or peculiar (e.g. Barthes 1983; Iwabuchi 2002; 
Chang 2000). While we need to question the cause of such othering, the continuance of 
the orientalising discourse among highly educated, European millennials requires to 
analyse how such preconceptions affect their lives in Asia.  
From an economic point of view, cities like Singapore and Tokyo appeal with 
their strong economies. Drawing from both official statistics on competitiveness, 
regional significance and living standard, Tokyo, followed by Hong Kong and 
Singapore, are frequently mentioned as the leading Asian cities (Poreisz and Ramhap 
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 For a discussion on Asian values and the capitalist development in Singapore see Wee (2007). On Japan 
and its position within Asia and vis-à-vis the West, see Ching (2006).  
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2014:6; Sassen 1991). While Tokyo and Hong Kong are referred to as the traditional 
economic centres in Asia, Singapore has more recently gained attention as an emerging 
financial and global hub (Poreisz and Ramhap 2014:13).  
Despite its newcomer image, Singapore, next to South Korea, is the only Asian 
country that has a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in place and there are 
more than 11,000 European companies in Singapore (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Singapore 2016). Recently, the European Union established one of its Enterprise Europe 
Networks (EEN) in Singapore which declares its aim to “promote and assist businesses, 
technology and research and development partnerships between Singapore and 
European companies” (Enterprise Europe Network Singapore 2016). While expanding 
its services to several Asian cities, the EEN does not have an office in Hong Kong. 
Moreover, concerns over Hong Kong’s growing dependence on mainland China and its 
socio-political stability have become louder (Financial Times 2017), whereas Singapore 
is regarded as a politically neutral – and thus more reliable – gateway to Asia (ibid; 
Tang and Bache 2015).  
Another aspect to consider is Singapore’s and Tokyo’s widely praised quality of 
life. Both cities have significantly less pollution and more green spaces than most other 
financial hubs, especially rising Chinese cities, as well as Hong Kong (e.g. ibid; Poreisz 
and Ramhap 2014; Hu and Zhou 2013). These are important factors for prospective 
migrants, and as my data analysis shows, young Europeans put high emphasis on 
environmental and health issues in their migratory decisions. Thus, while Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Tokyo are, followed by others, the attractive cities in terms of economic 
performance and centrality in the region, many Europeans might consider Singapore, 
similar to Tokyo, as one of the most appealing destinations in terms of lifestyle, safety, 
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political stability and, in the light of expansion of interregional trade, employment 
opportunities.  
Finally, Singapore and Tokyo are always listed among the top in rankings on 
‘Global City Competitiveness’. Typical indicators for their competitiveness are 
economic strength, human capital, institutional effectiveness, financial maturity, global 
appeal, physical capital, social and cultural character and environment and natural 
hazards (Florida 2012; Hu, Blakely, and Zhou 2013). In sum, these aspects render the 
two cities suitable and accessible cases to study European skilled migration to Asia – 
despite Asian ‘global cities’’ internal differences and the two cities marking opposite 
poles – under the overarching frame of a regionally defined migratory phenomenon.  
 
3.2 Methods Application: Field Work and Analysis 
My methodological and theoretical approach to this study was informed by grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Grounded theory was first proposed by Glaser and 
Strauss in 1967 with the aim to overcome preconceptions and construct theory by a 
constant conversation with data. I am referring to grounded theory here in the way I 
approached the field and organized data collection alongside analysis. As outlined by 
later developments and refinements of Glaser’s and Strauss’ original work, this cyclical 
method of data gathering, coding, integration and re-current periods of field work 
allows the researcher to develop her own theory which is firmly grounded in the 
original data (Weiss 1994; Marvasti 2004; Strauss 1987). As such, it helps to avoid the 
hasty adoption of grand theories without their proper fit or at the cost of failing to 
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integrate new concepts that could potentially develop the theoretical understanding of 
the phenomenon at stake (Strauss 1987:13-14).  
Grounded theory thus encourages researchers to be creative and consider bold 
angles to a topic that might have become deadlocked by one dominant, and possibly 
limiting, theoretical focus. Given the fact that theory is developed in the research 
process rather than issuing the initial hypotheses, grounded theory is sometimes 
misunderstood and charged with a lack of structure and thus questionable explanatory 
power (Strauss 1987:8). It is therefore important to stress the solid framework that 
guided the data collection, analysis and writing process.  
I entered the field with my observation that there existed a migratory phenomenon 
of young Europeans in Asian cities that has barely been documented. I was inspired by 
Sooudi’s (2014) ethnographic approach. The author embedded her ethnographic field 
work with the larger frame of Japanese modernity, which enabled her to uncover step-
by-step how Japanese lifestyle migrants’ in New York follow cultural logics that need to 
be understood within Japanese nation-building processes.  
In the case of the Europeans in Asia, the fact that the migrants in focus of my 
study were young and worked on local contracts in the Asian host societies led me to 
assume that they might have very different motivations to migrate and probably 
different (work) migratory experiences than their senior counterparts, the Western (and 
among them European) business expatriates and diplomates who up till then dominated 
the research on Westerners in Asia. This assumption guided my early field work and 
raised a broad range of questions. While being aware of the potential significance of 
“traditional variable[s] such as age, sex, class, race” (Strauss 1987:32) for European 
emigration the grounded approach allowed me to stay open for other less obvious 
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variables. Over time this method bore fruits as the continued data collection, follow-ups 
and multi-sited ethnographic observations enabled me to generate the thesis of a new 
trend of millennial labour mobility. 
In fact, the data brought to the fore the significance of mobility which I had 
initially not considered, probably because it had not been used in the study of Western 
migration to Asia. From earlier studies on Westerners in Asia, which broadly followed a 
postcolonial approach, I expected to find issues of settlement, return or lifestyle 
migration as a causal explanation of these Europeans’ postcolonial identity formation in 
Asia. However, my ongoing field work and simultaneous analysis pointed to the role 
which mobility started to play along migrants’ evolving pathways abroad. More than 
that, the data did not negate obvious issues like race, ethnicity and gender. I rather agree 
with Wimmer (2009:244) to treat these variables as “explanandum, as a variable 
outcome of specific processes to be analytically uncovered and empirically specified.” 
This enabled me to identify, over the course of recurrent data acquisition, open coding 
and later theoretical coding, another missing link in understanding these migrants’ 
dispositions: the key concept of the millennial generation.  
My main method were qualitative, semi-structured interviews. In contrast to the 
statistical value of data gained by quantitative methods, qualitative interviews allow the 
researcher to obtain information of more “depth” and “density” (Weiss 1994:3). This is 
a strong method if one wants to analyse data for the meaning of people’s practices and 
rationales and enables us to better understand processes. I adopted a life history 
approach in order to allow for rich accounts and gain a detailed insight on informants’ 
backgrounds, their experiences and changing life plans. Hence, I asked interviewees to 
briefly describe their upbringing, their household and education and to later become 
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more specific about their study choices and earlier mobility experiences. I then turned to 
issues of migratory decision making, the process of moving and settling in and the work 
experience as well as life in general in the host society. After the first interviews I had 
an idea of several major issues which I sorted and coded with the help of the qualitative 
software programme NVIVO 11.  
With these concepts in mind I re-entered the field and found that newly acquired 
data pointed to the need of more selective codes. In a sequential process each finding 
and concept added on and helped to determine the next steps. I added questions, probed 
on the meanings behind fleetingly mentioned comments and labels and arrived at higher 
level concepts which allowed for theoretical sampling (Corbin and Strauss 2008:57). 
This dynamic research method turned into a cyclical process and brought to light 
complex causation and threads between concepts which a theoretically informed or 
linear approach is unlikely to generate (ibid; Weiss 1994).  
The issues of gender and race are suitable to demonstrate the utility of such 
cyclical approach. As the literature review in chapter two demonstrated, European 
migration to Asia is overwhelmingly framed as “white migration”, and more often as 
male than female migration. Lundström’s (2014) study of whiteness in Swedish 
women’s migration or Debnár’s (2015a; 2016) research on whiteness and 
cosmopolitanism of Europeans in Japan are recent examples of innovative approaches 
to deconstruct the stereotypical image of Europeans in Asia.  
Lundström (2014), in her comparison of three field sites U.S., Singapore and 
Spain, is deeply interested in how whiteness is contextually perpetuated, transformed or 
contested. The comparative angle allows to offset the simplistic argument of whiteness 
as privilege and offers a more nuanced understanding of its changing meanings 
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depending on the varying socio-cultural, historical and class factors in each country. 
However, as Lundström (2014: 2) approached the field with the objective to study “how 
extensions of whiteness are played out in Swedish transnational migration”, she does 
not allow for other potential interpretations of these women migrants’ experiences and 
reflexivity. Had I chosen to design my study along this more common line of 
postcolonialism and race, I would most likely not have noted the identity-shaping role 
of mobility for the European millennial generation.  
Debnár (2014), on the other hand, starting out from an inductive approach, is 
conscious of whiteness but also migrants’ middling position affecting their experiences 
in Japan. Interested in Europeans’ integration in the host country, his diversion from his 
initial method and his move to an exponential discriminatory-sampling strategy enabled 
him to reject whiteness as a universal category. In fact, migrants’ experiences partly 
diverge depending on for instance gender or the European region they originate from. 
As such, his methodological choice allowed for a more informed analysis of integration-
related aspects.   
My objective for this dissertation is somewhat different from that of the two cited 
studies. It is neither a theoretically driven study of whiteness in contemporary contexts 
(see Lundström) nor one of a European ‘diaspora in Japan’ which includes Europeans 
across ages and generations but framed by one country context (see Debnár). Following 
my informants’ trajectories over a time of up to four years and across two field sites 
allowed me to contextualize and position the phenomenon as not migration per se – thus 
as linear or one-off event – but a mobility trend with multiple and diverse outcomes.  
As that, the chapters could be read separately and inform about specific issues in 
the migratory process such as the motivations for moving, the access to and mobility 
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within the labour market, and the social networks and bonding strategies. However, read 
in their entirety, I aim at establishing theoretical mini-theories at the end of each chapter 
(Corbin and Strauss 2008) which allow to link them to a coherent mobility theory. Each 
chapter thus serves as piece of a puzzle, or step towards constructing the complete 
picture of this novel migration pattern and is necessary for arriving at a more general 
conclusion. I postulate that what can be observed here is the social phenomenon of 
middle-class millennials’ – and specifically Generation Erasmus’ – mobile life projects, 
an attempt to construct a meaningful and successful life narrative in a globalised world.  
 
3.3 Positionality of the Researcher and Access to the Field  
As a Caucasian, European young woman of middle-class background my personal 
profile plays an important role in my research. I grew up and experienced first-hand 
encounters with Singapore and Tokyo similarly to my informants. On the basis of 
informants’ assumed mutual understanding of the conditions that shaped our shared 
context, conversations often evolved naturally. Furthermore, fluency in English among 
all of my informants considerably facilitated the research but also established an 
additional element of ease when interviews unfolded. Few of the participants, including 
myself, are native English speakers. However, European higher education and frequent 
travel within and beyond Europe renders English the undisputed world language and 
most European university graduates speak English on an intermediate level or above. 
Thus, speaking English to another non-native speaker, particularly someone from a 
shared European background, further helped me building rapport to my informants.  
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On the other hand, the similar background and (assumed) understanding might 
have impacted the subjectivity of the study, as my identity as perceived by the 
informants could have triggered certain topics to be raised at all or on the contrary only 
be implied, with the belief that sharing the same thoughts on the topic would render it 
unnecessary to voice them out. All narratives therefore have to be read with this notion 
in mind and should not be taken as complete, fully objective or representative (Weiss 
1994). 
Access to the people I sought to study was difficult in that they had moved 
independently. Company-assigned expatriates can more easily be found via expatriate 
clubs, as members of Chambers of Commerce or by contacting European multinationals 
in Asia (e.g. Findlay et al. 1996; Beaverstock 2011; Lundström 2014). However, the 
population I was interested in is more hidden, their existence in Asia less stable and 
seldom do they appear in any emigration statistics in their home countries (Nowok et al. 
2006).  
To find these people, I was inspired by Favell’s (2008a) research on the 
“Eurostars”, Europeans who move independently crisscross the free movement space of 
the EU. As Favell contends, “due to the temporary, often highly mobile modes of living 
across borders”, to study these people you “have to do it ethno-graphically, and you 
have to construct your population one by one (ibid:12-13 [ebook]).” Favell proceeds by 
first constructing a sampling frame at which he arrives from “using “subjective” on-the-
ground investigation, then match this to all the different, juxtaposed “objective” 
representations of the population available.” (ibid:12-13 [ebook]). Only then did he start 
interviewing, using a snowball method and later specifically sampling for those types of 
people who he could not access by his initial approach.   
  65 
In the case of non-expatriate Europeans in Asia, such “objective representations” 
are even harder to retrieve than in the case of the Eurostars. Thus, the roughly 80 people 
who were initially part of my research cannot be held representative of European 
millennials in Asia. After the first set of interviews, open coding and local integration, 
two key categories however started to emerge, that of the millennial generation and the 
significance of mobility. Moving on to theoretical sampling then allowed me to frame 
that sub-group of the European migrant population in major Asian cities whose story the 
dissertation would tell: independently moving European citizens in their early career 
stage. This led me to concentrate on 70 core informants (see appendices I and II) whose 
narratives capture the range and diversity within European millennials’ labour migration 
pattern to Asia in the 2010s.  
That said, I wish to caution against an essentialist reading of “Europeans.” As 
explained, this dissertation does not intend to simplistically represent Europeans as a 
homogeneous group or essentialise Europeans as a category of analysis. Rather, it 
attends to a generational group which is distinctive in its upbringing in the growing 
European Union. At the example of this heterogenous group, the study demonstrates 
how despite sometimes considerable differences in these young adults’ upbringing and 
domestic labour market situation, mobility emerges as a guiding narrative for 
constructing individual lifepaths. For some, it even becomes part of their identity.  
On ground of the above outlined objectives, I deliberately excluded a few groups 
of young Europeans in Asia. One firm criterion that I set up for this research is the 
frame of the European Union and participants to be millennials with EU citizenship. As 
such, when turning to these millennials in Asia, I did not include Europeans outside of 
the EU territory or outside of the European Economic Area. This method did not only 
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exclude Swiss citizens – whose numbers in Asia are supposedly very small – but also 
female Russian entertainers and Russian women married to Japanese men who 
constitute a considerable subgroup among the Europeans registered in Japan (Varvara 
2012). Given that Russia is a huge country which spans from East Europe to Central 
Asia, opinions differ if Russians should be counted as Europeans. For this study, 
however, the base criteria of them not having grown up with the freedom of movement 
in the gradually enlarging EU (or becoming EU citizens through their country’s 
accession to the EU later on) led me to exclude their case.  
A second group I did intentionally not include in this study are Europeans on 
spouse visa who are financially dependent on their spouse. This decision certainly 
excludes a range of people and needs to be seen as a limitation in terms of the 
significance of the sample. However, this project is interested in the meanings of 
European millennials’ labour migration to Asia and how the work experience affects 
their further occupational trajectories. I therefore defined full-time work as a 
requirement for recruiting informants expecting that full-time work and part time jobs 
or unemployment considerably affect people’s daily practices and strategies and future 
plans. As already mentioned, I followed a life course approach and acknowledged 
changes in people’s rationales and plans over different life stages. This meant that I 
eventually included a few informants who had initially worked full-time and had only 
recently moved to part-time or self-employment because of small children.  
Finally, I also decided to exclude academics from my sample. Scholars argue that 
mobility not only between institutions but often countries as well as the necessity to 
nurture an extra-organisational network are characteristics of the academic career 
(Richardson and McKenna 2002; Fries-Britt 2000, Welch 2007). I thus assumed that 
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academics’ migration motivations were somewhat different from the group of what I 
found were mostly employees in the private sector. In order to control this assumption, I 
conducted an interview with a British scholar during my first field trip to Singapore. His 
narrative confirmed that in his field and with regards to post-doctoral fellowships his 
current institute was one of the few options world-wide and his entire career up to this 
stage had been dependent on geographical mobility. In order to sharpen my focus and 
concentrate on a more coherent group of professionals in the private sector I ultimately 
excluded this academic from the core informant group.   
Qualitative research on a population that is hard to access often relies on a 
snowball sampling method. While snowballing is a proven method of reaching out to 
potential interviewees, it runs the risk of producing a highly biased picture due to its 
limitation to a very specific group of people (David and Sutton 2011). I thus ventured 
from multiple nodes into the field which meant that in all but two cases, the same 
gatekeeper introduced me to only one or two informants. I complemented this sampling 
method by approaching people at events which I visited with or without having any 
prior contacts. Such events included barbeque parties, dinners or home parties to which 
I was invited as well as official networking events in Singapore and job-hunting fairs, 
cultural festivals advertised in English (and thus directed at foreigners) and sports circle 
activities in Tokyo.  
During the fieldwork, I never hid my identity as a researcher but introduced 
myself as a doctoral student who was doing field work on European migrants. 
Sometimes, people were interested in my research and inquired further. In these cases, I 
would explain my research design in more detail and in no instance did anyone raise 
objections against my role as a researcher at the respective event. In the end, the 
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described multiple access points and qualitative methods enabled me to study a fairly 
heterogeneous group whose characteristics I outline in the last part of this chapter. 
 I conducted semi-structured interviews with a total of 79 informants but 
concentrate on the data obtained from 70 core interviewees in my analysis. As explained, 
with a sharpening focus on the main themes of the dissertation, some interviewees 
turned out not to fit the sample. For instance, I learned only during the interview that a 
few participants worked only on an internship contract without staying for full 
employment in Asia or to significantly divert from the generational group in terms of 
life stage. As to the latter, I interviewed a woman with middle-school aged children 
whose daily life revolved around quite different issues than the rest of the group which 
led me to finally exclude her from the core informants. Nevertheless, I understand her 
example, similar to that of the academic interviewee, as “deviant cases” (Silverman 
2005:132) which helped me to narrow down my sample and to develop the core issues 
of the dissertation. I stopped recruiting new informants when I reached theoretical 
saturation (Strauss 1987:31). As such, the number of 70 informants is a result of the 
flexibility of my grounded approach rather than a fixed target number.  
 
Follow-up interviews became a substantial part of my method. The second 
interview generally took longer and I noticed that informants opened up more. These 
follow-ups provided me with crucial information on how informants’ perceptions 
towards living abroad and their plans changed over time and allowed me to 
conceptualise these Europeans’ migration as ongoing mobility. More than that, however, 
many informants spoke more frankly when we met the second time and thus the 
longitudinal approach considerably enhanced the quality of the data. In total, I 
conducted more than 100 in-depth interviews. This meant that I interviewed about half 
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of the interviewees twice with the second interview taking place after roughly two to 
three years, depending on the interviewee’s availability. While I was not able to 
formally re-interview all of my informants, email, social media and casual meet-ups 
helped me to stay in contact and follow up informally with all but six of the 70 
participants.  
The interviews took place in public places such as cafes, parks or restaurants. In 
some cases, participants asked me to come to their workplaces or to their homes. The 
interviews lasted between 60 to 150 minutes and I recorded and transcribed them upon 
permission. Interviewees unanimously sympathised with my research and my plans to 
publish the findings. This also facilitated follow-ups since informants were generally 
supportive of my ongoing research or, as I sensed at times, needed someone to listen to 
their complicated trajectories. Many were thus willing to repeatedly share insights and 
updated me on changes at work, family life or place of residence. I use pseudonyms for 
all my informants and made all efforts to give a true view of their situation. That said, I 
sometimes altered the national affiliation of informant’s firms or used a regional rather 
than national category if their anonymity could not be guaranteed otherwise.  
Additionally, I applied strategies from online ethnography whose methods, 
strengths and weaknesses have recently been discussed in qualitative research.
13
 Social 
online networks like facebook, LinkedIn and Internations did not only help me to 
establish initial contact with potential informants and make myself familiar with this 
population’s networking and leisure activities but were especially valuable for follow-
ups. The online method gave me a richer insight into informants’ lives than possible by 
more conventional methods: Pictures, posts and reactions to comments on their online 
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 See for instance Figaredo et al. (2007) on the respective special issue. 
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profiles or blogs – while read critically as constructed representations of the self 
(Charmaz 2014) – revealed not only life events but also emotions and performative 
practices which contributed to my more nuanced understanding of informants’ 
migration experiences.  
My ethnographic approach meant that I physically experienced what it meant to 
be a ‘foreign talent’ in both cities. In Japan, I gained insights into work conditions from 
the perspective of a young European employee when I interned in the German Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry in Tokyo for half a year. While I completed the internship 
before starting my graduate research, the experiences I made allowed me to later 
develop a better understanding of informants’ narratives and their experiences with 
transcultural workplaces in Japan. The German Chamber, a partly German government-
funded, partly privately functioning corporation, employs mainly Japanese nationals 
who are in most cases proficient in German and/or English as well as a few German 
nationals. I was placed in a Japanese-only team, an experience which helped me when 
analysing migrants’ – particularly women’s – experiences in more rigid Japanese 
workplaces (see chapter six).  
The fact that I chose a shared apartment and not a hotel as accommodation for my 
two field trips to Singapore opened up further fruitful encounters: The majority of my 
flat mates were young foreign professionals and therefore part of the interest group, and 
by living door to door to these people and having short conversations on a regular basis, 
I developed a clearer picture of their weekly schedules, their habits as well as witnessed 
some of their daily struggles and sorrows.  
Another case worth to note was the chance to experience a foreign professional’s 
situation in terms of immigration regulations and visa issuance: Due to myself holding a 
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position as research assistant at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, 
during the time of my first stay in Singapore in 2015, I obtained a Training Employment 
Pass. This necessitated some of the same application procedures at the Ministry of 
Manpower (hereafter MoM) as the Employment Pass (EP), the visa my informants in 
Singapore almost anonymously hold.
14
 Hence, I requested an appointment at the MoM 
and can therefore now evaluate participants’ legal situation and their treatment by 
government authorities as ‘foreign talents’ more thoroughly. 
In Tokyo, I also had the opportunity to co-organize two focus groups on the 
workplace experience in Japan.
15
 The group discussions included foreigners from 
different national and ethnic backgrounds (U.S., Latin America, Africa, Europe) and a 
female-only focus group with five women (Japanese and foreign) respectively. The 
discussions revealed the significance of intersections such as sex, gender, cultural 
background, ethnicity or language proficiency which I will discuss in detail in chapter 
six.  
As informants in Singapore neither spoke about struggles at work and concerns 
over career development with the same intensity or frequency as informants in Japan 
nor suggested gender to matter much at the workplace, I did not conduct focus groups in 
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 Three informants have meanwhile exchanged their EP with permanent residency (PR). 
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 The two focus groups were part of a research project on organisational logics and cultural practices at 
Japanese workplaces, supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, on which the author 
collaborated with the principal investigator Gracia Liu-Farrer. The first group discussion with five foreign 
employees from different national and ethnic backgrounds (U.S., Latin America, Africa, Europe) took 
place in fall 2015. The objective was to understand the large numbers of dropouts of foreign employees in 
Japanese firms (including foreigners), which my own qualitative interviews strongly supported. The 
discussion circled around foreigners’ met and unmet expectations towards working in Japanese firms and 
accentuated not only employers’ and employees’ opposite expectations regarding employment and career 
development but also several patterns of how the young migrants reacted to the dilemma.  
The second group was a female-only focus group with five women (Japanese and foreign) in 2016. My 
previous one-on-one interviews had revealed the gendered nature of Japanese workplaces and the project 
aimed at detecting deeper lying issues of female employees’ experiences in male-dominated white-collar 
workplaces in Japan (Brinton 1993; Ueno 2013; Yamaguchi 2013; Nemoto 2016; Ho 2018). By inviting 
both Japanese and foreign (mostly European) women we aimed at identifying the significance of 
intersections such as sex, gender, cultural background, ethnicity or language proficiency. 
  72 
Singapore. Rather, as explained below, I more thoroughly investigated the visa situation 
which more often concerned my informants in Singapore and, through my ethnographic 
field work, explored social relations and issues of ethnicity which repeatedly surfaced in 
migrants’ accounts.  
 
3.4 Selection Criteria and Profile of the Group 
The 70 informants are evenly distributed over both field sites (Singapore 35, Japan 35). 
In both cities, men slightly outweigh women with altogether 37 men and 33 women and 
a male/female ratio of 19/16 in Singapore and 18/17 in Tokyo respectively. In the 
Japanese case, where detailed statistics on the foreign resident population are available, 
this ratio roughly reflects the even more uneven numbers in reality with men 
outweighing women for most of the EU countries (Ministry of Justice 2017c). While 
Singapore lacks official statistics on the foreign resident population, scholarship and 
public media suggest that European men in Singapore usually work full-time and are, in 
case they have a family, the main breadwinners. Scholarship on Europeans in China 
(Pieke 2012; Farrer 2011) and Hong Kong (Leonard 2010) find a similar imbalance in 
the sex ratio and depict women more often as trailing spouses than breadwinners. 
European women are generally portrayed as dependents and in fairly passive roles (e.g. 
Beaverstock 2011; Lundström 2014; Yeoh and Khoo 1998). Due to the scarce statistics, 
I addressed officials of all EU member countries’ embassies in Singapore. The 
Portuguese and Belgium embassy, the only ones with records available, relayed that 
male nationals outnumbered female nationals in the city-state. 
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The above-mentioned recent studies on Europeans in various Asian destinations, 
while not able to entirely represent the European population and its demographics, also 
argue for changing trends in the characteristics of the European migrant population in 
Asia in general: Contemporary European migrants in major Asian cities tend to be 
younger, often recent graduates who independently search for jobs and end up working 
on local contracts. As such, they are middling migrants rather than necessarily the 
business elite or affluent diplomates (see also Knowles 2015; Hof 2018; Farrer 2018).  
Instead of drawing strict age boundaries, my grounded approach, as explained 
above, hinted at the significance of the life stage and, even more, of the generation. This 
valuable finding encouraged me to adopt the generation as a unit of analysis, though not 
as a strict sampling criterion. With an age range from 22 - 38, migrants’ life stage at the 
time of the first interview consequently varied. That said, as they are roughly born 
between 1980 and the early 1990s, they are part of the millennial generation (see 
chapter four) and the majority was between 25 and 35 years old when I first met them. 
Generally speaking, participants were what I define as “young adults” at the time 
of the first interview: only roughly half of the informants were in a long-term romantic 
relationship and for the few with a family the children were still toddlers and thus too 
young to affect decisions regarding schooling or the like in the host society. Rather, one 
of the most important topics in participants’ narratives was work and rationales towards 
building a career. Even those in their early to mid-thirties were still in an early career 
stage, moulding their professional identity and yet to reach a point of mid-career 
stability.  
The first interviews, particularly those with South or East European informants, 
confirmed considerable differences within the European millennial generation. King et 
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al. (2016:18) called this a “different geo-economic and cultural positioning (within 
Europe).” While my early field work strongly pointed to the generation as a significant 
category for understanding these young Europeans, my insights were initially limited to 
Western and Southern Europeans’ narratives. Thus, I sought to include Europeans from 
more diverse geographical areas such as Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. Comparing 
their narratives with those of the Western European millennials allowed to discern 
differences but also to identify commonalities concerning mobility patterns, social 
networks and identity issues as migrants in Asia. 
Wimmer (2009:244), in his writing about ethnicity in immigrant societies, made a 
case for the danger of using ethnicity as a selection method. He instead proposes a 
boundary-making paradigm which “takes ethnicity as an explanandum, as a variable 
outcome of specific processes to be analytically uncovered and empirically specified 
(ibid).” Acknowledging his claim, I purposely excluded ethnicity as criterion for 
recruitment. Nevertheless, in the first rounds of interviews, I happened not to talk to any 
non-Caucasians. Thus, similar as to my theoretical sampling strategies for including 
Eastern Europeans and Scandinavians, I actively tried to interview at least a few non-
Caucasians in the consecutive interviews. These strategies also helped me to diminish a 
recruitment bias on grounds of my personal networks. As a German who had studied 
English and French in secondary education and who had been on short-term exchange 
programmes or study trips to the UK and France, I was often introduced to Western-
Europeans, especially French and Germans, although I did not intend to.  
Interestingly, I met very few British migrants but other Europeans instead who 
had studied or worked in the UK. This might explain why there are no English teachers 
among my informants. A few studies drew attention to English teaching as an 
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occupational niche for native speakers who struggle to secure employment in Japan (e.g. 
Nagy 2017; Appleby 2014). However, my informants with neither Japanese language 
proficiency nor training in a sought-after field, found other jobs than English teaching. 
Such employment includes occupations in which the Europeans are able to work in 
English but do not necessarily need to be native speakers.  
For instance, there are numerous head hunter firms in Japan of which a 
considerable part attend to foreigners (Froese and Peltokorpi 2011). Several of my 
informants did not only find their jobs via such head hunters but themselves worked for 
a limited time in recruitment companies which specialize on foreigners. While some of 
these informants were fluent in Japanese and the job offered a welcome change in terms 
of organisational management, other informants did not speak Japanese. For them, 
English speaking recruitment agencies were one of the few accessible occupations in 
Japan. With more foreigners in Japan and more firms willing to use English as working 
language, this seems to be a growing trend. At the same time, Nagy (2017) suggests that 
English teaching is no longer considered a well-paid job. For the generation in focus of 
this study, their narratives reveal that they try to distance themselves from the 
stigmatized image of the English teacher, probably a reason that pushed them into head 
hunting and recruitment which is more easily accepted as “professional” employment or 
in informants’ words “doing business.”  
In total, participants come from eighteen EU (in one case, European but non-EU) 
countries.
16
 I was able to interview six migrants of mixed (and thus visibly different) 
                                                             
16
 Informants’ nationalities include Romanian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Baltic (not further specified in 
order to protect informants’ anonymity), Greek, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian, French, 
German, British, Irish, Finnish, Swedish and Icelandic. Although Iceland is not a member of the European 
Union, it is a member of the Schengen Agreement that grants citizens of its 26 member states the same 
right of free movement as EU citizens and a member of the European Economic Area (Schengen Visa 
Info 2017).   
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ethnic background. Three of them have one Asian parent, two have Arabic features and 
one informant has an African parent. Their narratives as well as those of other “minority 
voices” like those of Europeans of the peripheral EU member states or homosexuals 
enabled me to understand the significance of ethnicity and race better and demarcate 
ethnicity from other influential factors such as culture, class, education system, 
generation and life stage. Neither can ethnicity alone account for Generation Erasmus’ 
mobility patterns in Asia nor can we ignore ethnic and racial issues. The situation is 
more complicated. The more data from interviews with millennials I gathered the more 
clearly I identified the context in which these youth grew up next to the life stage as an 
influential factor for migratory decisions. 
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4. Generation Erasmus’ Migration Motivations 
In chapter one, I introduced the subject of the dissertation and used Andras’ story to 
document how personal and professional trajectories unfold in Asia. Specifically, Asian 
global cities are the places where Europeans choose to spend their early adulthood and 
hope to establish a professional identity. The young adults share European roots and 
their childhood in an enlarging European Union, two aspects which affect their later 
migratory decisions.  
When talking about Europe in this context, I am referring to the enlarged territory 
of the European Union (hereafter EU) and the surrounding countries Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway, as these countries are part of the European Economic Area 
and their citizens enjoy the same rights of free movement as EU citizens (European 
Commission 2013).
17
 In the EU declaration on “What does it mean to be a European 
citizen?” the first among four bullet points which describe a citizen’s rights reads “the 
right to freely move around the European Union and settle anywhere within its territory” 
(ibid:4). This grants European citizens (hereafter Europeans) not only the right to stay 
and work in any member country but also makes working visa obsolete.  
In this dissertation, I use the concept of ‘Generation Erasmus’ to propose a new 
mobility phenomenon. I argue that one distinctive group within the so-called millennial 
generation pursues active career and lifestyle strategies through geographical mobility. 
                                                             
17
 The European Union consists of 28 member countries which are, by year of entry and beginning with 
the founding member states: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia. 
Although the Brexit vote on 2016 decided that the United Kingdom would exit the union, at the time of 
writing this dissertation the United Kingdom “remains a full member of the EU and rights and obligations 
continue to fully apply in and to the UK (European Union 2017).” Furthermore, I do not include migrants 
from Switzerland in this study since the country, while part of the Schengen area, is neither part of the EU 
nor of the European Economic Area and has always been very clear about its wish to remain independent 
of the EU.  
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These young adults are highly educated but equally insecure; they embrace mobility, 
flexibility and cosmopolitan ideals, are eager to work hard and anticipate numerous 
opportunities ahead. Yet, they are restless because of the very same opportunities. 
Raised to aim high and equipped with the necessary degrees, they feel urged to compete 
for the numerous chances lying ahead and to avoid constraints on their local labour 
markets. The key to understanding Generation Erasmus lies in their distinctive 
characteristics which I outline in the first half of this chapter. Based on the group’s traits, 
I then examine migration motivations in the second half. With the help of four ideal 
types, I seek to illustrate communalities and variances within the group and propose that 
despite all differences the concept of Asia – from a European perspective – plays a 
significant role in this migration phenomenon. 
 
4.1 Generation Erasmus   
Sociologist Mannheim (1928/1952) argued for the significance of events in a 
generation’s formative years. The shared experience, to which scholars later added 
“mediated experience” (Edmunds and Turner 2005:566) would shape transition to 
adulthood and result in specific traits that allow to distinguish generational cohorts from 
one another. The Europeans of this study are part of a generation often referred to as 
millennials, the first generation who grew up with internet and later smartphones as 
taken-for-granted.  
Millennials are vaguely understood as born between 1980 and the mid 1990s 
(Chirimbu, Vasilescu, and Barbu-Chirimbu 2011) or as having turned adult in the 2000s 
(e.g. Ng, Lyons and Schweitzer 2012; Howe and Strauss 1991). At the time of writing 
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this dissertation they are thus roughly in their mid 20s - late 30s. Millennials are 
associated with affinity for new technologies and connectedness all over the world (e.g. 
Edmunds and Turner 2005; Pew Research Center 2010). Their shared experience of 
traumatic events such as 9/11 prompted Edmunds and Turner (2005) to define them as a 
global generation. The authors contend that millennials’ global connections are 
multifaceted and complex rather than previous generations’ linear connection from the 
US to the periphery. Finally, the millennials struggle for a career in post-Lehman Shock 
labour markets (De Genova and Tazzioli 2016; Eichhorst, Hinte, and Rinne 2013).
18
 
Millennials are generally found to pursue further education (e.g. Eisner 2005; Dafflon 
2008) and to postpone the markers of “full” adulthood such as moving out from their 
parents’ house, marriage and children (Eisenstadt and Turner 2015:869). 
Millennials in the EU have something in common most of their peers around the 
globe could only dream of: Brought up in countries of high living standard and good 
education systems, the range of palpable opportunities and the freedom to choose is 
overwhelming. Their options are not limited to the nation state but framed by the 
spatially, culturally and economically diverse territory of the EU (e.g. Kuhn 2016; 
Recchi 2015; Ralph 2015; Favell 2008a). More than that, European millennials have 
witnessed the successive enlargement of the European Union, especially the most recent 
entries by ten East European countries in 2004 and another two in 2007. While the 
notion of a possible European identity was for long only associated with Western 
Europe, the incremental inclusion of ex-socialist countries has enlarged membership to 
the West thoroughly (European Commission 2002). Nowadays, even ordinary citizens 
                                                             
18
 The filing for bankruptcy by the investment bank Leman Brothers in October 2008 was the beginning 
of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, often called Lehman shock. Its economic implications for 
the Eurozone and the European Union have been particularly severe and have thus been referred to as the 
European (Financial) Crisis.  
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cross national borders frequently (Kuhn 2016) and work-related movement, especially 
from the “young” member countries to the more established Western countries, is 
common (e.g. Recchi 2015; Ralph 2015).  
Picht (2004) was the first to adopt the term “Generation Erasmus” and applied it 
to the European millennial generation. He depicts how European students perceive the 
2004 accession. These students feel European and yet, they struggle to explain what this 
means. An amalgam of enthusiasm for the European idea and insecurity surfaces across 
regions. Particularly students educated in European politics and those who have already 
experienced educational mobility are critical of the potential success of Europeanisation 
(ibid). I demonstrate below how, more than ten years later, some of these youth, 
nowadays young professionals with 3 - 10 years of work experience, have left the 
continent.  
Since Picht’s reflections, the term Generation Erasmus has entered public 
discourse via politics, scholarship and public press. The Erasmus programme was 
founded by the European Union in 1987 and has since, with its “focus on skills 
development for employability and active citizenship” (European Commission 2015), 
supported young Europeans in their studies and internships abroad. Erasmus offers a 
constantly growing number of study abroad opportunities all over Europe and has 
thereby promoted study abroad to higher education for the masses. Figure 1 illustrates 
the constant growth in numbers since the introduction of Erasmus in 1987, with close to 
300,000 students being abroad in 2013. In the same year, the total of participating 
students since the programme’s introduction reached the bench mark record of three 
million. Participating countries, too, have diversified and numbered 34 in 2014, 
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including besides the 28 EU members also Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey and most recently the Republic of Macedonia.  
 
Figure 1: Growth in Erasmus student mobility 1987-2013 
 
Source: European Commission 2014. 
 
As pillar of the internationalisation of European higher education, roughly five per cent 
of all European graduates in 2014 were former Erasmus students and the Commission is 
aiming for 20 per cent by 2020. The total number of all Erasmus students so far is 
impressive, with 3.3 million students having studied or interned within European 
borders for an average period of six months (ibid). Importantly, many Erasmus students 
receive grants for monthly living expenses and as EU citizens do not have to deal with 
visa issues.  
Generation Erasmus has been the focus of publications by the German Academic 
Exchange Service, short DAAD (2007), market studies (e.g. Wilson 2011) or 
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sociological and educational research (Cichelli 2013; edited volume by Feyen and 
Krzaklewska 2013). Scholars have examined the implications of European youth’s 
heightened mobility for later employment (Wilson 2011; King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003), 
their appropriation of online social media for identity construction (Roguski 2013) and 
the linkage between educational mobility and identification as a European citizen (Van 
Mol 2013; Ambrosi 2013; Striebeck 2013; Wilson 2011).  
The feasibility of a European, or post-national society is highly contested (e.g. 
Hajer 2000; Favell and Nebe 2009; Jensen and Richardson 2004). Against the 
background of debates around ‘Europeanness’ and the union’s Europeanisation policies, 
Van Mol (2013), similar to Wilson (2011), suggests that students who participate in an 
overseas exchange programme are already more “European” – that is, support European 
integration and identify among other identifications as European – before they 
participate in Erasmus. Thus, not increased mobility is driving Europeanisation but 
Europhile individuals take part in and so promote mobility within the union.  
Cicchelli (2013) somewhat challenges above positive voices on the outcomes of 
the Erasmus experience. In his chapter of the edited volume Critical Perspectives on 
International Education, he argues that the young self-proclaimed cosmopolitan 
European youth who embark on a semester abroad in the EU often end up socialising 
with other Erasmus students. Their initial “thirst for unfamiliar life styles” (ibid:206), 
thus, entails that they are “meeting with other limiting European cultures” (ibid:207) 
rather than socialising with the locals more thoroughly.   
Despite the crucial contributions of above studies, their focus has been limited to 
students who actually participated (and sometimes on those who decided not to do so) 
in Erasmus exchange programmes. Few scholars have, despite using the term, looked at 
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other forms of this generation’s mobility than Erasmus (Murphy-Lejeune 2002; Bagnoli 
2009; Frändberg 2014) and even fewer have studied this youth’s migration beyond the 
confines of the union borders (for an exception, see Knowles 2015 and Hof 2018). 
Jensen (2015) on the other hand demonstrates that researching young educated 
Europeans’ European orientations does not require to study them abroad. The author 
finds middle-class Danish students in Denmark to exhibit a range of more or less 
cosmopolitan orientations. These young Danes’ local, national and global worldviews 
evidence how the European home can make people comfortable to be both their 
country’s nationals and global citizens. 
As the subjects of above studies, the Europeans of this dissertation, too, were used 
to family travel in European neighbour countries. A few were sent to relatives or host 
families in other European countries during the school holidays as their parents valued 
foreign language acquisition and cultural exchange. More exceptional, two participants 
grew up moving with their diplomate parents around the globe. Another example of 
intercontinental mobility before university is that of Boris, a Czech interviewee who 
explained that “everyone in eastern Europe wanted to go to the US. The education 
system is much better than in Europe, I still think so.” He worked hard and was 
admitted to a scholarship programme for high school and later undergraduate studies in 
the US.  
The majority of the young Europeans first experienced extended spatial mobility 
in their university years. Roughly a third of my informants participated in an Erasmus 
exchange programme. Others embarked on an internship in another European country or 
enrolled in graduate school abroad. Cases include several students who went to London, 
Edinburgh, Paris, Barcelona or Brussels; that is, either English-speaking destinations or 
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global cities. Parey and Waldinger (2007) find that studying abroad increases the 
probability of working abroad in one’s early career by 15 to 20 per cent. They 
demonstrate that of the former Erasmus students who work in a foreign country after 
graduation, two thirds work in a European country – which leaves a small but 
significant number of one third of former Erasmus students who find employment 
abroad to emigrate from Europe.  
Unfortunately, emigration statistics are hard to obtain even within Europe (Nowak 
et al. 2006; Poullain 2008; Eurostat 2018). As stated earlier, comprehensive statistics 
(classifying for regions of origin, age, gender and the like) of contemporary European 
emigration to Asia do, to my knowledge, not exist. However, both qualitative 
scholarship and newspaper reports support my thesis of a recent trend of skilled 
European emigration (Moutet 2013; Korpela 2010; Knowles 2015; Fechter 2016; 
Coconut Daily 2015; Marlow 2013).  
As discussed, the majority of my informants temporarily lived overseas before 
migrating to Asia for work. The establishment of European wide university exchange 
programmes did not only make study abroad respectable, it positioned the overseas 
experience and associated foreign language proficiency as highly valued skill set on the 
curriculum vitae. Today, foreign language proficiency beyond English and extended 
experience abroad are highly regarded qualifications on the job market (Aramburu 
2015; Morgan McKinley 2013; Conboye 2013; Ralphs 2015). 
Several of my informants admitted that lacking the overseas experience comes 
close to personal deficiency among the highly educated European middle class. 
Referring to statistics, we know that “Erasmus is not a ‘program for everyone”” (Feyen 
and Krzaklewska 2013:10), but young students who are surrounded by ‘leavers’ regard 
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extended mobility as the norm. In particular, returnees’ stories stir up the desire to move 
among the stayers.  
Berna’s mobility history shows how her first consideration to participate in an 
exchange programme triggered a series of later events which led to her repeated and 
gradually longer sojourns abroad. “When I started university in Italy I was in a kind of 
student house, it had lots of activities and promoted students to Erasmus. So I always 
saw the older students who went abroad. So somehow, I thought it was something nice 
to do, not something impossible or strange.” Her older brother went abroad with 
Erasmus, too and probably was another influential factor. Berna, who studied 
mathematics in a small North Italian city, eventually went to Berlin as an Erasmus 
undergraduate student. She enjoyed living abroad and studying the German language 
but also admitted that there was a more practical benefit when she remarked that 
“staying abroad could be useful for my future career.”  
Once in a foreign country, Berna found out about plenty of feasibilities for 
studying abroad in the EU, including a wide range of scholarship programmes. She 
eventually entered a graduate school in Paris which a friend had recommended to her 
and studied financial mathematics. Growing more confident with the French language, 
Berna completed a six-month internship in a French bank as part of the master 
programme. This did not only offer her first work experience in her field of 
specialisation but introduced her to her future employer with who she would later move 
to Tokyo.  
Even economically constrained Europeans found ways to become mobile. For less 
affluent students like the Baltic logistics major Olaf, Erasmus was no option but 
ironically, studying overseas in Japan, a country known for its high living standard and 
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high tuition fees, turned out to be financially feasible. I will return to his case in chapter 
five when examining the channels through which Generation Erasmus access the Asian 
labour markets.  
Now, why such a strong urge to go abroad? Why Asian global cities if most other 
destinations would have been closer, living costs lower and cultural differences 
probably less pronounced? Generation Erasmus want something different. Deborah’s 
comment leaves no doubt about the attraction of the unfamiliar and the ‘edgy’ factor of 
studying something or somewhere different than her peers who chose foreign languages 
like Spanish, French or German.  
 
The UK or US would have been the norm. At least in Greece we grow up 
with that Harvard etc. dream. […] I’m coming from a middle-class family. 
So we had money to travel but nothing fancy. These kind of middle-class 
families, in our age, it’s typical that they go abroad at least to Germany or 
UK to study and travel at least a year, it’s nothing very different, kind of 
normal. (Deborah, Greek in Singapore) 
 
While the world in which Generation Erasmus grew up ceased to offer security and 
stability, this globalised world also appeals, in informants’ words, with an 
unprecedented range of “great opportunities” or “fascinating experiences.” A Northern 
European informant had worked in his home country for several years before he 
embarked on a new life in Japan. His answer to my question what attracted him to both 
China and Japan at that time captured the essence of most of the migrants’ pre-migration 
impression of Asia. “When you’re 20 everything in Europe looks and feels the same. In 
Asia everything is always different. Chinese and Japanese were just the most obvious 
[languages], I didn’t think of other countries at that time.” 
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It is not surprising then that one of the many outcomes of “chosen biographies” 
(Beck 1994) – and one of the potential answers to the need or attraction of 
distinguishing oneself – is migration. To really distinguish oneself then is not to move 
within the EU, or even the West as many informants referred to the US, Canada or 
Australia when contemplating other options, but beyond. New emigration patterns of 
European young adults to destinations around the globe seem to confirm such 
arguments (Korpela 2009; Debnár 2016; Knowles 2015).  
Generation Erasmus have been told for years how mobility benefits the career and 
the self. More than that, however, we need to understand their global mobility and the 
diversifying destinations they choose in the economic, political and socio-cultural 
context. This is an enlarged European Union which after prosperous years and an 
optimistic look into the future has recently come under serious attack. To put the current 
situation when writing this thesis between 2015 - 2018 into perspective, millennials in 
Europe grew up witnessing a series of decisive events: The union’s enlargement along 
with the hopes and struggles pinned down to the European project, the impacts of the 
Lehman shock which unfolded in economic recession, high rates of unemployment and 
an imposed austerity policy in several member states and, most recently, the continent’s 
so far biggest refugee crisis. 
Since Generation Erasmus are equipped with substantial cultural capital (tertiary 
degrees, ‘intercultural’ experience, foreign language proficiency, etc.) and sometimes 
social capital after a previous stint abroad, the move to Asia is exciting rather than 
daunting. The final decision, then, is less if to move but where to move. Asia offers what 
the chosen biography asks for: it is different. Generation Erasmus’ choices are complex 
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and cannot simply be explained by artificial distinctions between labour migration or 
lifestyle migration, or economic versus non-economic motivations.  
 
4.2 Motivations for Moving  
In order to capture Generation Erasmus’ motivations for migration I constructed four 
ideal types of movers from my interview data. They are by no means comprehensive 
and in reality, these motivations often overlap. Nevertheless, I suggest that ideal types 
are helpful to carve out these migrants’ main characteristics and at the same time to 
clearly discern variations within the group (Weiss 1994). Table 1 lists the major 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of each type, grouped as university 
major, pre-employment overseas stint, age range upon first migration, work experience 
when moving, single/liaised when moving, and destination city. I explain these 
characteristics at the example of one case per type in the sub-chapters that follow. 
Based on table 1, I identified the major differences yet also certain overlaps 
between the four motivational types. I map these in Figure 2, which serves as a 
conceptual map that delineates proximate motivations per type. By the 3-level structure 
and the hierarchical relationship between primary/general motivation and 
secondary/specific motivation I emphasize that there are two broader and more general 
motivations that come as a primary (‘career advancement’ on the side of the ‘economic 
factors’ and ‘cultural fondness’ on the side of the ‘non-economic factors’). They 
materialize in three more specific motivations ‘fleeing un(der)employment/unattractive 
job conditions’, ‘creative, dynamic, international workplaces’, and ‘cultural 
experience/climate’) which are all interdependent.  
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Table 1: Types of movers and their main features 
 
Note: SG for Singapore, JP for Japan, US for United States, EU for European Union  
 
The starting point vertically, or context, for all types, is their upbringing in the 
enlarged EU as a free-movement space which they decide to leave. While on level 1, 
two of the ideal types are primarily motivated by economic considerations (economic 
refugees, global professionals) and two more by non-economic considerations (lifestyle 
migrants, cultural enthusiasts) we can see on level 2 that the broken down secondary 
motivations also blur the clear-cut lines of level 1. For instance, ‘creative, dynamic, and 
international workplaces’ as a secondary motivation to migrate is more or less a mix, or 
an amalgam of both economic and non-economic considerations. Level 3 then sorts 
these motivations that are related to each other to varying degrees into the four ideal 
types. This last level demonstrates how each type exhibits several secondary/specific 
motivations. Yet, they can either be strongly (indicated by        ) or weakly (indicated by 
-----) present in the respective type. The figure thus visualizes that each type has one 
Type
University 
major
Pre-
employment 
overseas stint
Age range 
upon 1st 
migration
Work exp.
when 
moving
Single/
liaised 
when 
moving
Destination
city
Lifestyle migrants
humanities
social sciences
intra-European, 
extended travel 
Asia
late 20s-
mid 30s
some years 
work 
experience
long-term 
partner
or married
both, more 
often SG
Cultural enthusiasts
Japanese 
studies
(major or 
minor)
students/
interns in 
Tokyo or 
elsewhere in JP
20- mid 20s no work 
experience
single Tokyo
Global professionals
various multiple, intra- 
and inter-EU
mid - late 
20s
no or little 
work 
experience
single, or 
move 
indep. from 
partner
both, more 
often SG
Economic refugees
human./social
sciences, 
architecture
none, or like
global 
professionals
mid - late 
20s
no or little 
work 
experience
single or 
married
SG
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strongly present specific motivation, but with minor significance, also exhibits one or 
several weak motivations. 
 
Figure 2: Explanatory 3-level typology of motivations for moving  
    
Figure and ideas by the author.  
 
Sam Scott (2006), in his discussion of the social morphology of skilled migration in 
Europe, distinguishes six types of British skilled migrants in Paris. Scott argues for both 
the diversity within the migrant group and their middling position in the world city 
which situates them somewhere between the elite and the ‘underclass’ (Scott 
2006:1125). His findings somewhat resemble Europeans’ motivations to move to Asia 
and thus point to a more generalisable phenomenon of the young, highly educated and 
mobility-affine European middle class.  
My typology confirms not only the diversity within this group but also the 
significance of lifestyle, cultural factors, appeal of world cities and mobility as a way of 
(middle-class) distinction and reproduction. It does however extend Scott’s typology as 
it unravels the interdependence of these motivations. Mobility to culturally, 
< - - - - - - - - - - - - Economic factors
Context EU
Secondary/specific motivation
Creative, dynamic, 
International workplaces 
Type 2
Global professionals
Secondary/specific motivation
Fleeing un(der)employment/
unattractive job conditions
Type 1
Economic refugees
Secondary/specific motivation
Cultural experience, climate
Type 3
Lifestyle migrants
Primary/general motivation Primary/general motivation
Living abroad
Career advancement Cultural fondness
Type 4
Cultural enthusiasts
Non-economic factors - - - - - - - - - - - - >
Level 1
Level 3
Level 2
  91 
geographically and socially distant Asian cities is a product of our times and of 
Generation Erasmus. The young adults seize opportunities which they do not find in the 
EU through mobile “worklife pathways” beyond Europe. I return to this point in the 
conclusion of this chapter. There I demonstrate how despite great variance in the group 
concerning initial motivations to move, the types can be subsumed under the collecting 
idea of pursuing mobile “worklife pathways” which cannot be understood by either-or, 
economic or non-economic factors.  
 
4.2.1 Lifestyle Migrants 
Many young Europeans moved to Asia because they dreamt of the “Asian experience” 
as one informant put it. This fascination with the region came up in many interviews so 
I started to explore what was behind this dream of Asia. What I found was that 
European media, the travel industry and popular culture have created a stereotype of 
Asia – to be precise, on South-, Southeast and East Asia, as a world full of exotic 
objects and beliefs. The orientalisation of Asia as “exotic” (Said 1987) dates back to 
European colonialism, missionaries and travel writing and later the neo-colonial re-
fashioning of voluntary leaving home as “sophisticated” travel (Clifford 1997:65). Even 
nowadays, European media, the travel industry, and ultimately, European (as other 
Western) tourists reproduce the stereotypical images of Asia as a world full of exotic 
objects and mysterious beliefs (Hendry 2000; Hall 1979; Richards and Wilson 2003). 
While contemporary orientalist projection appears in an overwhelmingly positive light 
it also reinforces the binary construction of East versus West and is thus a major source 
for Generation Erasmus’ fascination for Asia.  
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Many lifestyle migrants had previously travelled Asia, often as a couple. This 
triggered their desire to “come back and do something here in the region” as Hubert put 
it. The German, together with his wife, consequently started to look for positions in Asia. 
Other Europeans told me how literature on the Asian continent, friends’ travel narratives, 
or television programmes about the region sparked their interest. Their narratives sketch 
an image of Asia as a place with exotic traditions and a diversity of cultures which they 
partly derived from media as the following quote by Rico, a Portuguese, illustrates.  
 
I guess my expectation [of Japan] was… I don’t know, the mix between all 
the manga, anime, weird television shows that I saw in my country. But at 
the same time, I was expecting to find a very deep Japan, very traditional 
very you know like samurai style. I had a very weird image of Japan. I was 
expecting to find those both radical [sides]. 
 
In their expectations and excitement of encountering the ‘other’, the lifestyle migrants 
prioritize the Asian experience over stability or quick money. Thus, they interrupted 
their careers in Europe and embarked on an “adventure”, which mostly meant a new job 
with different tasks and thus a dropping out from a possibly more straight-forward 
career progression in their home country. Although many managed to negotiate a 
position in the local (Singaporean or Japanese) branch of their firm, the job also came 
with a local contract and thus rarely equated to the job security at home.  
Hubert and his wife are a case in point. The couple were still in their twenties and 
he had already started to work full-time when she graduated from university and they 
toured Southeast Asia for several months.  
 
We spent one month in Nepal, one month in Indonesia, one month in 
Vietnam and Cambodia, [...] we were I guess roughly four months away, a 
bit of SG, Bangkok, Thailand, all these places. And we kind of liked it so 
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much that we [...] said ‘Ok, we have to come back and do something here in 
the region.’ And this was when we had this idea, ‘Asia is quite nice’. We 
both had this vague vision that we wanted to work abroad and not only be 
there as a tourist. I had never studied abroad and was mostly in Germany. 
For her it was similar. So we said ‘OK, travelling is all fine, [...] but in one 
way or another we wanted to work and do some sort of job-.’ It was totally 
vague what kind of job.  
 
The couple agreed that as long as either of them found stable employment, no matter if 
in his profession or not, the other one could follow – even if this meant selling coffee, as 
Hubert jokingly added. Hubert discussed their plans with his boss and owner of the 
small family business for which he had worked since he was a student. The owner, who 
trusted Hubert and knew his skills, was enthusiastic about the idea to expand the 
company business beyond Europe. Hubert explored potential locations for a market 
venture in Asia. The decision fell on Singapore which seemed most promising 
“regarding language, lawyers, banks, authorities – simply, business-friendly indices.” 
Hubert’s wife, too, was successful in transferring within her company, a huge firm in the 
health sector. In her case, however, negotiations were tedious and she finally worked 
under a contract that did not offer prospects for career progression. 
The couple’s case illustrates the background that characterizes the lifestyle 
migrants and the motivations to move to Singapore or Tokyo. Hubert and his wife grew 
up in a small city in middle-class households and enrolled in a university close to home. 
Until graduation, life seemed to develop similarly to that of their peers. The natural next 
step would be a permanent job, a house and a family. Yet, the holiday encounter with 
Asia left such a deep impression that the couple changed their minds, seeking a break 
from the life that tacitly lay ahead. More exciting, in Hubert’s eyes, was a stint in 
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Southeast Asia where “[you have] the best weather all year round, can travel, go diving 
in Bali, all no problem, all these things are really good.”  
This does not, however, mean the lifestyle migrants turn life in Europe down for 
good; they rather decide to give themselves a few years for an exciting experience. They 
assume they could regret if they did not try living in Asia for some years at this life 
stage when they are flexible without children or other commitments. For Hubert, too, 
the fact that he “had never been abroad” was a main motivation for initiating the move. 
Many lifestyle migrants initially regard life in Asia as something temporary. 
However, as Hubert’s example demonstrates, they leave the actual length of their stay to 
the developments on-site. In Singapore, high requirements for professional work visa
 
(see chapter five), and in Japan, the necessity to speak fluent Japanese are constraints 
for the lifestyle migrants. Thus, many lifestyle migrants inquire about the possibility to 
move overseas within their firm. This facilitates bureaucratic issues such as visa matters 
and appeals by its relative ease for accessing a full-time job in the host city. Lifestyle 
migrants’ positions in Asia are slightly less attractive, at least from a European point of 
view. They are not permanent but contracted positions with local work conditions, but 
the European migrants accept these jobs in exchange for the adventure.
19
  
Staying within the same European firm appears to be a relatively risk-free way of 
moving to Asia. The common rationale was one of “if it doesn’t work out you can 
always go home.” The lifestyle migrants regard Europe as a fix point to which they will 
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 Local, i.e. Singaporean and Japanese, contracts usually come with fewer annual holidays than what is 
standard in most EU countries. Other conditions, such as health insurance, are also generally less 
attractive than in Europe. For instance, informants in both cities told me about approximately 15 - 20 days 
of paid holiday a year. This is already more than the stipulated minimum amount – for full-time 
employees, excluding national holidays – of 7 days in Singapore (MoM 2018a) and 10 days in Japan 
(ILO 2018). A few reported to be “lucky” that their European companies, despite their local contracts in 
Asia, granted them holidays according to the headquarter regulations which, on basis of EU law, 
stipulates a minimum of 20 days of paid leave per year (EUR-Lex 2003). Some European countries 
however lie well above, for example France with 25 days of paid annual leave.   
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return and where, if necessary, the welfare state and their families provide a safety net. 
Hubert and his wife epitomise the main characteristics of this type: First, the Asian 
experience is important enough to put life in Europe on a hold for an indefinite time. 
The couple sold parts of their belongings before their departure and left Germany 
despite their awareness that their move to Asia might disrupt a more straight-forward 
career advancement at home. However, at this point of their lives, the adventure in Asia 
became a priority to the lifestyle migrants.  
Secondly, they see the move as a sojourn, a joint adventure; one that will become 
one of many sections, or pathways, of their partnership – and which is thus temporary. 
The couple’s decision to marry just before migration further underlines their attitude 
towards the endeavour. The Asian adventure, thus, becomes a relationship project. For 
its sake, they possibly forgo a promotion or risk working in a mundane job for the years 
abroad. Yet, they do not turn their backs against Europe. They enjoy travelling, new 
friendships and daily discoveries of the unfamiliar. Likewise, they are aware of their 
sojourns being definite, and among many couples, including Hubert and his wife, 
discussions circle around a more settled life, for some with children, somewhere in 
Europe. 
In contrast to economic migrants and thanks to their resources (for instance, 
tertiary degrees, middle-class families), these young migrants choose to move because 
they can and want to. They state that they want to focus on lifestyle rather than career 
progression (Benson and O’Reilly 2009). A job in a high-wage country, in a European-
affiliated company, using the English language seems to open up an avenue to both: 
respectable employment, which does not significantly harm, maybe even decorate their 
resumes as it testifies their capability and confidence to work overseas. At the same time, 
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it allows them to explore a different culture and enjoy Southeast Asia’s tropical climate 
– “indefinite holidays in Asia”, as Bettina, another young German woman, summed it 
up.  
Yet, there is also a less invigorating component to lifestyle migrants’ motivation to 
move. They want a “break” from Europe and its rather rigid promotion structures while 
they are “still young enough” as the French woman Florence remarked. They worry 
about their prospects of career advancement and count on their migration as an eye 
catcher on the curriculum vitae (hereafter CV). An overseas sojourn is for them both a 
sign of individualisation and a challenge that fosters personal growth and confidence. In 
Hubert’s words “I find it for me personally good, exciting, interesting. … you need to 
go [overseas] yourself, I guess it’s hard to learn these things if I stayed in Germany.” 
Migrants are proud to add these experiences to their personal stories; on their CVs they 
stick out exactly because they are just one phase among other more conventional routes.  
To conclude, even though some lifestyle migrants consider less qualified jobs 
(“selling coffee”), eventually they all search until they find employment that requires 
university degrees. Thus, they try to maintain positions in their field of education or 
professional specialisation. In fact, their job situation is a consequence of two factors. 
One is the restrictive immigration policies in Asian global cities. Prospective migrants 
need to prove their high qualifications in ‘professional’ occupations. In Singapore, to 
which most lifestyle migrants flock, the skilled visa is the EP. It is however not issued 
for low-skilled jobs like “selling coffee.” In order to keep up a middle-class living 
standard, the young Europeans need to qualify for an EP which in turn requires them to 
work in their profession.   
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My data demonstrates that both partners identify themselves as professionals. 
Although Hubert’s wife struggled to negotiate a position in the Singaporean subsidiary 
of her firm she persevered and finally succeeded. Thus, despite being faced with career 
stagnation rather than advancement, it at least enabled her to work in her field and not 
settle for any other job or become a housewife, which Hubert’s salary would probably 
have allowed. Generation Erasmus’ dispositions and aspirations, as outlined in the first 
part of this chapter, can be traced to their childhood and youth in Europe as children of 
middle-class families. Not only have they been raised by parents who emphasised the 
value of higher education, but also did the rights attached to their EU citizenship, 
Europeanisation policies such as Erasmus and earlier mobility experiences nurture the 
desire for something beyond Europe, but also for being competitive and able to pursue 
professional jobs.  
More specifically, the lifestyle migrants see themselves returning to their home 
countries, and thus, to their domestic labour markets one day. The overseas experience 
allows for some leeway. Ultimately, however, they strive to maintain a professional, 
secure, middle-class lifestyle. While they are interested in different parts of the Asian 
region they only seriously consider Asia’s more developed global cities such as Tokyo, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and a few even ‘Middle Eastern’ Dubai. Ending up in Tokyo or 
Singapore is not always their first or only destination desired as the discussion has 
shown. Singapore, however, appears to be more accessible in terms of language and, in 
some instances, ease of setting up a business. Consequently, the majority of informants 
in this group eventually migrate to Singapore.  
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4.2.2 Cultural Enthusiasts 
The cultural enthusiasts, as the lifestyle migrants, move for their personal interest in a 
certain place. The difference, at first glance, simply seems to lie in the lifestyle migrants’ 
general fantasies about Asia as a region and, in the case of the cultural enthusiasts, a 
love for the country Japan, its people and its language. Yet, the two types differ 
profoundly. The cultural enthusiasts’ interest in Japan goes deeper and has motivated 
many young Europeans to devote years to language study. Many stay in Japan as 
students or interns and directly start working there afterwards. Hence, they do not enter 
the country on a professional visa but stay on after graduation and simply change their 
visa category. Their cases demonstrate the blurred line between international students 
and labour migrants.  
Among young Europeans in Tokyo I found that the majority is in the country for 
some sort of (pop)cultural or linguistic interest.
20
 All interns in the company where I 
conducted my internship had studied the Japanese language. They applied for the 
internship in order to spend more time in the country they liked and to explore options 
for a full-time job in Japan. This is true for many of the 35 interviewees in Japan. More 
than half of them graduated from Japanese studies majors or minors at university while 
some others studied the language on a private basis or in language schools later. For a 
better understanding of the cultural enthusiasts’ motivations, I examine their childhood 
and investigate when and how the course for their fondness of Japan was set.  
Japanese culture has long been a subject of interest in the West (Befu 2001). In the 
19
th
 century, world fairs in Europe and America portrayed Japan as it was imagined by 
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 Japan’s popularity throughout the world, mostly in terms of soft power, is not limited to European, or 
Western, consumers only (Goldstein-Gidoni 2005). See for instance Iwabuchi (2002) on “Cool Japan”, 
the establishment of Japanese study programmes and Japan-related media programmes around the world. 
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the West, displaying representations of the exotic, mysterious Orient (Hotta-Lister 1999; 
Benedict 1994). For the Europeans of this study, who grew up in the Europe of the 
1990s, the first contact to Japan was often by Japanese pop iconology which found its 
way into European media at the time (Iwabuchi 2002; Napier 2007).  
According to informants from both Western and Eastern European countries, 
serials like Sailor Moon, Pokémon and Dragon ball were among the most popular 
animated television series when they were elementary or junior high school students. 
Many cultural enthusiasts discovered their passion for the country through their first 
contact with Japanese popular culture. Japanese anime spread across Europe from the 
1990s and Japanese manga have since been easy to spot in book shelves for children 
and young adults. For others, Japanese traditional culture like tea ceremony or 
calligraphy and the Japanese language caught their attention. With their consumption 
they gradually developed a more general interest in Japan, which fascinated them – 
similar to the lifestyle migrants in the broader Asian context – in contrast to familiar 
Europe.  
Olga’s interest in Japan arose when she was still a child. The Baltic woman grew 
up with Japanese cultural artefacts in her home which her mother had received from 
Japanese business partners.  
 
You know it’s all thanks to my mother who is actually working in a company 
that has all kinds of businesses with Japanese. [...] When I was a small kid 
the Japanese business men came to [my home country] and as my mother is 
quite a top position I just met them, got all the, you know, omiyage 
(souvenirs). And just naturally I got interested in that, I started watching 
movies, anime, and decided to go to a Japanese language school back at the 
same university which I eventually got in. I just wanted to get better at it, 
you know, not like shumi-teki (a hobby). So I decided to enter university and 
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study Japan studies you know, as a senmon-ka (professional). I just loved the 
Japanese language. 
 
As Olga’s narrative shows, as often as it was (popular) culture which drew these 
Europeans’ attention to Japan, they were also fascinated by the Chinese characters of the 
Japanese language. In 21
st
 century Europe, there are multiple ways to encounter 
Japanese language. Apart from the above mentioned popular culture (e.g. the globally 
broadcast and popular TV show “Takeshi’s castle”, various anime and manga series, 
computer games such as Super Mario Bros.), universities have increasingly started to 
offer Japanese study programmes. Even some high schools nowadays include Japanese 
and Chinese in their list of language options.   
Given the cultural enthusiasts’ fondness for Japan, many took advantage of the 
great range of student exchange programmes between European and Japanese 
universities. I discuss the nature of these programmes and their significant influence on 
students’ later job search in Japan in chapter five. Here I wish to stress that the time of 
being a student in Japan fuelled these youths’ interest and consequently the motivation 
for later moving to Tokyo for work. As international students they had time to travel and 
make Japanese friends. Olga describes with shining eyes how deeply her first visit to 
Japan impressed her.  
 
I loved it, I loved every second of it. And I just had these pink glasses you 
know like “Everything is so perfect.” You know like when at the same time 
you look at these high glass buildings and you have this jinja (Japanese 
Shinto shrine) around. Like “kawaii! (cute)” And all this, you know, 
Japanese guys [laughing]. All this culture which you had been looking at 
over the two years studying about it. Yeah, I loved it.  
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What they experience as a time of freedom and adventure later crystallises into a clearer 
life plan with the aim to live in Japan. The more these young Europeans learn about the 
country the more determined they are to improve their Japanese language proficiency. 
They understand that the domestic labour market is centred on the Japanese language 
and that even foreign companies employ mostly Japanese staff.  
Many of the cultural enthusiasts had reached a relatively high Japanese language 
proficiency upon graduation. Olga considered graduate school in Japan but missed the 
application deadline and was furthermore uncertain if she could afford the high tuition 
fees. Contemplating her options, she started to consider employment in Japan seriously 
– not, as we can see, for the sake of employment, a big career or the like, but as a path 
to life in Japan. “And afterwards”, she recalled, “because I didn’t want to go back- Well, 
I wanted to stay in Japan. So I talked to my boyfriend at that time, he is Japanese also.” 
Olga eventually decided to search for a job since it happened to be the season when 
companies’ job information sessions started across Tokyo.  
Having familiarised themselves with Japan, the young Europeans were aware of 
Japanese corporations’ recent welcoming attitude towards foreign employees (see 
chapter five). Thus, they sensed their opportunities: Working in Japan seemed to offer 
an extension of the joyful time they previously had experienced in the country. Many 
described their excitement of finally having the chance to apply everything they had 
learned. They assumed they would be regarded as gurōbaru jinzai (literally: global 
human resources). This is the key word with which Japanese corporations refer to 
employees who are able to work in global settings.  
Olga, too, was lured by the “global image” which even Japan’s traditional (and 
most prestigious) companies – among them her later employer – have recently 
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developed. Her quote reveals that this global image was one of the main reasons for her 
to apply for the company. “You know, they speak about being global and they create this 
image that [they are] kind of the most global company in the world.” Due to Olga’s 
repeated travels to Japan and her time as an exchange student she was experienced 
enough to know that most foreigners struggled with the language. She saw her chance to 
fill this niche. On the one hand, she felt capable to work the Japanese way in terms of 
language and culture. On the other hand, she possessed all the “global” attributes of 
which the official discourse and companies were talking; that is, English as well as 
other foreign language proficiency, intercultural knowledge, and experience of living 
abroad.  
Two factors cause the cultural enthusiasts to return to Japan after their stints as 
travellers or students: First, they have fallen in love with the country. Their initial 
encounter with Japan is carefree, full of adventures, but few responsibilities. 
Simultaneously, they deepen their understanding of the country and language and 
extend their networks. Second, they connect with similarly minded people who provide 
access to institutions and contacts that turn out to be of high value when later trying to 
find a job.  
Ultimately, finding employment in Japan is not only attractive “in order to get the 
visa”, as Olga puts it. Since very few of the cultural enthusiasts worked in Europe 
before, staying in Japan also seems to be easier than returning to their home countries. 
There, they would have to build new networks and familiarize themselves with the 
domestic job search system. This, then, clearly demarcates them from the lifestyle 
migrants, who only take a break from work in Europe where they had worked for 
several years previous to migration to Asia. While the lifestyle migrants intend to return 
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after a few years of adventure and thus opt for jobs with linkages to their home 
countries in order to maintain their careers, the cultural enthusiasts have not 
experienced full-time work in Europe and do not wish to do so. They strive to build a 
life in Japan and prepare by investing in the local language and domestic networks. This 
different focus then is the major difference between the two types. The lifestyle 
migrants keep their home countries as a fix point and anchor whereas the cultural 
enthusiasts orientate themselves increasingly at Japan, its job market and their local 
friends and spouses. 
 
4.2.3 Global Professionals 
In the opening of this thesis I introduced Andras, the Hungarian hospitality manager 
who I met in Singapore. I used his case for the beginning because he characterises the 
major type of my informants who I call the global professionals. Andras, who had never 
felt at home in his own country, decided, after several shorter overseas sojourns, to 
leave his home country permanently at the age of 25. From France (intra-European 
mobility) to the Maldives (as a gateway to Asia) to Singapore (a hub with more 
promising career opportunities), Andras slowly worked himself up in the hotel industry. 
When I met him, he was mid-way through his expensive and time-intensive MBA 
which meant that he slept for an average of four hours a night. Yet, for Andras it was 
worth it. Countries like Singapore and Hong Kong – the latter his next city of residence 
after Singapore – value high education and expertise. Andras’ goals in life are bound up 
with these or similar dynamic labour markets. For him, only global cities offer the kind 
of jobs which make for a satisfactory life. 
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Global professionals’ motivations to move to Asian cities are multifaceted and lie 
somewhere between the celebration of life overseas in an international environment, the 
feeling of oppression, or more often, monotony, in one’s local surroundings and the 
assumption that employment in global cities could boost the early career. Isabelle’s 
story offers a detailed insight into the complexity of global professionals’ motivations 
for mobility. The 28-year old French woman has Arabic roots and sticks out from my 
predominantly Caucasian informants. She started describing how her family situation, 
among other factors, strongly influenced her migration decisions. Isabelle then went on: 
I got my master degree in law in Paris. As a lawyer in France your prospects 
internationally wise are limited and I wanted to have a more international 
career. I really wanted to go overseas and live abroad, and to Asia, but I 
realised that my degree was mostly not recognised. So I was trying to find a 
master degree in business with international options. A friend told me about 
a good university in Australia.  
Isabelle’s account indicates the multiple dimensions of her mobility decision. Her multi-
ethnic and multinational background, earlier mobility experiences, longing for an 
“international career”, and the disappointment with her home country which failed to 
offer her such international and for her equalling attractive employment conditions in 
her field. This is why she applied for the Australian university mentioned and, after 
travelling Southeast Asia for six months, enrolled in a master focusing on employment 
law. Now being able to compare she felt encouraged to follow her professional 
aspirations. “I came to Australia and discovered a brand-new culture. After studying in 
France- It (France) is very elitist, very organised, hierarchical. Very settled so when you 
want to have a career it’s very challenging when you are young. In Aussie, it’s very laid 
back.”  
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Isabelle found a job in Australia after graduation. However, when Australia’s 
economy declined a year later, Isabelle looked out for other options and revived her 
initial plan of moving to Asia. Having travelled Southeast Asia before, she was fond of 
the region and excited about the idea of living and working in Asia. When a friend who 
worked in Singapore told her about the presence of many other young French and the 
chances to secure a job, Isabelle did not think long. 
As she reflected on her determination to make it into Singapore’s labour market, 
Isabelle realised that her multicultural background had helped her. She doubted that 
“pure Europeans who have only lived in Europe and have never been out of the country” 
would throw themselves into job search in Singapore on a tourist visa, especially if they 
were not accompanied by a partner. However, while my data demonstrates that her final 
assumption is not entirely true, most of the global professionals have indeed been 
mobile before moving to Asia.
21
  
What Isabelle is right about is the fact that the ones who had experienced life 
abroad were confident enough to leave for Asia without a job offer, and often without a 
partner. Quite a few global professionals including Isabelle came to Singapore on a 
tourist visa. This was less prevalent in Tokyo where the Japanese language barrier is 
daunting. However, several of my informants in both countries had difficulties to secure 
employment and in fact, there were a few who sought a job in Singapore but ended up 
in Tokyo or, more often, the other way round. Others persevered and sometimes 
received a job offer right before they ran out of money or their tourist visa expired.  
The more stories I collected the more obvious it became how the young adults 
were disappointed with the labour market structures in their home countries. They knew 
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 Several of the lifestyle migrants in Singapore had no personal mobility experience before moving to 
Asia and none has an immigrant background.  
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from friends or personal experience that moving up in the organisational structure 
would take a long time or that even securing a permanent job after graduation has 
become increasingly difficult. In contrast, Asian workplaces did not discourage them 
from the outset but signalled that they valued their education and their ideas. Singapore 
has retained one of the leading ranks as attractive destination for foreign talents for 
years (IMD 2018). My informants are well aware of this image since it made headlines 
in both business as well as popular media. Moreover, as Isabelle remarked, friends told 
her of the chances to obtain a job as a foreign, less experienced person.  
Isabelle thus expected to find a labour market which welcomed highly educated 
people who were willing to fight for recognition and a career. She knew of the modest 
income tax and had heard that no hierarchical structures or a saturated market would 
limit her early professional development. Also, friends as well as reports on foreign 
talent in Singapore reassured her that neither socio-cultural nor legal restrictions would 
deny her as a foreigner, as a woman, or as racial minority access to employment or the 
chance to grow.
22
 Gender, as race, both affect motivations for moving as well as 
experiences in Asia, as I examine in later chapters. At this point it is enough to say that I 
met several European women who did not worry about moving as an independent single 
woman and straight-forwardly stated how much they appreciated the possibility to do so.  
To sum up, global professionals’ most significant characteristic is that they take 
the world as a framework for their professional trajectory. The way their career unfolds, 
in turn, directs their mobility and lifestyle decisions. Thus, in contrast to the lifestyle 
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 This is not entirely true. For instance, Indians are discriminated in some professional occupations such 
as the finance industry. This however has less to do with foreign professionals of Indian ethnicity but is 
rather related to the fact that Indians are the minority group of Singapore’s officially recognised racial 
minorities. They have experienced a history of discrimination as a minority within their own country (e.g. 
Ye 2014). Nevertheless, for my informants, even for racially non-Caucasians such as Isabelle, none of her 
physical traits worked against her.  
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migrants, they do not intend to experience living in a country that culturally interests 
them temporarily. Instead, global professionals’ main concern is to work and live in an 
international environment. The choice of country is of minor importance and the focus 
is clearly on building an international career and being surrounded by people of diverse 
national, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The path they pursue to reach this goal is 
geographical mobility. As Andras’ and Isabelle’s trajectories before coming to Asia 
exemplified, the global professionals are not looking for a temporary break from Europe 
in hot or exotic Asia, nor do they commit themselves to a specific country or region.  
First and foremost, they are convinced that chances are higher to find an 
intellectually stimulating work environment and vibrant life abroad than in their home 
countries. For this sake, they are open to embark on employment opportunities in other 
parts of the world as long as such opportunities promise interesting and challenging 
positions. While some start out in Europe (as Andras) or other Western countries (as 
Isabelle), a considerable number of my interviewees found their first job in other Asian 
countries, especially China. Others have worked in their home countries for years. At 
one point, however, they decide that their current job, or maybe even conditions in their 
home country (or first host-country, to recall Isabelle’s case), might not enable them to 
lead the life they want or to advance in their career at the pace they wish. In general, 
they leave Europe for an indefinite period of time and both the shape of their life abroad 
as well as an eventual return is much less clear than in the case of the lifestyle migrants.  
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4.2.4 Economic Refugees 
My ethnographic field work made me aware of a growing number of young educated 
adults who for various reasons do not find life satisfactory in the Europe in its present 
state. While journalistic accounts have portrayed the fate of many young Europeans 
who suffer from unemployment, precariousness or flee the very same (e.g. Küchel 
2018; Lynn 2016) there is very little written about those who left the continent. One of 
those who left is Marcos. The Portuguese, 34 years at the time, had grown up in Lisbon 
in a middle-class family. His father, a director in a huge advertising company, pushed 
the children to reach out internationally. Marcos, who failed to enter university in 
Barcelona and thus studied urban architecture in Lisbon, spent 6 months in Japan under 
a student exchange agreement. He loved the experienced and was somehow 
disappointed with the settled life he found when he accepted a research position in 
Portugal after graduation. The position did not keep him long. Knowing about the 
generous scholarship opportunities provided by the Japanese government, Marcos soon 
started to prepare the necessary application documents and one year later happily 
entered a graduate programme in sustainability and architecture in Fukuoka, the biggest 
city on Japan’s southernmost main island Kyushu.  
Three years later and equipped with a master degree, Marcos applied for jobs in 
Japan but had to realise that although he spoke conversational Japanese his proficiency 
was inadequate for employment. When in March 2011 the Great Tohoku earthquake hit 
the country and Marcos’ family worried about his health, he gave up the job search and 
returned to Portugal. However, his return fell together with the peak of the European 
crisis and he could not find a job in his field in Portugal. The following year was 
  109 
depressing, marked by the frustrations of working outside his discipline and 
simultaneously tedious job search spanning various industries and European countries:  
It was a bad time in Europe and the world and for an architect. So I was 
applying for all kinds of jobs in Portugal, even shipping because I could 
speak a little bit of Japanese and English, Spanish, Portuguese, French so 
why not use this? And I was a little bit desperate because at that time. I was 
waking up and still living with my mum- (sic)
23
 
When architect friends  told  him  about  positions  in  other  European 
countries he widened his job search but still could not secure employment. 
After ten months Marcos heard about big architecture projects in Singapore. He had one 
friend in the country and soon decided to buy a flight ticket to Singapore where he 
eventually found a job.  
Marcos’ case exemplifies the desperation that drove him and others to leave their 
countries, flying to far-off places and with as strict immigration policies as Singapore. 
In many ways the economic refugees, as I call them, resemble their counterparts from 
developing countries who flee unemployment and broken economies. While these 
Europeans enjoyed a higher living standard during their youth, they now feel the 
consequences of the economic and financial crises which hit the European Union’s 
Mediterranean member states particularly hard.  
De Genova and Tazzioli speak of a “crisis talk” where the “multifarious crises” 
(2016:8) can and should no longer be separated in order to conceptualise their 
implications on Europeans and non-Europeans. During my fieldwork, I encountered 
precarious situations mostly with those whose countries were hit hardest by the 
                                                             
23 Some quotes contain mistakes in grammar or expressions that the informants made. I decided to keep 
and not correct them as they are my informants’ original expressions and best convey their state of mind. 
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economic crisis such as Italians and Portuguese. Figure 3, based on a study by Eichhorst, 
Hinte, and Rinne (2013), illustrates the dramatic rise in young academics’ 
unemployment rates in several European countries between 2008 and 2012. While the 
study is to a certain extent limited due to the authors’ definition of youth as age 15 - 24, 
it clearly conveys how prevalent precariousness is even for the highly educated in 
several European countries.  
 
Figure 3: Rise in unemployment among young academics in the European Union 
 
Source: Eichhorst, Hinte, Rinne (2013:2)  
 
Academic literature and public media have discussed youth un- and 
underemployment in Europe. While university graduates in the 1980s and 1990s tried to 
secure a permanent position right away, Germany’s buzz word in 2006, “Generation 
Praktikum” (generation internship), describes an infamous development in several EU 
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countries in the early 2000s. University graduates increasingly struggle to secure full-
time positions but survive on precarious, short-term internship arrangements – or simply 
temporary employment contracts – over months or even years. Surveys in Germany, on 
the European level and even voices from the United States present similar results (see 
Zerahn 2007; Economist 2007; Eichhorst, Hinte, Rinne 2013 in the respective order): 
Salary is poor and employment conditions precarious which is why the youth tend to 
stay longer with their parents and view their job prospects very critically.  
A study in Germany for example found that 41 per cent of the graduation cohort 
of 2000 did not find a full-time position immediately but first completed an internship 
(Grühn and Hecht 2007). Critiques of such claims – in general as on the respective 
study – however argue that the phenomenon must not be generalised but concerns 
graduates of humanities rather than engineering or other natural sciences. What is 
certain is that Generation Erasmus realised during their studies that they would not 
secure work and experience rising salaries as easily as their parent generation.  
Interviewees from Greece, Italy and Portugal all commented on the strained 
condition of their home country labour markets. Depending on their age and thus time 
of entering employment as well as their occupational industry, the crisis was not just 
one out of many but the main factor for their decision to emigrate. Yet, few of the 
economic refugees were cushioned by a financial safety net. Interviewees mentioned 
that they could have relied on their parents in the worst case. Nevertheless, before doing 
so, they took on lower qualified jobs as we can see from Marcos’ stint in the shipping 
industry. The economic refugees who I met in Singapore knew that the country was one 
of their few chances to avoid unemployment, precarious underemployment or living off 
their parents. While their eventual road into employment varied, they drew on any 
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resource – networking events, online job portals, speculative applications and the like – 
which could possibly secure them a job.  
Marcos’ example reveals yet another feature of the European migrants of this 
study. The young adults are used to being “successful” in their lives. They have 
graduated from higher educational institutions and some have been awarded 
scholarships abroad. They are driven to desperation when they cannot secure a decent 
job. Recognition is important to Generation Erasmus and pride essential for 
understanding their migratory decisions. Many of my informants admitted that they 
were grateful to know that they could rely on their parents. Yet, they unanimously saw 
returning to their parents’ house, either temporary after graduation from university or 
after longer time abroad, as a back-up plan or even the least desirable option. While a 
few returned temporarily or worked under short-term agreements outside their field, 
they felt considerable unease. Marcos, for instance, frankly admitted how humiliating he 
experienced his situation. Thus, both, becoming independent again and finding 
employment in their profession and not “just any job”, were the economic refugees’ 
biggest concerns to re-establish their self-esteem.  
I found a similar situation to the Mediterranean countries in the Baltic and some 
Eastern European countries where young people with university degrees literally fled 
the country. Informants from these regions mentioned constraints when searching for 
employment or dim prospects for a career at home. Nonetheless, participants from 
Western European countries, too, complain over struggles to secure decent jobs and dim 
prospects for professional development in their home countries. What is more, they are 
less convinced that their home country will pay them sufficient retirement benefits once 
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they are old. Thus, many oppose the high income and social security taxes that were 
deducted from their salaries.  
In the extreme case of some poorer European countries, the situation pushes the 
majority of the educated youth to leave the country. Those who remain, or those 
considering a return after having been abroad, perceive their home country as far less 
attractive as Olaf, a Baltic informant remarked. “Since people are leaving and there 
[are] no friends to hang out with, whether everybody is in England or friends are in 
Germany or Sweden- So there is kind of nothing really holding me there.” With no jobs, 
no decent wage and no friends, some left to Asian cities of whose more promising 
positions and high quality of life they knew.  
This however, made evident by Marcos’ narrative, reveals another characteristic 
of the economic refugees.  Most of them had been abroad before they migrated in search 
for employment. Also, they desired interesting jobs and inspiring surroundings that 
offered opportunities for career advancement. Thus, no matter how heavy the economic 
factor weighed, these Europeans’ positive attitude towards challenge and foreign 
countries played a role in their mobility and partly explains why they moved to an Asian 
global city and not to any other labour destination.  
 
4.3 Demarcation and Conversion of Types 
In this chapter I so far have defined the group of Generation Erasmus, the young 
European migrants in focus of this study. I proposed that a generational lens is useful to 
understand their distinctive traits. These young adults’ commonalities are rooted in their 
upbringing as middle-class citizens in an enlarging EU. Coming of age with the 
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ubiquitous availability of information technology and online social networking tools 
and having enjoyed pre-employment mobility in Europe and beyond, shaped their 
dispositions and aspirations. This allows to conceptualize them as one group, 
Generation Erasmus. However, they also confronted rising competitiveness on their 
local labour markets. Despite the group’s middle-class background and high education, 
they struggled to find decent employment.  
More than mere economic factors, however, a general sense of insecurity and the 
urge to choose a meaningful, maybe promising biography in what Beck (1994) called 
“reflexive modernity” affect Generation Erasmus’ perceptions of opportunities in 
Europe and elsewhere. Van de Velde (2008) suggests that, despite large cultural and 
structural differences between European regions, young adults across the continent 
search for the meaning of life in different ways than earlier generations did. Some of 
them exercise geographical mobility as a means. The author however reminds the reader 
of the contingency of social class and state intervention models which direct the actions 
the young adults ultimately take. 
Migration becomes a viable option for some of the European millennials, 
especially when they have been abroad before and have made positive experiences. 
What attracts them to Asia, then, does not simply refer to lifestyle but to professional 
opportunities, the chance to distinguish themselves and the chance to escape from a 
crisis-ridden EU. While these young migrants might easily be misinterpreted à la “free-
floating in the cosmopolis” (Colic-Peisker 2010), the portrayal of the four ideal types 
brought the complexities of their migration motivations to the fore. The typology 
detects variations in motivations to move and ways into employment overseas. It also 
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points to the heterogeneous reasons for which different people migrate to different 
destinations.  
In the beginning of this chapter, figure 2 illustrated the main motivations which 
demarcate the four ideal types. While both lifestyle migrants and cultural enthusiasts 
exhibit “culture and climate” as major motivation, the chapter illuminated their 
profound differences: For the lifestyle migrants, their motivation is to go on a (mid-
term) adventure very often as a couple, in a place they expect to be culturally different 
from their Western upbringing. Since they see the adventure as a temporary break from 
Europe, they maintain their professional and personal connections in their home 
countries. While they are fascinated by the image they have of Asia, they seldom have a 
preferred destination in mind. Singapore happens to be most accessible given the 
linguistic advantage (English as working language) and the fact that bigger European 
companies often have a regional office in the global city. While the adventure in the 
culturally unfamiliar place is their primary motivation, career considerations cannot be 
neglected in the migratory project. The lifestyle migrants, despite their intention to 
return and their consequently staying attached to their home countries and even 
employers, see the values in the more dynamic and flexible labour markets and growing 
industries in Asia. They hope to gain from their mobility both in terms of a stimulating 
international environment as well as in a professional sense regarding stagnating 
promotional opportunities in their home countries.  
In contrast, cultural enthusiasts from early on develop a specific fondness of 
Japan, the Japanese language and traditional or pop culture. At the time of graduation 
from university many have obtained an intermediate proficiency in Japanese or above 
and they have spent several months in the country as students or interns. Migration to 
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Tokyo, then, is not a temporary break from Europe. Actually, the cultural enthusiasts 
regard employment as a means to the end of living in the country of their dreams. Their 
motivations formed at a time when they had not yet experienced full-time work and 
family or career concerns. Given both their pre-employment embeddedness in Japan – 
with local friends, and sometimes a Japanese spouse – and their lack of labour market 
knowledge and connections in Europe, they seem motivated to stay. 
In contrast to the latter, global professionals, as their name implies, are not fixed 
on a specific country in which they plan to stay (cultural enthusiasts) or a specific 
region as a temporary adventure before returning to Europe (lifestyle migrants). They 
seek an international environment where they can interact with people of different 
backgrounds, ethnicities, cultures and languages. They believe that working abroad is 
more beneficial to their personal growth and career advancement than staying in 
familiar surroundings, which they perceive as less challenging and less stimulating but 
rigid or even oppressive. Since their motivation to migrate is tied to the feasibility of 
career development and working in diverse international surroundings, they are not 
loyal to the destination country nor the social environment, as long as it offers 
interaction with like-minded people. 
Finally, the economic refugees are the victims of the European economic crisis 
and the growing precariousness among European youth, including the highly educated. 
They experienced the feeling of failure which unsettled their self-esteem. Yet, even the 
economic refugees could have found some sort of job in their home countries or in other 
European countries. Given their earlier overseas experience and their hunger for 
challenge, they were inclined to rather move farer away from their home countries but 
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in turn gain more in terms of high living standard, opportunities for professional growth, 
and, importantly, an internationally minded community of their like. 
The categorisation by types revealed the significance of place for migratory 
decision makings. Images, language, and a country’s economic power strongly affect 
which destination attracts which type of potential movers. Before the young Europeans’ 
first move to Asia, few were indifferent with regards to the destination city. While a big 
city was for the majority the minimum requirement for migration, many had fairly clear 
ideas of why they targeted Tokyo or Singapore. As demonstrated, Tokyo first and 
foremost lured with cultural appeal, including the Japanese language which is 
commonly known as difficult to study. Singapore, on the contrary, is a substitute for any 
Asian – and for the global professionals any global – city that offers a high living 
standard, decent employment without a language barrier and the additional advantage of 
its connectedness to other hubs as well as appealing travel destinations. The discussion 
so far underlined the differences of the two cities when initially considered by potential 
European migrants. The final paragraphs of this chapter complicate these findings by 
pointing to the commonalities of all types regarding migration motivations and 
anticipate that migrants’ mobility motivations approximate over time.  
The analysis of migrants’ narratives elucidates two characteristics that all my 
informants’ display to some degree. These are indicated by the two primary motivations 
in Figure 2, career advancement and cultural fondness. The young Europeans underwent 
higher education (often postgraduate), and several obtained degrees from reputable 
universities. Some worked extensive hours or studied foreign languages in order to 
secure a job in a country where they hoped for a better life or simply for more 
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stimulating professional surroundings. They aspired an international career which they 
perceived hardly possible in their home countries.  
The other characteristic is the recurring issue of experiencing an unfamiliar 
culture through mobility. Mobility is prevalent, for some because of their roots in 
several countries or their previous migration stints, for others as a common discourse, as 
the norm, as something to aspire and in the fabric of conferring cosmopolitanism, open-
mindedness and access to a brighter, maybe more rewarding or more exciting, future. 
Overall, the pervasiveness of mobility directed their ambitions and ultimately led to 
migration.  
Each type exhibits its own primary motivation, visualised through a strong (        ) 
link between the specific motivation in level 2 and the type in level 3. However, weak 
links ( ---- ), as well as the vertical relations between the two primary motivations of 
level 1 with all secondary motivations of level 2, demonstrate each type’s complexity 
and the interdependence of its respective motivations. These interdependencies and all 
types’ origin in the context of the EU and the group I call Generation Erasmus nurtures 
their desire to live abroad. Abroad, in the case of Generation Erasmus, means 
emigrating from the EU and thus leaving the familiar. In sum, these types do not 
represent several migration phenomena but one mobility phenomenon of young 
Europeans’ work-related migration to Asia, and the nature of this work is the focus of 
the following chapter. The types gradually converge and migrants align in their 
orientation towards a ‘mobile’ life, which becomes clearer in the course of the following 
chapters.  
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5. Routes into Employment  
This chapter focusses on Generation Erasmus’ routes into jobs and their employment 
conditions in Asian cities. While the previous chapters unravelled these young 
Europeans’ shared – sometimes orientalised – imagination of ‘Asia’ as opposed to the 
familiar West, this chapter underlines variances in East Asian capitalism (Lechevalier 
2014) which become significant once ‘motivation’ to move turns into actual labour 
migration.  
As explained, numbers are particularly hard to obtain and statistics in most cases 
do not discriminate for generation or age in combination with the visa status and the 
country of origin or citizenship. This means that even for Japan, where extensive 
statistics on the foreigner population can be obtained, it is not possible to adequately 
trace the trend of young European independent movers to Tokyo. Figure 4 shows the 
increase of the foreign resident population in Japan between 2006 and 2017, broken 
down by the major regions of origin. Asians are the biggest group by far, followed by 
South Americans. However, while the number of the latter group has dropped, that of 
Westerners, especially Europeans, has grown considerably and Europeans have lately 
outnumbered North Americans in Japan. 
As stated above, the recent trend of young Europeans’ independent migration to 
Asian cities, despite its arguably small scale when compared to the larger number of 
intra-Asian migration, is featured in newspaper articles and media reports (Coconut 
Daily 2015; Marlow 2013; Zhuang 2018; Qian and Elsinga 2015; Koshoibekova 2014). 
Qualitative micro-level studies, both in Japan as well as other Asian destinations such as 
Beijing (Knowles 2015), Shanghai (Farrer 2019; Stanley 2013), Hong Kong (Leonard 
2010), Taiwan (Tzeng 2010) and Singapore (Lundström 2014), too, demonstrate that 
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contemporary migration has diversified including numbers of young Europeans who 
take up full-time jobs in major Asian cities. These reports give a more accurate 
understanding of the change in directions of movements from Western labour migration 
(in contrast to company-assigned expatriation) to Asian countries and the qualitative 
shift and diversification of the recent young migrant population.  
 
Figure 4: Foreign residents in Japan by region of origin; 2006, 2011, 2017 
 
Source: Created by the author. Calculated based on Ministry of Justice (2006a, 2011a, 2017a). 
 
 
The first part of this chapter addresses the situation in Singapore and the latter in Japan 
where the great majority of Generation Erasmus are working in Tokyo. Both parts are 
organised in the same order. First, I outline the labour market characteristics and take 
into consideration how the state handles the issue of skilled foreign labour. In the 
subchapter that follows, I turn to the legal and institutional frameworks that channel the 
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European migrants into distinct labour market niches. I then outline migrants’ access to 
the labour market and their occupational profiles. This provides grounds for my analysis 
of the role migrants’ resources and ability to mobilise various forms of capital play for 
the process of migration. Scrutinising Generation Erasmus’ access to employment and 
their distinctive occupational profiles, I advance towards a discussion of the symbolic 
capital which renders the young Europeans attractive for the globalising labour markets 
of both host societies. 
 
5.1 Singapore 
5.1.1 Characteristics of the Singaporean Labour Market 
Singapore became independent from Great Britain in 1965. Tackling the challenge of 
nation building and economic development in the post-colonial immigrant state, the 
government embraced an open market economy with free trade and a focus on foreign 
direct investment (hereafter FDI) (Chia 2015).  By the year 2003, 6000 multinational 
companies (hereafter MNCs) constituted one of the economy’s main pillars (Wong, 
Millar, and Choi 2006:80). Through their presence, the city-state integrated into global 
production networks and supply chains. Long known as manufacturing export base, 
Singapore has striven to become a knowledge-based economy and has gradually 
upgraded to higher value-added industries. Since the 1990s the government has 
encouraged Singaporean firms to venture abroad and started to strengthen its domestic 
entrepreneurial sector (Phelps 2007).  
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Due to the country’s dependence on (increasingly highly-educated) human 
resources and the limited number of its local population – who are in fact immigrants 
from China, Malaysia and India themselves –, the government has long welcomed 
foreign labour. Though the unskilled foreign workforce outnumbers skilled foreigners 
by far, the official rhetoric concentrates on the latter group, the so-called foreign talent. 
Since the 2000s, when the country expanded research in biotechnology (Wong and 
Bunnell 2006) and electronic products and targeted healthcare, education (Olds 2007) 
and creative industries (Chang 2000; Wong, Miller and Choi 2006), the attraction of 
such foreign talent has become a major political discourse. 
Nowadays, Singapore is most notably recognised as a regional service hub for 
finance, shipping and air transport. Singapore’s political, social and macroeconomic 
stability, transparent legal and regulatory framework, low level of public sector 
corruption, availability of foreign professionals and workers through a sophisticated 
immigration system as well as a well-developed physical infrastructure (Chia 2015) 
have secured the city-state a position among the world leaders of a conducive business 
environment.  
The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 however slowed economic growth. During 
the 2008 - 2009 recession again firms had to retrench and suddenly Singaporeans had to 
fear job loss (Chia 2015). Concerned about the small country’s competitiveness in the 
future, the government had earlier set up the Economic Development Board (hereafter 
EDB). The EDB launched a range of programmes that targeted local businesses and 
human resources in order to foster home-grown innovation, entrepreneurship and 
technological excellence. As part of these initiatives, the EDB set up a Startup 
Enterprise Development Scheme (SEEDS). In contrast to risk-averse Singaporean 
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graduates who are supposedly less prone to become entrepreneurs (Chua and Bedford 
2016), I demonstrate below that the recent entrepreneurial mood appeals to foreign 
talent.  
At the turn of the century, with the struggle to sustain the high living standard and 
counter rising social tensions, the issue of foreign professionals has taken centre stage 
(e.g. Yang, Yang, and Zahn 2017; Koh 2003; Montsion 2012). For long, the government 
had argued that in the need to upgrade skills foreign talent was indispensable. The 
climate however changed with the 2009 general election (Yang et al. 2017). Despite the 
ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) retaining its position, their hegemonic rule was 
challenged and they experienced dramatic losses in votes for the first time since 
Singapore’s independence. Political analysts contributed a great part of the electoral 
outcome to the government’s refusal to change their foreign labour policy because the 
public had repeatedly demanded a cap on the foreign workforce. Since then, the PAP 
has put significant restrictions on welcoming foreign talent. The number of foreigners 
who were granted permanent residence (hereafter PR) has dropped significantly as has 
the one for naturalisation. Working visa for foreign talents, so-called Employment 
Passes (hereafter EPs), are often rejected, yet reasons are unclear and the whole 
immigration system is highly obscure (ibid). 
 
5.1.2 Europeans’ Access to the Labour Market  
Legal and Institutional Framework for Migration 
Singapore’s total population was 5.61 million in June 2017 and is classified by the 
Ministry of Manpower (MOM) into three groups: Citizens, numbering 3.44 million, 
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Permanent Residents (PRs) with a population size of 0.53 million and Non-residents, 
1.65 million (figure 5). These Non-residents hold various visa available for dependents, 
foreign workers and students. Twelve per cent of Non-residents have an Employment 
Pass (EP), the most widely issued permit for professionals (National Population and 
Talent Division Singapore 2018). As the government does not disseminate detailed 
statistics on foreigners, the current number of Europeans among Singapore’s foreign 
workforce is unknown. The last figure available is Coe and Kelly’s study (2000:417), 
which stated that of the 80,000 EP holders in 1998, “Japanese nationals form the largest 
contingent (approximately 25 per cent of the total), followed by Americans, British, 
other Europeans and Australians.” 
 
Figure 5: Population Singapore 
Total Population                                                           Non-Residents 
 
Source: National Population and Talent Division. 2018. Retrieved June 24, 2018 
(https://www.population.sg/population-trends/demographics).   
 
Singapore provides smooth and quick processing of visa applications. According to the 
Institute of Management Development (IMD 2018), the country has ranked high in 
terms of overall competitiveness and consequently in attractiveness for highly skilled 
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labour for years. Working visa are categorised according to skill level. Most of my 
informants have the ‘skilled’ visa, the EP. This status demands a significant level of skill 
and financial resources or a minimum monthly salary of at least 3,600 Singapore dollars 
for recent graduates and higher salaries for experienced professionals.
24
 Additionally, 
the applicant needs to have “acceptable qualifications”, which the MoM (2018b) defines 
as “usually a good university degree, professional qualifications or specialist skills.” 
The employer has to apply on behalf of the future employee and the pass is valid, upon 
its approval, for up to two years for first-time candidates and up to three years thereafter 
(ibid). Termination of the employment contract – from either side – has to be reported to 
the immigration authorities and the foreign national only has one month to secure new 
employment until his current EP expires (Zhang et al. 2017). 
 
Navigating Options of Access to Employment 
The Europeans in this study accessed the Singaporean labour market via several patterns. 
As indicated upon in the previous chapter, some arrived on a tourist visa and searched 
for a job on-site. Isabelle, the French woman with Arabic background who had started 
her professional career in Australia, heard about job opportunities in Singapore from a 
friend.  
I always wanted to come here [Singapore] so I talked to a friend who said “if 
you want to come you should give it a try. There are so many French here 
coming every week who try their chance and quite a few find a position.” 
[…] I gave everything I had in Aussi away. I was really into coming here. I 
went on Airbnb and found a job. I was very motivated. I went to all the 
networking events, met so many people, also people in my industry, career 
                                                             
24
 Approximately 2700 US dollars.  
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recruitment, where I wanted to work. I think when you arrive you have to be 
really targeted, have to know what you want, know the people and know 
where you fit.  
Isabelle’s case drives us to the unconventional ways through which a fair number of the 
Europeans enter Asian global cities. In Singapore many arrive with little or no network 
and start to build contacts from scratch. “Know[ing] the people” in Isabelle’s case meant 
to use her single French contact in Singapore as a gate keeper to others and as an 
informational source. For weeks, she attended every event she heard of and built 
contacts with people in her industry. Also, the presence of a large and networked French 
community in Singapore helped her to extend her knowledge on the market and receive 
advice on how to sell herself in job interviews. This requires self-confidence and an 
outgoing personality as well as at least some savings. Isabelle had worked in Australia 
before and so could afford accommodation via Airbnb and three months of 
unemployment.  
Others had less financial resources. They found temporary housing with friends 
and simultaneously concentrated on online job search, meetings with head hunters and 
every single networking event that took place in the city. Marcos, the Portuguese 
architect who I introduced as an economic refugee above, was one of them as was 
Lorena, an Italian woman who developed creative strategies to catch potential 
employers’ attention. “I attended two networking events where I printed my personal 
business cards with details and three main bullet points with my top three skills. And if 
[you] turned [it had a] QR code with my CV [accessible] through mobile phone. I 
attended all these meetings so at least people will not forget me.”   
The above narratives demonstrate that, despite varying motivations for moving, 
European migrants increasingly access jobs from the non-privileged position of tourist 
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visa holders who are financially and legally under pressure to secure employment 
quickly. This finding is significant and compares to the situation in Tokyo where young 
Europeans, too, compete with local graduates and other highly educated migrants on the 
job market.  
Other informants followed more traditional paths to employment in Asia. Some 
negotiated an internal transfer with their European firms, yet on a domestic and not an 
expatriate contract. One of the latter, part of the lifestyle migrant type, is Florence, a 
French lawyer. Florence migrated together with her husband and, while both had 
wanted to leave France, the decision for Singapore fell when her husband learned about 
a job with a French company in the city-state. The position was posted through the so-
called V.I.E. programme, a French overseas internship scheme which enables EU 
graduates with limited or no work experience to work on a contracted basis in French 
firms abroad.
25
 Eight of my informants in both cities (roughly ten per cent of the total) 
exercised their first work-related migration as interns through this so-called V.I.E. 
scheme. Two of the eight informants are not French but EU citizens. This hints at V.I.E. 
as a channel for labour migration on a much larger than just the French domestic scale. 
In fact, it targets at all European citizens of the specified age range. Thanks to a greater 
supply of internationally-minded and linguistically capable applicants, French 
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 The V.I.E. French International Internship Program was founded in 2001 by the French Ministry of 
Foreign Trade in order to promote French exports abroad. The French National Service manages the 
programme which means that interns are considered to be French public employees and receive a monthly 
allowance (as opposed to a salary). They are exempted from tax and are covered under the French 
insurance system (Civiweb 2017a). The French state is not only intermediary but is responsible for the 
interns. European graduates between the age of 18 and 28 are eligible to apply for an overseas working 
assignment for a period varying between six up to 24 months. Since its establishment, more than 35,000 
interns have found limited employment abroad with 4336 companies. While these are also called 
“internships”, being first-time or early career positions for new graduates that do not guarantee transfer, 
they give young people the chance to find work abroad despite lack of work experience (Ubifrance 2015). 
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companies can choose from a larger labour pool – the European and not only the French 
– which in turn benefits the French state.  
From the company perspective, too, the programme is advantageous in that the 
firm does not need to arrange for the visa and can waive the hire of costly expatriates. 
The homepage promotes the programme under the heading “The benefits of hiring a 
V.I.E. intern for the company: Flexibility, Simplicity and Financial Benefits.” In other 
words, companies are invited to take advantage of flexible, namely monthly contracted, 
and relatively cheap but highly educated labour who might gradually replace traditional 
expatriate assignments (Civiweb 2017b).  
For the young Europeans, the V.I.E. offers clear assets: It allows them to embark 
on an extended work-related overseas “training” while guaranteeing them certain 
security structures. The system does therefore not only facilitate youth mobility but 
fuels it beyond EU borders. However, the contract is limited to one or two years and my 
data shows that a permanent position afterwards is not guaranteed. This influences how 
young migrants think about their sojourn. Florence and her husband knew that his 
position was only for two years and Florence suggested that they were likely to return to 
Europe, maybe even France.  
The non-expatriate dispatch of young professionals from developed countries, 
similar to an internship, yet time-wise and in terms of compensation addressed at full-
time employees, is something rather new. Apart from the V.I.E. programme, I met 
migrants who came via similar channels to Asia. For instance, an independent public 
entity of the Government of Portugal, which promotes Portuguese businesses abroad, 
operates an internship programme that sends one hundred graduates to Portuguese firms 
around the globe every year (aicep Portugal global 2017). Thus it is the Portuguese 
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equivalent to V.I.E. with the essential difference that it is only open to Portuguese 
citizens. One of my informants, Nico, was in his words “lucky enough to […] go to 
Singapore.” The programme’s striking characteristic is that accepted candidates have to 
sign the contract without knowing their destination. Nico was assigned to a company in 
Singapore. Thanks to the connections he had made with Portuguese business owners 
during the internship, he later managed to find a full-time job in Singapore. 
A student visa is another comparatively “easy” form of access to Singapore. Three 
of my interviewees studied at a Singaporean university, two of them as full-time 
students for graduate degrees. These latter two did not have much trouble to find 
employment afterwards as Deborah, a Greek informant who I met in 2015, told me.  
 
When I first arrived six years ago it was much easier to get a job. I did my 
master at NUS [National University of Singapore] and I was working there 
at the research centre. And upon graduation I had the right to apply for the 
so-called “employment eligibility certificate” or something like that. And 
this allowed me to have a Long Term Visit Pass for a year to stay in 
Singapore to find a job. […] In September 2011, they stopped issuing new 
ones. They changed the policy, it doesn’t exist anymore. 
 
As Deborah’s account reveals, she graduated at a time when migration regulations were 
still very tolerant. Another interviewee, John, came as an exchange student for a year 
and, fond of the idea to start his professional career in Singapore, returned after 
graduation from his home university in Europe and tried to find a job. He struggled 
severely, both because he came without a valid visa (in contrast to Deborah) and 
because at the time he graduated in 2013 immigration regulations had become much 
stricter than before. Eventually, a friend informed him about a prospective employer and 
he was offered a job right before running out of money and risking illegality. Another 
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informant, Caspar, who had graduated from an MBA programme in Singapore was 
stressed by the importance of having networks. He noted how after graduation he 
“suddenly [felt] being alone” and that without friends who could help with “basic stuff 
[like] finding accommodation” he would have run into severe troubles. 
In line with student migration to other countries (e.g. Liu-Farrer 2001a; Szelenyi 
2008; Beech 2018; Collins 2008), the social networks these students nurture over their 
time in the host country later enable them, in the form of social capital, to secure 
employment. More than that, however, I suggest that it is the combined activation and 
conversion of cultural and social capital which makes Generation Erasmus attractive 
junior employees for the global labour market.  
Giacomo, an Italian structural engineering graduate, suggested that his 
“Europeanness” was advantageous for his hire in the Kuala Lumpur branch of an 
architecture company. When I met him after his transfer to the Singaporean headquarter, 
his narrative on the initial hiring process in the company’s Malaysian branch was 
intriguing as it elucidated that this ‘Europeanness’ was more than just his citizenship in 
the EU or his whiteness.  
 
Giacomo: Also the factor that I am European, that’s an advantage that we 
[Europeans] have or had and I took it. 
Me: What do you mean by that?  
Giacomo: It’s the approach to work, at least in engineering. I wouldn’t 
generalise but probably the ways to approach problems are different [here] 
than in Europe. [The company owner] had that experience [of studying in 
Europe] himself and probably was looking for something like that as well. 
So I think it’s a bit of education and mindset. It’s probably the only thing left 
that Europe can sell. (sic) 
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Giacomo suggests that the company owner, himself educated in Europe, values 
European higher education. The prestige of European educational institutions certainly 
plays a role here. It is noteworthy that the Iranian company owner is an alumni of 
Giacomo’s alma mater and himself a migrant in Singapore. His decision to hire a fresh 
graduate from Europe is likely to hail from his trust in Giacomo’s qualifications. Such 
trust then is based on the shared social and institutional network rather than on a belief 
in accomplishment or prestige based on race or nationality. Importantly, Giacomo was 
not, in contrast to some others in Singapore and Tokyo, placed in a sales or marketing 
position where he faced Western clients. Instead, he became member of a team of 
Malaysian employees who worked on local projects. I return to a discussion of migrants’ 
capital in the end of this chapter, but now I wish to conclude the section on Singapore 
with an overview of the occupational profiles and company types of the group.  
 
5.1.3 Labour Market Niches and Occupational Profiles 
Singapore is a hub for MNCs and for regional headquarters of foreign firms. In 
particular, its strong role as a financial and logistics centre, as well as recently in 
biotechnology, software, education and the creative industries have created demand for 
highly skilled human resources in these fields (Montsion 2012). The young Europeans I 
met in Singapore represent the growing industries fairly well. However, against the 
stereotypical image of Westerners being expatriates in MNCs (Lundström 2014; 
Beaverstock 2011), my field work provides evidence that not only distinguished 
multinational companies employ these migrants. I identified five company types in 
which the young Europeans initially work after entering Singapore. Table 2 provides an 
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outline of these types which are foreign firms, EU or European national government-
related businesses, Singaporean firms, Singaporean government-related business, and 
Singaporean start-ups with the European migrant as business owner.  
 
Table 2: Europeans’ initial occupational industries and company types, Singapore 
Type of firm, 
location of HQ 
Industry  Number of 
informants 
Foreign firm 
(HQ: EU, US, 
Taiwan, China) 
Finance, logistics, software, health, 
manufacturing, hospitality, market research, 
advertising, architecture, manufacturing, IT, 
Logistics, design, consulting 
21 
EU/national 
gov.-related 
Politics and trade; culture, information and events 4 
SG firm Architecture, finance, Human Resources, design, 
civil engineering, planning, IT 
8 
SG gov.-related Civil engineering/infrastructure 1 
SG start-up 
(founder) 
Arts 1 
HQ: Headquarter 
 
The table lists the occupational industries and the distribution of the European 
informants (n=35) over the five types. It illustrates that the vast majority (twenty-one) 
enter employment in Singapore via foreign firms in ‘typical’ industries such as finance, 
logistics, architecture, consulting and the like. Most of these companies are 
headquartered in the EU and the US while a few are based in China and one in Taiwan. 
The Europeans who work in Asian companies all had worked in China before. While 
working in these Chinese firms they attained social capital such as trust relationships to 
Chinese managers, a network in China, and familiarity with organisational structures. 
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They managed to cultivate these qualities, which rendered them attractive to their 
Singaporean-based Chinese employers. Insightful is also the role which European and 
national government-related political and cultural institutions play as first employers 
(four informants).  
Nevertheless, eight informants, or one fourth of the total, were hired by local 
firms which operate in similar industries as their foreign counterparts. Some of the 
domestic firms which employ European migrants as well as Singaporean government-
related businesses and the domestic start-up founded by one informant, engage in the 
arts, design, planning and education. Thus, the domestic firms reflect the Singaporean 
government’s recent policies: Promotion of the city-state’s cosmopolitan face via 
emerging flagship industries like innovation and the arts and the rapid expansion of 
education and by recruitment of highly skilled labour.  
 
5.2. Tokyo  
5.2.1 Characteristics of the Japanese Labour Market 
Thanks to Japan’s post-war decades of economic growth, domestic companies were able 
to provide permanent employment to their core employees. Cheaper and dispensable 
labour – mostly women – filled contractual positions as administrative staff and 
clerks.
26
 This created a distinctive labour market and recruitment system whose main 
                                                             
26
 Throughout the booming decades of the post-war years until entering the ‘bubble economy’ in the late 
1980s (Waldenberger 2016), Japanese salaries and along with them living standard rose. When the real 
estate bubble burst in 1991/1992 Japan was the world’s second largest economy after the U.S. 
Contemporary Japanese economy is marked by its third decade of slow growth which has entailed far-
reaching labour market changes especially in terms of hiring and promotion.  
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characteristics are lifetime-employment, on-the-job training, seniority promotion and 
pay, in-house careers, and as a consequence, limited inter-organisational mobility 
(Rebick 2005; Waldenberger 2016). This distinctive political economy had 
consequences for the 2010s’ strained economic situation and for the internationalising 
work force in Japan. 
In Japanese capitalism as it had become established over the decades, socialisation 
in the company transformed the prototypical white-collar worker, the salary man, into a 
shakaijin, literally ‘society person.’27 It started with the recruitment system, the so-
called ‘job-hunting’ (shukatsu) (Dasgupta 2003). This is the period of job search 
activities which usually begins over a year before university students’ graduation.28 
Students are preoccupied with job hunting activities for months. On April 1 of each year, 
new employees enter the companies and complete a series of in-house or boot camp 
training sessions before they are assigned to a team (Kosugi 2007).  
The idea of this system was to train generalists with utmost loyalty to the 
company. In order to assure high quality, firms tied their core employees to the 
company by lifelong employment, the seniority principle which promises salary rise by 
length of employment and age, and financing schemes for loans. This system valorises 
general rather than specialised skills and length of stay in the firm. It obstructs job 
transfer and the possibilities of individual or creative career paths. Under the pressure to 
                                                             
27
 The white collar Japanese worker is symbolised by the salary man, a male Japanese who is committed 
to his company to long working days and after-work drinking with co-workers and clients (Reskin 1993; 
Ogasawara 1998). 
28
 Students visit prospective employers’ information events, register online to submit their resumes, 
complete a first screening based on formal criteria and sometimes essays. Later follow computer-based 
tests and then interviews, often in several stages and, towards the end, including group discussions. In 
average, it takes six to ten months until successful applicants receive their official job offer.  
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globalise and the need for more flexible labour, this system has been heavily criticised 
in recent years (Waldenberger 2016).  
While the fundamental structure of corporate work in Japan, with the 
institutionalised job hunting system as part of it, is still in use nowadays, employment 
conditions have undergone significant changes (Rebick 2005). Many firms had to 
retrench and although the Japanese employment law continues to obstruct lay off, new 
employment forms – part time positions and especially dispatch work under easily 
terminable contracts – have become prominent (Allison 2013). In the light of these 
developments, scholars argue for a change in the young generation’s expectations 
towards work (e.g. Dasgupta 2013). Roberts (2016) for instance demonstrates how 
young couples increasingly seek work life balance and more often men are willing to 
share housework. This was uncommon in previous decades of the traditional male 
breadwinner model.  
Nevertheless, surveys among university students point to the continuous desire to 
work in the traditional large manufacturing or trading firms – so-called ōtekigyō – 
which represent status and stability (Rikurūto Wākusu Kenkyūjō 2016). Work 
conditions in these firms continue to leave little room for women aspiring career and 
still prescribe long work hours (Liu-Farrer and Hof 2018; Holbrow and Nagayoshi 
2016). In the anxious economic climate of Japan’s “lost decades”, young people 
however focus on the big firms as guarantors of stability. Eventually, despite the desire 
for work life balance, they orient themselves at quite conservative values regarding 
gender roles, marriage and the household division of labour (Rikurūto Wākusu 
Kenkyūjō 2016; Roberts 2011; 2016). 
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Japanese workplaces have been diversifying not only in terms of an increased 
participation of women in the labour force. While in 2017, the total foreign work force 
is with 1.2 per cent still comparatively small, the number marks a continuous increase 
since 0.8 per cent in 2000 (JILPT 2016).
29
 The majority of foreign workers are either 
long-term residents or low-skilled migrants who entered Japan through one of the 
various side doors (Roberts 2018).  
Against the backdrop of Japan’s economic constraints, aging population and 
workforce decline, the government has half-heartedly joined labour specialists in 
promoting the recruitment of skilled foreigners – yet refrains from calling them 
migrants (imin in Japanese). Instead, the expression kōdo jinzai, a highly technical term 
whose literal translation is close to “high human capital” or “foreign talent”, is the 
commonly used term (ibid; Keidanren 2016; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 
2013). Roberts (2018) argued that such naming allows the supporters of immigration to 
bring large numbers of foreigners into the country as the term kōdo jinzai emphasises 
the benefit of added human capital but obscures the fact that foreign people enter 
Japanese society.  
Japan has repeatedly scored low on its attractiveness for ‘global talent’ (World 
Economic Forum 2016b).
30
 Scholars attribute this to uncompetitive salaries and the 
seniority-based promotional system (Oishi 2012), non-transferable skills (Tsukasaki 
2008) and the inaccessibility of distinctive industries for a certain ethnic group (Debnár 
                                                             
29
 Compare other OECD countries such as Germany with a ratio of 9.3 per cent or Ireland with 15.3 per 
cent in 2014 (statista 2018a). 
30
 It is important to note that the Japanese government refers to “global human resources” (gurōbaru 
jinzai) as those who “act from (the perspective of) a Japanese identity” (Gurōbaru jinzai ikusei suishin 
kaigi 2011:7; translated by the author). Thus, while stipulating foreign language skills or intercultural 
understanding as qualifications, the Japanese definition differs strikingly from other countries such as 
Singapore which, when promoting global talent, addresses hard qualifications and the assets rather than 
drawbacks of foreigners’ different background and education, and not identity issues (former Prime 
Minister of Singapore in his 1997 National Day Rally Speech, cited in Pang 2006). 
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2016) or because the Japanese immigration officers’ hesitance to accept foreign degrees 
as in the case of some Indian IT professionals (D’Costa 2016. Nevertheless, Liu-Farrer 
(2011b) and Achenbach (2014) claim that Chinese students who graduated from 
Japanese universities find permanent jobs in transnationally operating small and 
medium companies (SMEs) and are sometimes rewarded with high responsibility such 
as business travel from an early stage on. 
 
5.2.2 Europeans’ Access to the Labour Market 
Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Migration 
While there is a range of different visa categories for “skilled” foreigners available in 
Japan, the young Europeans of this study almost unanimously hold positions as white-
collar employees in the private sector. Their visa, with just two exceptions, is the so-
called Engineer/Specialist in Humanities/International Services visa (“Specialist visa” 
hereafter). The employer applies for the foreign employee’s visa and has to prove his 
eligibility. Upon approval, the foreigner receives a resident card and is entitled to work 
in Japan for a period of one, three or five years. In case of change in his or her 
employment status, for instance upon lay off or self-driven exit from the company, the 
foreigner has only a three-month period of time to secure a new job (Immigration 
Bureau of Japan 2018).  
Citizens of the EU make up only a small proportion of foreigners in Japan. Also, 
Europeans only constituted 10,810 of a total of 161,124 “Specialist” visa holders in 
Japan in 2016 (roughly 6.7 per cent). While the number of “Specialist” visa holders 
from Europe has only slightly increased from 9,481 in 2006 to 10,810 in 2017 (Ministry 
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of Justice 2008; 2017), it is the dominant work visa category of Europeans in Japan.
31
 
Figure 6 visualises European residents’ visa status. The largest group constitutes 
permanent residents with roughly 20,000 of the approximately 70,000 European 
residents in Japan.
32
 The second largest group – and by far the largest of all work visa 
statuses – are the “Specialists” who with 10,810 visa holders account for a higher 
number than all other work visa holders together.
33
 Remarkable is also the number of 
college students, which, as I explain below, has more than doubled within ten years. As 
my analysis will show, former European foreign exchange and full-time students form 
part of the potential Japanese labour force, similar as in the case of other national and 
regional groups. 
Debnár, (2016) in his study on Europeans in Japan, argues that the “Specialist” 
visa category “does not necessarily represent a group of high-skilled workers” 
(2016:44). In contrast to the immigration regulations, which stipulate applicants for the 
“Specialist” visa to have professional work experience in the field of their university 
major or training, many of his European informants work in the language sector or 
cultural industry, for which they often lack specialised training. 
 
                                                             
31
 Recently, the status “engineer” was added to this category and its current name is ‘Specialist in 
Humanities/International Services/Engineers.’ Thus, statistics for 2006 present numbers for two different 
visas while reports for 2016 combine the previously separated visa categories. 
32
 As stated earlier, the numbers consist of Europeans from all over Europe and not only the EU. These 
non-EU Europeans’ visa categories do however in proportion roughly reflect those of the EU citizen 
population. This is especially true for Russians who are, among the non-EU Europeans, the by far largest 
group in numerical terms. 
33
 It should be noted that permanent residents and spouses are allowed to work, too. Therefore, the legal 
categories do not give a comprehensive overview of Europeans’ employment situation in Japan. However, 
the Europeans in focus of this thesis are young and relatively new to Japan and thus yet to become 
eligible for permanent residency. Moreover, they are either single or if married still hold a work visa and 
thus do not count to the two largest legal groups.  
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Figure 6: Major visa categories of European residents in Japan, 2016 
 
Source: Created by the author. Calculated based on Ministry of Justice (2017). 
 
Firms and cultural institutions which require multilingual or intercultural skills are 
commonly concentrated in big cities. Figure 7 visualises the number of Europeans in 
Japan by prefecture of residence in 2006, 2011 and 2017. It demonstrates not only the 
considerable growth in Europeans’ numbers in Japan in total but also that Tokyo has 
constantly hosted by far the largest number of European residents while other business 
centres like Osaka and Fukuoka as well as Japan’s cultural hub Kyoto host significantly 
fewer Europeans. 
Similar to cases in Singapore, my informants entered the domestic labour market 
via distinct channels. In Japan, however, more so than in Singapore, a large number of 
informants had graduated from a domestic university or had spent one or two terms in 
Japan as exchange students. In the light of the internationalisation of higher education 
and consequently increasing competitiveness between universities globally, Japan set its 
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aim to host 300,000 international students by 2020. In 2016, a total number of almost 
240,000 foreign students were registered in Japan, an increase of almost 100,000 
students since 2010 (JASSO 2017). By nationality, the top ten number of international 
students in Japan includes only Asian countries. In the interest of this dissertation, I 
wish to underline that although a much smaller number of Europeans study in Japan 
their numbers, too, have been constantly and significantly rising from approximately 
4000 in 2006 to roughly 10,250 in 2017 (Ministry of Justice 2006a; 2017a).  
 
Figure 7: Europeans by prefecture of residence in Japan, 2006, 2011, 2017 
Source: Created by the author. Calculated based on Ministry of Justice (2006b, 2011b, 2017b). 
 
Along with the internationalisation of its universities, the Japanese government has 
established several generous scholarship programmes. Given the particularities of the 
Japanese labour market which I illustrated above – the preference for fresh graduates 
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who are recruited once a year via an institutionalised job hunting (shukatsu) system – 
several of the respective interviewees found their first employment via shukatsu.  
 
Navigating Options of Access to Employment 
In recent years, some of the so-called “job fairs” have started to focus on attracting 
foreign graduates. International students are often proficient in several languages and 
they have gone through Japanese educational institutions (at least partly). As such, they 
are very attractive for Japanese firms which want to foster their overseas business or 
strive for a more international company image (Conrad and Meyer-Ohle 2018). 13 of 
the 35 informants in Japan enrolled as full-time students at Japanese universities (one as 
an undergraduate, 11 as graduate students and one woman for both undergraduate 
studies and graduate school) (table 3).  
Table 3: Work or study experience in Japan previous to employment (N=35)* 
Exchange 
student 
Full time, 
undergrad. 
Full time, 
graduate 
Language 
school  
Internship Working 
holiday 
Host family 
(high 
school) 
11 2 11 1 8 1 2 
*While 11 of the 35 did not spend any time in Japan pre-employment and thus do not appear in the table, 
some informants appear in several categories. For instance, one woman spent a year during high school 
with a host family, later completed an internship and then studied as an exchange student in Japan. 
 
The only self-financed informant could just afford so after having worked full-
time for several years. The other 12, as well as another 11 informants who spent 
between 3 – 12 months as exchange students in Japan, received generous scholarships 
which provided for their studies in Japan even without financial support from home. 
The exchange students benefited from bilateral university agreements whereas most of 
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the full-time students received a Japanese government scholarship and a few others 
successfully applied for private support.  
The European students did not only receive financial support. In university 
rankings, their universities were all average or above and several studied in Japan’s elite 
private or national universities. This positioned them particularly favourably on the job 
market and meant that they could rely on a range of “in-house” services and facilities. 
Their universities offered professional orientation sessions, organised job fairs where 
employers introduced the employment at their firms and assisted students with filing 
documents or even with preparation for tests.  
Interviewees appreciated the services in place and admitted that they might not 
have found employment in Japan without such help. Job hunting events which explicitly 
target at foreigners were for some the decisive factor to secure a job. For instance, 
Pauline, a Northern European woman with intermediate Japanese proficiency, attended 
her graduate school’s “international job hunting event” which eventually led to a job.  
 
If you want to do the shukatsu it’s very convenient. You just go with the 
mass, you know. And you use all the services that [my university] has, the 
Career Centre and the seminars that they have, it’s very convenient. […] 
They organise setsumeikai (information sessions) inside of the school and 
that’s actually where I met the representative of the company where I am 
working now. So they had this English-language setsumeikai […] and it was 
very small maybe because it was in English. […] So there were not many 
students attending. So it was very intimate, with some companies you could 
actually talk one-on-one with the director of the company so it was really 
good. 
 
Others admitted that they had attempted shukatsu and failed. They had to realise that 
despite years of studying the Japanese language, they lacked the technical terms and 
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competence in Chinese characters to succeed in the process. They then turned to other 
channels into employment, such as personal, often national-based networks or positions 
posted via the V.I.E. programme. The ones who managed to secure jobs via the Japanese 
shukatsu system were in most cases previously enrolled as full-time graduate students in 
Japan.  
Another institution that is known to channel young foreigners into jobs in the 
cultural sector in Japan is the JET Programme.
34
 It offers two different kinds of 
positions. One is the ALT (assistant language teacher), which targets native English 
speakers. While I have encountered many US or Australian ALTs in my time in Japan, I 
did not meet any European ALTs. The UK and Ireland are the only EU countries with a 
majority of native English speakers and are therefore the only European countries from 
which people commonly apply for ALT positions. Furthermore, for those who want to 
use the Japanese language at work or who do not want to teach, the ALT openings are 
unattractive. 
The other track that JET offers, the CIR (Coordinator of International Relations), 
appealed to many culturally interested Europeans (who I categorised as cultural 
enthusiasts in chapter four). CIRs’ tasks, according to the programme website, include 
“translation/interpretation for government officials, teaching community or school 
English classes, and international exchange event planning and implementation” (JET 
2015b). The CIRs are dispatched to local government offices and thus very few work in 
bigger cities. The two CIRs among my interviewees were assigned to smaller cities, too. 
Both had hoped for Tokyo or another major city. However, given the limited chances to 
                                                             
34
 The Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme was established in 1987 by a collaboration of 
several Japanese government authorities. The programme website states that it “aims to promote 
internationalisation in Japan’s local communities by helping to improve foreign language education and 
developing international exchange at the community level (JET 2015a).” 
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work in the cultural sector as a foreigner in Japan, they accepted offers in rural areas. “I 
just wanted a job, really,” was how Marc, a 23 year-old British man, explained why he 
seized the offer in one of the mid-sized cities in sparsely populated Northern Japan.   
Similar to the case of Singapore, there are trainee and internship programmes that 
channel recent European graduates with limited or no work experience into employment 
with foreign companies. Several of my informants came to Japan via the French V.I.E. 
programme. In contrast to Singapore, however, two of them are not French nationals. 
Their placement in French companies in Tokyo might be explained by their specific 
background. They had majored in mathematics and economics respectively and thus 
possessed credentials which few of the Japanese studies majors had. This probably 
made them attractive for their employers, namely financial companies. Furthermore, 
one of them, the Greek man Alexiou, was fluent in Japanese additionally, while Berna, 
an Italian woman, was fluent in French. Thus, their language advantage in the Japanese 
subsidiaries of French companies – where they spoke at least two of the three official 
working languages fluently – in combination with their qualifications in the field of 
finance seems to have been decisive for their hire.  
I found another common channel into employment with both Japanese and foreign 
firms. This was recruitment through intermediaries in the IT industry. Head hunters, 
while unconventional for white-collar positions during times of lifelong employment in 
Japan, are common in the more dynamic and flexible IT market. Especially prestigious 
sectors such as Japan’s flagship industry robotics/artificial intelligence (AI) use 
specialised employment agents to find young and creative developers – among them 
foreigners to an increasing extent. Stefan, a French man with a PhD degree in AI, first 
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struggled to find a job due to his limited Japanese proficiency. Once he learned about 
head hunters from friends and had met a few, he quickly found a job.  
 
As soon as I contacted [the head hunters] it was easy. I could even state 
fields of interest, expectation of salary, etc. He proposed me two jobs. I 
could choose. They were already good so I didn’t search further. […] They 
are used to find foreigners and to working in English, so it eased the whole 
process. […] If [the job] wasn’t good I would just contact job hunters again. 
Now that I am working I have received several offers, so it is not as difficult 
anymore [to find something]. 
 
Stefan’s account indicates that even his deficiency in Japanese did not obstruct his job 
search. As he later explained in the interview, many employees in his company were 
foreign. As long as migrants have the technical skills that software companies are 
looking for, head hunters offer convenient and fast access to decent employment.   
 
5.2.3 Labour Market Niches and Occupational Profiles 
As the previous subchapter demonstrated, the way the Japanese capitalism has 
developed results in particular employment features of the Japanese labour market. 
These are the status of the employee – permanent employment in many Japanese firms 
while foreign companies often hire contract workers – as well as the working language. 
Even in most foreign companies, Japanese is the dominant language although 
increasingly added by the preferred fluency in both, Japanese and English. Table 4 
illustrates my informants’ main occupational industries and types of companies when 
they initially started to work in Japan. I added the two variables “employee status” and 
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“working language” to the table which otherwise resembles table 2 of the group in 
Singapore.   
 
Table 4: Europeans’ initial occupational industries and company types, Tokyo  
Type of 
firm 
Industry  Employee status Working 
Language 
Number of 
informants 
Foreign 
firm 
(HQ: EU, 
US, China) 
finance, health, 
fashion, games 
market research,  
recruitment, 
FMCG*, renewable 
energies 
consulting, HR  
Mostly contract  JP and 
English 
(sometimes 
English 
only) 
15 
Large 
Japanese 
firm  
Manufacturing, 
communications, 
logistics, trade, 
renewable energies 
Permanent Japanese  9 
Japanese 
SME 
IT, Media, 
education/languages, 
patent law, HR 
Mostly contract, 
Permanent as 
exception 
English 
main, 
second 
Japanese 
7 
Japanese 
gov.-
related 
Culture and tourism Contract Japanese 
main, 2
nd
  
English 
3 
JP start-up 
(founder) 
arts Business Owner English 1 
FMCG: fast moving consumer goods, e.g. non-durable consumables such as beverages  
 
With regards to Japan, two aspects are striking. One is my informants’ routes into 
employment: More than half enter the Japanese labour market via Japanese firms. 
Japanese companies, as in table 4, consist of large Japanese firms (9), SMEs (7), 
  147 
Japanese government-related businesses (3) and one start-up with the European being 
the founder (1). The ones in large and established Japanese manufacturing and trading 
companies all came in through the April 1 intake typical for the institutionalised 
Japanese recruitment system. Both the recruitment process and the working language 
are in Japanese and all informants were hired as permanent employees (seishain). Then, 
there are contracted Europeans in the cultural and language industry (JETs, translators, 
and the like with high Japanese proficiency) and specialists with no or limited Japanese 
language skills in the IT sector, working in small Japanese companies and often being 
recruited via head hunters. The latter are either contracted or permanent employees. 
On the other end of the spectrum are the remaining 15 informants who are hired 
by foreign firms which are mostly subsidiaries of established European companies. 
These firms employ the migrants more often than not as interns or trainees before 
eventually turning them into permanent employees or terminating their contracts after 1 
– 2 years. In such companies, the Europeans work in two or three languages and do not 
necessarily need to speak Japanese depending on the occupational industry and 
additional European language skills.  
 
5.3 The Role of Motility  
The former chapter discussed Europeans’ employment conditions in the two global 
cities Singapore and Tokyo. I reviewed the structure and recent development of both 
labour markets and provided an outline of their immigration systems and visa policies 
for skilled workers. Singapore, which has always relied on foreign labour, has lately 
tightened its visa requirements. This is especially the case for the EP and PR, which are 
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the two most common forms of legal status that the European migrants of this study 
hold. Japan on the contrary, which still denies its status as an immigrant country 
(Roberts 2018), is reluctant to address migration publicly. In 2017, however, the 
Japanese government announced its goal of becoming one of the fastest countries for 
highly skilled migrants to receive PR.
35
 The turn in Japan’s ‘skilled migration’ policy is 
reflected in my data and academic scholarship (e.g. Debnár 2016). Several of my 
informants received an “Engineers/Specialist in Humanities/International Services” visa 
although they lacked training or work experience in the sector they entered and simply 
held a tertiary degree. 
My examination of Generation Erasmus’ routes into employment in the two 
labour markets highlights the existence of institutional channels for migrants from 
Western countries which are insufficiently researched. An exception is the case of 
student migration as a well-known resource of skilled foreign labour, particularly in the 
case of Japan (e.g. Liu-Farrer 2011a). Another important player – or intermediary – in 
young Europeans’ migration to Asian global cities is the V.I.E. internship system (and 
other less well-known programmes) which assigns EU graduates to French companies 
overseas. The young Europeans are labour migrants in the very sense. At the same time, 
the system allows them to avoid some of the common insecurities of labour migration. 
That is, they are exempted from taxes, receive a decent salary calculated on the basis of 
the country’s living costs and receive some logistical support from their companies. 
Finally, Generation Erasmus find employment in government-related sectors (research 
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 In 2012, a new point-based visa category was introduced to attract “highly skilled foreign professionals” 
and provides a direct path to permanent residency. However, given the high criteria for academic 
credentials and professional accomplishments, numbers of applicants for this visa status have so far been 
low. As a matter of fact, none of the Europeans in this study holds this visa status. 
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and planning in Singapore, education and culture in Japan) which act as first employers 
before most of these migrants eventually turn to the private sector (see next chapter).  
There is also a considerable number of informants who engage in more ‘local’ job 
search activities which are unrelated to European institutions or firms. In Singapore, this 
means applications via online job portals and introduction to potential employers via 
networking events, usually from the legal status of a tourist visa holder. In Tokyo, 
Europeans participate in the institutionalised ‘job hunting’ system by which Japanese 
companies recruit university graduates once a year. This means that in contrast to 
Singapore, Europeans often transit from an international student visa to a working 
(“specialist”) visa. Therefore, European migrants’ ways into employment in Singapore 
and Tokyo are not only highly diverse, with distinctive features in the different political 
economies of the Singaporean and Japanese labour markets, they are also proof of 
changing trends. Chapter two discussed how postcolonial structures in Singapore and 
Japan’s modernisation as modelled after Western powers produced Europeans’ ‘elite’ 
image in these and other Asian countries. This legacy transformed into Europeans’ 
positioning as business elite in Asia in the second half of the 20
th
 century.  
My analysis of young Europeans’ access to the Singaporean and Japanese labour 
market in the 21
st
 century reveals a significant change. The young migrants do not enter 
these Asian cities in elite positions nor as company assigned expatriates. Moreover, they 
do not exclusively work for European companies. The Europeans seek positions in the 
host country labour markets through less privileged ways. My informants split into two 
groups, those whose pathways into Asian labour markets are linked to European 
institutions in one or the other way and those whose are not. The former clearly benefit 
from the power structures developed by their forebears. The directions from West to 
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East are still the same and migration through government-related channels, bilateral 
university exchange programmes or infrastructures for trainees perpetuates the 
somewhat privileged access to the host country.  
Nevertheless, their status and positioning in Asia clearly differs from that of 
earlier European migrants in Asia. Generation Erasmus hold junior positions with 
corresponding salaries. They have local contracts which stipulate working conditions 
typical of the host country such as less paid holidays than in many European countries. 
Most important is the fact that they receive limited or no support for housing and the 
like and so start out from a position similar to independently moving skilled migrants 
from other parts of the world. 
The latter group, those who access their jobs without the help of European 
institutions or European migration channels, divert even further from the image of the 
privileged Westerner in Asia. Competing with both local applicants and other educated 
foreigners, they experience what it means to be at the lower end of power structures. 
They are anxious if they can secure jobs successfully since this decides over their 
legality in the country and, without income during the time of their job search, they 
have to cut back on expenses.  
These local job seekers’ cases also mark the greatest difference between 
Singapore and Tokyo: The language barrier on the Japanese labour market means that 
the young migrants need to invest in the local language in order to raise their chances of 
finding employment. Basic proficiency is not enough. Only after years of studying at 
Japanese universities or majoring in the Japanese language abroad have they reached the 
required level of fluency. This challenges old power dynamics where Europeans in non-
Western countries did not have the need to compete against the locals or labour migrants 
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for jobs: The young Europeans are on more equal footing with other migrants who 
studied the language from zero. In fact, their narratives reveal that they struggle more 
than Chinese or Korean migrants whose mother tongue is closer to the Japanese 
language. In Singapore, on the other hand, such preparation is not needed. This spares 
the Europeans not only a lot of time but also the uncomfortable moment of feeling stuck, 
of being disadvantaged because of one’s limited vocabulary or poor way of expression. 
The contrasting cases therefore show how language has important implications not only 
for migrants’ chances to find employment but also for power dynamics between the 
European migrants, migrants from other countries and local job seekers.  
Nevertheless, Generation Erasmus are equipped with both the mindset and the 
credentials to pursue a professional career. These young Europeans’ “motility”, or 
potential for movement (Kaufmann et al. 2004), positions them favourably. They have 
acquired a diverse set of resources which, combined and converted under specific 
circumstances, enable them to migrate and find employment in Asia. I hereby mainly 
refer to social capital – these Europeans’ ‘international’ networks and contacts in the 
host society, which function as informational resources or even gatekeeper to jobs – as 
well as cultural capital. To recall my analysis in chapter four, Generation Erasmus 
cultivated professional dispositions and cosmopolitan aspirations. These are product of 
their upbringing as millennials in middle-class families in an integrating EU and the 
confidence they gained in situations of unfamiliarity and in international surroundings 
thanks to their pre-employment mobility experiences. To this, they added foreign 
language proficiency (English as normative plus often another foreign language) and 
degrees from European educational institutions to the set of cultural capital.  
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As migrants’ accounts in this chapter demonstrate, the combined activation of 
such social and cultural capital helps them to access positions in Asia’s globalising 
labour markets. Sometimes, they are able to convert their social or cultural capital into 
symbolic capital, as the case of the Italian engineering graduate Giacomo pointed out. 
His degree from a well-known university and his European higher education gained him 
his job in Kuala Lumpur which would later lead to a career in Singapore. Giacomo 
assumed that the company owner, who had graduated from the same Italian university, 
“was looking for something like that.” His suggestion that “education and mindset […] 
are the only thing[s] left that Europe can sell” point to the symbolic character of his 
Europeanness.  
Underlying Generation Erasmus’ mobility to Asia, then, is motility, these young 
adults’ potential to become mobile. Kaufmann et al. (2004:750) contend that we can 
understand motility as “[i]nterdependent elements relating to access to different forms 
and degrees of mobility, competence to recognise and make use of access, and 
appropriation of a particular choice, including the option of non-action.” The concept 
elucidates what the actual steps, conditions and actions behind mobility are. As such, it 
captures what exactly positions the Europeans as attractive candidates for entry-level 
professional jobs in Singapore and Tokyo.  
As Franquesa (2011:1028) notes, “power, then, is not so much located in the pole 
of mobility, as an intrinsic attribute of it, but rather in the capacity to manage the 
relation between mobility and immobility.” After all, the young Europeans are endowed 
with an amount high enough and various forms of capital that enable them to become 
mobile. Not only migration, or mobility, per se is significant here but also the 
destinations (Van Hear 2014). These Europeans, before risking social or spatial 
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immobility back in Europe, choose to become mobile by migrating to destinations as far, 
expensive, culturally different and selective in terms of visa requirements as Singapore 
and Tokyo.  
In line with Bourdieu’s claim (1986), economic capital constitutes the basis of other 
kinds of capital. More than that, however, Generation Erasmus can count on the 
combined activation of several other forms of capital. Put differently, they can at least 
afford the airplane tickets and the first weeks or even months before they earn a stable 
income; they receive recognition – and thus symbolic capital – for their university 
degrees also because they stem from Western educational institutions; they have an 
adequate proficiency in English and sometimes Japanese and/or one more European 
language (as well as their mother tongue); their national or regional (EU) citizenship 
provides them with credibility if not a notion of accomplishment as coming from a 
country or supra-national territory which is associated with being the cradle of 
Enlightenment, economic power and high culture. Finally, their curricula mark them as 
internationally experienced at work or in educational contexts.  
The chapter revealed how involvement of so far ignored actors and structures in 
the migration process have created migration channels for the educated but 
inexperienced young European workforce. These Europeans do not only possess 
economic and cultural capital. In contrast to their school peers who enter the labour 
market in Europe, they have built social capital abroad and often especially in their later 
host societies by earlier mobility experience. However, even this does not yet suffice to 
explain their migration to Asia. 
At this point, it is necessary to consider Kaufmann et al.’s (2004:750) use of 
appropriation more closely. It “refers to how agents […] interpret and act upon 
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perceived or real access and skills. Appropriation is shaped by needs, plans, aspirations 
and understandings of agents, and it relates to strategies, motives, values and habits.” 
The young Europeans know at least enough of the foreign labour markets they enter as 
to reckon that they cannot access any occupational field or firm. In Singapore, they need 
to work their way through the strict visa requirements. In Tokyo, the Europeans know of 
the language barrier but also of firms’ globalising efforts and the demand for English 
speaking staff or for natural science majors. Competent in either of the sought-after 
skills, they appropriate their resources and institutional channels which could open the 
door to the respective industries.  
Through the lens of motility, we can thus explain how the young Europeans 
migrate and which segment, or stratum, of the receiving Asian societies they enter (Van 
Hear 2014).  The specific company types are significant in that they have the means to 
sponsor the migrants for a visa and because in turn, the fresh graduates can apply their 
skills – even if these skills do in fact not meet official visa requirements. Only later 
might the young Europeans be able to access other jobs in the host country labour 
markets.  
Skills, then, are a vague concept. In both Singapore and Tokyo – though arguably 
more common in the latter – migrants do not always fulfil the stipulated requirements 
for a skilled work visa. Nevertheless, old power structures which are perpetuated by 
partly very recent migration channels enable the young Europeans to migrate. Only 
when they have accumulated further capital valuable in the host country’s labour market 
do they actually become foreign talents as the following chapter will show. What kind 
of capital this is depends, as discussed above, on the fields in which it is activated. 
These are the respective types of East Asian capitalism (Lechevalier 2014). While social 
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capital in both cities helps the young Europeans into jobs, profound work experience 
and internationally approved credentials, human capital, are valuable in Singapore. In 
Tokyo, however, locally acquired cultural capital, especially language proficiency, are 
crucial.  
To conclude, it is necessary to consider migrants’ access to the Asian labour 
markets from a broader angle and place it into a contextual and comparative perspective. 
In the light of the competitive labour markets of a European Union in crisis and a 
changing global power balance, the role of motility is accentuated. Once “on the way”, 
various forms of distinctively European middle-class capital, i.e. symbolic capital, is a 
tool of great value for navigating life. Seizing their chance, Generation Erasmus choose 
to seek alternative routes and upward mobility through outward mobility.  
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6. Strategies and Practices of Working in Asia 
The previous chapter illuminated the salience of so far poorly understood institutional 
channels and social networks through which the young Europeans exercise their 
mobility to Asia. What happens after the migrants start working? What kind of career 
paths do they follow and how do they negotiate issues of career advancement, relations 
with colleagues but also gender or racial barriers – or privileges – on the job? I open this 
chapter with a look ahead and sketch migrants’ professional trajectories over the years. 
Table 5 and 6 illustrate Europeans’ employment upon arrival and again after two or 
more years work experience in Singapore or Tokyo. It hints at distinctive patterns of job 
transfer in both cities, an issue I closely examine in this chapter.  
Table 5 shows that the majority of the Europeans in Singapore first worked for a 
foreign company. After 2 - 3 years roughly half of these employees in foreign firms (10) 
have left Singapore. It is also striking that six Europeans engage in their own 
entrepreneurial venture, four of them full time and two of them as a second job. In 
Tokyo (table 6), slightly more than half of the informants initially entered Japanese 
companies. Their numbers mark a slight decrease after two or more years. Interestingly, 
none of those in large Japanese companies – the hierarchical firms where foreigners 
supposedly struggle most – has directly exited their employer and have left Japan. The 
table does however not reveal if they first changed to a different company type after 
which they might have left the country. What we also see is a considerable increase of 
employees in foreign companies in Tokyo. Nevertheless, half of these employees in 
foreign firms have meanwhile left the country, too.  
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Table 5: Informants’ organisational mobility and exit from Singapore  
 Foreign 
firm 
EU gov.- 
related  
Domestic 
firm  
SG gov.- 
related 
Start-up 
(founder) 
Total  
Upon arrival 21 4 8 1 1 35 
After >2 
years 
22 (of 
who 10 
left) 
1 (already 
left) 
7 (one 
left) 
1 6 [of who 2 
have 2 jobs, 
and another 
one left]* 
35** 
Net exit from 
SG 
10 1 1 0 1 13 
*[] indicates numbers for those with two occupations: both entrepreneur and employee, thus counted in 
two categories; ** n=70, two informants counted double since both employee and entrepreneur. 
 
Table 6: Informants’ organisational mobility and exit from Tokyo (Japan) 
 Foreign 
firm 
Large JP 
firm 
Domestic 
SMEs 
JP gov.- 
related 
Start-up 
(founder) 
Total 
Upon arrival 15 9 7 3 1 35 
After >2 
years 
21 (of who 
9 left) 
6 5 (of who 
2 left) 
2 (of who 
one left) 
1 35 
Net exit from 
Tokyo (JP) 
9 0 2 1 0 12 
 
In brief, the tables point to important dynamics concerning job changes in both 
migration destinations. The significance and the directions of the transfers require 
further examination, one of the main tasks of this chapter. The tables also suggest that 
EU government related jobs in Singapore function as a step towards employment in the 
private sector. All of the initially four informants switched to different employment, 
although one of them left Singapore in the course of the job transfer. Similarly, 
Japanese government related jobs lead to transfers to private business and of the three 
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Europeans in this category, only one has left Japan. While the tables leave us with a first 
impression of the complexity of Generation Erasmus’ professional trajectories in Asia, 
they raise more questions than they deliver answers. In the following, I delve into 
informants’ accounts in order to generate a more nuanced yet likewise comprehensive 
picture.  
 
6.1 Singapore: Professionalising the Self 
In the first part of this chapter, I use the story of Nico to show that the young Europeans 
strive for achievement after all the legal framework in Singapore. High criteria for the 
eligibility for an Employment Passes (EP) require foreign talents to constantly upgrade 
their skills in order to guarantee the renewal of their visa. Generation Erasmus, who 
often arrive in Singapore with little work experience, try to build a professional profile 
and measure themselves against objective markers of success such as title or salary 
increase. Through these practices they claim legitimacy of the foreign talent status. 
Their strategies accentuate that in fact, the migrants are often not “talents” from the 
outset but become so along the way of professionalising themselves.  
Nico is Portuguese, 31 years old and had been living in Singapore for eight years 
when I met him in early 2017. He grew up in a small Portuguese town, studied 
economics in one of the country’s major cities and spent six months on an Erasmus 
student exchange in Italy. Upon graduation, he envisaged greater opportunities overseas 
and applied for a government-sponsored internship with a Portuguese company abroad 
(aicep Portugal global 2017). As described earlier, Nico felt “lucky enough to […] go to 
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Singapore.” When he returned to Singapore for a full-time job the following year, it was 
less about the contents of his job with a Portuguese wine importer but a means to living 
in Singapore.  
 
Also, I really wanted to come back because I had met my current wife, that 
was an extra incentive. I had good options in Portugal. Two good offers 
earning good money for the status that the country was at that time. But I 
really wanted Singapore so I made every effort to stay in that company [the 
wine importer] because even though I like wine but I was young and looking 
for more of a corporate job, right? But it went well, I stayed there for a year 
and a half. I was the only employee, doing everything like logistics, dealing 
with customs, taxes, doing marketing, sales, delivery. […] After that I left 
because the salary was not that competitive. And the boss was over 70 years 
old so there was a real gap. (sic) 
 
Nico’s first occupation was obviously not his dream job. Being the only employee and 
the age gap to the much older business owner curbed his enthusiasm both about what he 
perceived he could learn and regarding collegial relations he imagined at other 
workplaces. Furthermore, Nico named the poor salary as one factor. Nevertheless, his 
main rationale for changing jobs was neither of the two. In his opinion, a large corporate 
structure was the most suitable work environment for learning. Nico had been back to 
Portugal for five months without finding a corporate job in Singapore. Hence, he 
reckoned that his connections to the Portuguese wine importer would be his only way 
into the Singaporean labour market. Despite aspiring a higher salary and the corporate 
experience, the job pleased him for the moment because it allowed him to get a foothold 
in Singapore, to be together with his future spouse and to extend his professional 
network.  
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After one-and-a-half years, Nico switched to a huge American software MNC. As 
a consultant in the operations department, he was able to build a profile as a business 
developer in the media and technology industry. Nico valued the experience for its 
“super easy job, well paid, and one hundred per cent stress-free. After being the only 
man in the company with lots of pressure, this was excellent.” The job left him enough 
time to explore professional possibilities. Two years later, the Portuguese Chamber of 
Commerce in Singapore, where he had earlier completed his internship, closed. Nico 
seized the chance for an entrepreneurial venture. “I got more requests from Portuguese 
companies to help them to get distributors etc. So me and another colleague […] opened 
our own company. We help companies to have an open door to Asia.” 
For two years, Nico worked two jobs as a corporate employee during the day and 
as a business owner in the late afternoon and evening. Since I was introduced to some of 
his friends during my ethnographic field work, I learned about his reputation as well-
connected sociable person. This expansive network helped him to grow his business. 
Nico and his friend registered their company as a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) 
which enables foreigners with an EP to open their own business quickly and without 
much financial investment.
36
 With four years in his job at the MNC and two years with 
his own firm Nico initiated another organisational move. He became business 
development manager in a Singaporean start-up which sold marketing software around 
the world. While the company was still in its infancy the position provided him with an 
                                                             
36
 A minimum of two natural persons over eighteen years are eligible to open an LLP and only one, the 
manager, must be an “ordinary resident” in Singapore. The LLP is quick and easy to set up with few 
bureaucratic procedures and moderate initial expenses of only 115 Singapore Dollars (ACRA 2017).  
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extraordinary number of clients in the region and globally and afforded one hundred per 
cent of his time.  
 
In five to six months I met over 150 people for micro companies. I expanded 
massively the number of clients from three to more than 40. It was an intense 
period where we didn’t have time for our own company […] We still have 
[the company], if we have time and the project can be done aside we still do 
it. Then I stayed for one year […] They had a nice product and were a start-
up, that’s what I was looking for. I wanted to expand the market for the 
company from scratch.  
 
Nico considered the job as a chance to prove himself as a successful sales person. He 
acquired industry expertise and enlarged his network. Two months before our interview 
Nico married his Malaysian Singaporean girlfriend. The wedding changed his legal 
status in Singapore. He received a Long Term Visit Pass and planned to apply for 
Permanent Residency (PR). The Long Term Visit Pass opened up new possibilities. 
When we met, Nico was again interviewing with several companies. 
 
Tomorrow I have the final interview with a [technology] company for a good 
position. I am talking with others as well. I have more time and less pressure, 
so I want to choose a good job. The EP was a limitation, certain companies 
don’t have a slot for EPs, or only with a valid pass. Now my options are 
much broader. But that company would be a really good position. It is still a 
start-up in Southeast Asia but [has] various branches in the US. It is part of 
[a famous technology company].  
 
6.1.1 Job Transfer as the Norm  
Nico’s trajectory offers a fascinating insight into what becoming a foreign talent – rather 
than starting out as one – means in Singapore. In this subchapter, I argue that job 
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transfers are the norm for the European migrants. Generation Erasmus have what it 
needs to become mobile in the first place, which is motility. I demonstrate below that, 
while this helps them to exercise their first move out of Europe and into the 
Singaporean labour market, horizontal mobility becomes an important tool for 
navigating the competitive labour market. Job transfer, or the “boundaryless career” 
(Arthur 1994), is the norm and provides access to vertical mobility. Horizontal moves 
across organisational boundaries (more often than not) advance Europeans’ social 
position as foreign talents in Singapore. The organisational mobility reinforces the 
status of a foreign talent through objective markers such as rise in title, salary or 
employment with a famous company.  
As for youth everywhere around the world – and argued in reference to 
millennials in particular (Porschitz, Guo, Alves 2012; Hershatter and Epstein 2010) – 
the young adults also were often clueless which occupational track they should follow. 
Having chosen a major at university did not necessarily mean that they had a clear 
career outline. Nico only knew that he wanted to work abroad. The internship 
programme offered this opportunity and provided assistance with some of the legal and 
bureaucratic issues. For Nico, the kind of job was of secondary importance and, lacking 
a specialisation in his economics degree, he was uncertain which industry to choose. 
The internship programme released him from the decision but offered instead what was 
Nico’s highest priority: It assigned him to a company abroad and so set the course for an 
overseas career.  
In contrast to Nico’s move to Singapore “out of the blue”, he became more 
focused over the years. While the internship and his first job were the only options at 
hand as a fresh graduate, he could choose more deliberately later. The more resources – 
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cultural, social and economic capital – he had accumulated the more he was able to 
strategize. Nico owed his first sojourn in Singapore to his degree in economics, his 
Portuguese and English language proficiency and presumably his ‘intercultural 
competence’ acquired during Erasmus. This mainly cultural capital did however not 
sponsor him a visa. Later Nico was able to convert the cultural capital, by developing a 
social network during his internship, into social capital. This eventually led to his first 
full-time job with the wine importer.  
Nico’s trajectory can be grasped when examining the role of motility. To recall 
Kaufmann et al. (2004:750), motility consists of the three interdependent elements 
access, conditions, and appropriation. Nico’s case evidences the salience of all three 
elements. They enabled him to exercise his spatial mobility and as a consequence led to 
social mobility. First, without the Erasmus experience, Nico might not have become 
interested in living abroad. Furthermore, his chances of acceptance in the internship 
programme would have been reduced. The fact that a government sponsored internship 
system exists is, after all, an important factor. Nico had the option to apply in the first 
place and the conditions were for him favourable: As a Portuguese citizen and based in 
one of the bigger cities during his studies where all necessary facilities for preparing for 
the selection process were available. As Nico pointed out, the selection process was 
competitive and required thorough preparation and determination.  
Following this line of thought, an economics major is nothing particular and so 
Nico’s time in Italy along with the acquisition of another European language certainly 
increased his chances for the position. In Kaufmann et al.’s (2004) words, Nico had 
access to mobility – shaped through options and conditions – and the competence to 
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take action. The authors’ third element of motility, appropriation, then is crucial for 
explaining Nico’s move to Singapore and his later trajectory (ibid:750). 
 
Appropriation refers to how agents (including individuals, groups, networks, 
or institutions) interpret and act upon perceived or real access and skills. 
Appropriation is shaped by needs, plans, aspirations and understandings of 
agents, and it relates to strategies, motives, values and habits. 
 
Nico frankly spoke about his indecisiveness over his future profession. He did however 
understand his skills as suitable to try the internship which would bring him abroad, an 
aspiration he had since participating in Erasmus. After the six months in Singapore 
other motives added up to his strong motivation to attempt a return to Asia: His 
girlfriend and his plan to make a career in business for which he expected Singapore to 
be a promising location. However, he also understood that the biggest barrier to his 
move were the high requirements for an EP which he as recent graduate hardly fulfilled.  
Here, his social capital played the decisive role. Nico’s capacity to activate the 
business contacts in Singapore and the trust his later employer had in his personality 
and skills ultimately enabled him to return. The combined activation of different forms 
of capital then allowed Nico to migrate. Yet the move also came with some 
compromises as to the employment conditions and scope of his job. In line with 
Kaufmann et al.’s notion of “appropriation [as] shaped by needs [and] plans” 
(2004:750) he adjusted his professional aspirations, knowing that the wine importer job 
was the only access to Singapore at that time. 
Having secured his legal status and gained some work experience, Nico sought a 
corporate environment where he could learn work processes on a large scale. This 
corporate ‘training’ enabled Nico to open his own business. Later, with some economic 
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securities from the previous stable jobs, he could finally allow himself to apply for 
promising positions selectively. His professional trajectory was not entirely smooth, 
though. Apart from the high work load and stress in some of his jobs, Nico also 
experienced lay off once. Due to financial concerns, he bridged the time up to his 
wedding with a temporary job while waiting for issuing his Long Term Visit Pass. Once 
he was granted his new and more secure legal status, Nico again focused on his career 
as his remark about the scheduled job interview with his desired employer revealed.  
 
At this time of my career it is important to make a mark in the company. I 
am 31 years old now and I really need to make my mark in the company. 
[…] It is a little bit of pressure because it is a sales job, but rewarding 
because it makes the company grow. I still have the energy, I don’t have kids. 
I need to step up and make something out of it, ink my name in one’s 
company development. In this company, I [would be] the one leading the 
development in Asia, I will be the one whose name is highlighted. That’s 
what I want. I’m a little bit cheesy for looking for glory at this time of the 
career. That’s why I am evaluating well enough my options. […] I want to 
choose well. [The] potential for me to shine is bigger.  
 
For Nico, a professional identity is tied to objectively observable signs of success. In a 
young company, he has greater influence which allows him to be recognised for his 
performance. For this sake, he renounced the well-paying position as sales force at a big 
firm and opted for the more stressful sales job of a small company. Success, for Nico, 
takes on an almost identity-shaping significance. His account reveals, through words 
like “rewarding” and “glory” that Nico is less concerned about money but the status 
which a steep career in business confers. 
Europeans’ strive for a professional identity is related to their status as migrants in 
Asia – not in Europe, which, to recall, for them barely feels as having ‘migrated’ and 
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does not require a visa. However, their status in Singapore as foreigners on temporary 
work visa is uncertain. Apart from that, with increasing time away from their home 
countries, the Europeans come to view a return to Europe more critical. Consequently, 
the most intriguing option is to accumulate enough professional credentials as to stay 
employable – in Singapore or in other countries with promising employment conditions 
and a high quality of life.  
 
6.1.2 Gender and Racial Issues 
Migrants’ experiences with working in Singapore and their strategies to manoeuvre 
employment are shaped by more than immigration regulations and labour market 
structures. The following subchapter reveals how gender and racial issues affect 
migrants’ work experience. In fact, gender and race indicate different dimensions of 
‘being a foreign talent’ and play out in interesting intersections. Women perceive their 
opportunities for career advancement as fairly gender-equal and favourably compare the 
situation with more conservative structures in some European countries. Gender, thus, if 
it affects Europeans’ perceptions of working in Singapore, does so in a positive way in 
the sense that it appears to be relatively neutral.  
In contrast to that, the Europeans report to meet reservation, if not reluctance or 
mistrust from Singaporeans at the workplace. They realise that Europeans continue to 
be associated with the affluence and seniority of the senior European – and importantly, 
white – generation in Singapore, the expatriate community. Their whiteness makes the 
young migrants, both men and women, suspicious and underlines the different dynamics 
of race and gender in the Singaporean work context. I demonstrate how the young 
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Europeans differ from company-assigned expatriates and oppose such labelling. The 
migrants seek recognition for their self-earned skills and their individual abilities rather 
than status conferred by postcolonial inequalities. Nevertheless, trajectories divert with 
those who are able to overcome the invisible barriers that are reminiscent of the colonial 
past and those who give up and turn to the Western community and colleagues.   
I waited for Verena, a Russian-German woman, to arrive for an interview at 3pm 
on a Thursday afternoon. As many times before, I interviewed during a weekday’s day 
time, and Verena’s situation confirmed that job transfer is considered to be the golden 
path to career advancement. Verena arrived late, in classy grey pencil skirt, elegant dark 
blouse, brief case in compatible colours and hair impeccably pinned-up. The brunette 
woman apologised and explained her delay with a job interview which had taken longer 
than expected.  
Verena’s first full-time job was with the Asia-Pacific headquarter of a Western 
European logistics company in Singapore. The firm needed someone for the Asia-
Europe trade. After six months on a definite contract, Verena and two other new foreign 
employees – a Mexican man in charge of Latin America and a Filipino woman 
responsible for Southeast Asia – became regular staff. Verena was grateful for the firm’s 
dynamic environment. Through client acquisition and high-quality sales training her 
initial learning curve was high. The company announced to train the three foreign 
employees for management positions within a year. However, the logistics industry 
experienced a slack. Verena disappointedly reflected on the events when business 
slowed down in her company.  
 
I was very goal oriented. I wanted to go out and work on my career. […] 
They had big plans with us, wanted to promote us but then our manager was 
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promoted to country manager and no one was looking after us anymore. […] 
The focus was gone from us so we all started looking for another job. One 
[of my two foreign colleagues] resigned, the other one was fired and I was 
like searching for another position.   
 
Ultimately, Verena did not change job because she was promoted to set up a new team. 
Part of her rationale for moving to Asia had been her impression of the chance to reach 
managerial level quickly. Indeed, it took her less than three years in full time 
employment to do so.  
Verena did not raise gender as an issue. Despite her limited work experience, 
young age, status as a foreigner and ‘weaker’ sex, she was promoted – as was her Asian 
female manager –, likely as an incentive to stay in the company. When I probed on 
gender issues at work towards the end of our conversation, Verena shook her head. After 
a second, she added frowning, “[But] I feel like if as a woman in Germany you are 
wearing a skirt with heels, you better don’t do it, right? You better dress – I felt like as a 
woman you have to prove yourself first, right? They will judge you if you are wearing a 
dress.” Verena obviously counted on my understanding since we shared the experience 
of growing up as women in Germany.  
A few other women, too, reckoned their career prospects – at least at a young age 
– to be higher in Singapore than in their home countries. Florence, a 28-year old French 
who was hired as legal manager Asia-Pacific at the Singaporean branch of her French 
firm, is a case in point. “In Europe, I would have had this position maybe in my 40s – so 
perhaps 15 years later.” Employment in Singapore, then, sometimes propels young 
migrants’ careers. Additionally, it equips them with practical skills and a professional 
standing which positions them favourably on the global job market. This becomes clear 
when they seek change in employment but also when they return to Europe. Florence 
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and her French husband moved to Germany after two years in Singapore. In her opinion, 
the overseas work experience in a managerial position helped her to secure a position in 
a British firm in Berlin. 
For the European women, Singapore offers an environment where they perceive 
to have the same professional chances as men and where their gender does not prompt 
people to question their professional qualifications. That said, my ongoing interview 
with Verena revealed her mixed feelings regarding acceptance in the company. Verena 
encountered how white people were admired and were the centre of fascination in India, 
where she had previously completed an internship. Yet she was taken aback to find 
similar stereotypes in Singapore’s multicultural business environment.  
 
In India […] they put themselves lower than you, which I never liked. They 
are like ‘you are the smart one, wealthy.’ […] But in Singapore I didn’t 
expect that it would be similar. […] They still think that someone from 
Europe is paid more, is more important because they basically get 
transferred from the HQ. […] [Singaporean clients] always treat you much 
better I would say. […] But I don’t like personally if someone puts them [my 
Singaporean colleagues] in a conversation below me. […] I have many 
Indian colleagues who work here, who had been to Dubai or someone who 
studied in New York, who had exposure to the Western world. So they are 
different, they treat you the same. But Singaporeans and Asian people, they 
always treat you like special. […] Most [Singaporeans] think we are getting 
transferred from the HQ and get all this expat package, like housing and all 
the money for everything which wasn’t the case for me. I know lots of 
Germans who got all these benefits. I came here with my 2000 euros which I 
saved. The Mexican guy and the Filipino girl [we are] all on the same level. 
[…] We all started from zero. 
 
Verena’s narrative provides evidence for the fact that while neither gender nor young 
age might be limitations per se, the intersections of several social categories (Leek and 
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Kimmel 2014) matter for these European migrants’ work experience in Singapore – not 
in terms of title or salary but for socialising with colleagues.  
More than simply whiteness, it is the lasting symbolic status of Westernness or 
Europeanness that account for Singaporeans’ suspicion of their young European 
colleagues. Verena’s account demonstrates that her young age and low status in the 
company render her peculiar in colleagues’ eyes as she does not fit the picture of a 
German expatriate who receives generous benefits. Verena became friends with other 
Asian foreign talents, yet her relations with Singaporean colleagues remained limited. 
Other interviewees confirmed this experience. Interestingly, however, their perceptions 
ranged from positive to negative ones.  
Several women mentioned similar situations where they felt uncomfortable with 
the somewhat elevated treatment or worse, sensed that colleagues doubted their 
professional qualifications. Some of them, for instance the French legal adviser 
Florence, concluded after several unsuccessful lunches that the “Asian” colleagues were 
not willing to open up. She mostly stayed among the few other European women in her 
firm over her time at the company. When her husband’s contract neared its end, 
Florence was looking forward to their move to Germany. In her eyes “Europeans are 
more similar to us.” While she attributed this to different preferences for spending free 
time (“they just watch TV or go shopping on the weekend”), she also admitted that her 
Filipina colleague could financially not afford traveling in Southeast Asia, one of 
Florence’s beloved hobbies and one of her favourite topics at lunch.  
Again, race alone cannot account for these migrants’ difficulties to socialise with 
Asian colleagues. When asked to expand on her perceived differences between 
Europeans and Asians, Florence uses culture as an explanation for different leisure 
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preferences. The reference to her Filipina colleague who remits part of her salary to her 
family in the Philippines identifies socio-economic reasons as one side of the coin. The 
other and equally important factor is these Europeans’ identity of the stranger who 
wants to observe, experience and explore. In the tropical climate of Singapore where 
long-term residents and citizens avoid the heat of a city which they already know, the 
young European migrants embrace the tropics and tailor their leisure activities to the 
new and unfamiliar. This is how their leisure preferences differ.  
In other cases, however, workplace relations developed into collegial relationships. 
Giacomo, the Italian engineer who was hired for the Malaysian branch of his 
Singaporean firm and only later moved to the city-state, relayed his challenging but 
after all fortunate start as an employee. As he was the only non-Malaysian in the Kuala 
Lumpur office and a junior employee fresh out of university, his colleagues were 
initially sceptical of his skills. It took Giacomo several months of hard work to win their 
trust. It was crucial that despite communication problems, he went for lunch with his 
colleagues and lived like a local. His co-workers knew about his tiny maisonette 
apartment and watched him spend the same small amount of money on food. On the 
weekends, they sometimes took him out for scenic drives outside of Kuala Lumpur. 
While he did not become close friends with the majority of his colleagues who were 
significantly older, Giacomo is nowadays, more than two years after leaving Kuala 
Lumpur, still in touch with some of the younger ones.  
To some degree European migrants’ characteristics as white but young and 
inexperienced employees help to pull down some of the exclusionary racial boundaries. 
This is especially true for domestic companies where the young migrants are 
surrounded by locals, as Giacomo’s comment on his first job in Kuala Lumpur reveals. 
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“It was also probably good in the sense that it forced me to […] adapt rather than having 
another Westerner and creating your own group.” Giacomo assumed that being the only 
non-Asian in his office facilitated integration into the team. The fact that fewer 
Westerners used to live in Kuala Lumpur than in Singapore and Giacomo’s fairly low 
salary might have accentuated the situation in that it created a more even playing field 
among employees. 
As discussed, migrants’ qualifications, a proactive attitude, flexibility and 
educational credentials are assets that secure the Europeans their jobs. This is in line 
with the Singaporean government’s emphasis on neo-liberal attitudes such as lifelong 
learning and competition on the labour market as positive for economic growth (Sidhu, 
Ho, and Yeoh 2011; Phelps 2007). Nevertheless, the young Europeans are not 
necessarily what Singaporeans expect foreign talents to be as the prevalence of racial 
stereotypes underlines. I now turn to one more feature of Europeans’ work experiences 
in Singapore. This is the discrepancies between the official image of foreign talents’ 
employment characteristics and the realities I found in the field.   
 
6.1.3 Entrepreneurial Self-making  
The European migrants in Singapore not only change jobs for straight-forward career 
advancement. In this last section of the chapter on work experiences in Singapore, I 
show that for many working on themselves – their personality, their skills or their 
creativity – becomes increasingly important, sometimes more than a stable job, and with 
it, the EP. Male engineers and software specialists are particularly prone to open a 
business, often together with others. I also met female entrepreneurs as well as a few 
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Europeans who opted for occupations not considered professional and thus not eligible 
under an EP. Europeans’ entrepreneurial endeavours and their strategies in navigating 
high living costs, professional dreams and rigid immigration policies are the focus of 
this section.  
Despite their passports, their race and their tertiary degrees, many young 
Europeans initially struggle to meet the requirements of the EP. Andras for instance, the 
Hungarian hospitality employee who I introduced in the opening of this dissertation, 
was fully aware and concerned of his insecure status in Singapore. He thus enrolled in 
an MBA programme next to working long hours in the emotionally straining hotel 
sector. The rising competition for jobs partly explains migrants’ drive for 
professionalisation. Only a professional job, which is increasingly harder for foreigners 
to secure, grants the EP, which is the golden pathway to the status of a desired migrant 
or ‘foreign talent.’  
While the Europeans come for a variety of reasons, all somehow bundled under 
the impression of Singapore being a multicultural country that offers job opportunities, 
a high quality of life and stimulating surroundings of different languages and cultures, 
there is more to their strive for professionalisation. Andras, although concerned about 
the tightening visa requirements, also sees value in Singapore’s demanding system for 
foreign talent.  
 
I came here with an [EP] but when I renewed it I wasn’t sure if I was going 
to get it because the quota levels are going back and the minimum salaries 
are going up. Mine ends next year […] and I don’t know if I will be 
extended. Because what I heard is if you’re in the same level for all the years 
[…], they are not going to [extend]. But […] if they can see that you are not 
just hanging out and they see that you’re moving up, then they will [grant 
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extension]. […] I like that because in a way, they want people to have better 
lives. 
 
Many of my interviewees reported how friends failed to get an EP or how others were 
denied PR despite having stable jobs, high salaries and having been in the country for 
long.
37
 While this obviously contributes to their insecurity they seldom consider 
returning to Europe. Instead, they put all the more efforts into their careers. For Andras, 
the MBA symbolises the path to a better life. The hospitality industry is a harsh 
workplace with long hours, comparatively low salary and often disrespectful treatment 
by both customers and bosses. Singapore pushes him towards an imagined better future 
and, despite the physical and emotional exhaustion his lifestyle demands, he is proud of 
challenging himself.  
Others have more stable jobs. They emphasise that the conditions in Singapore 
allow them to concentrate on what they deem important. This is for many their career, 
less in monetary terms but in a sense of “personal growth” or “professional 
development.” Some interviewees have their companies aside, usually founded together 
with same-aged (but sometimes nationally different) friends. They share work, 
organisational responsibilities and liability. While the start-ups are often online 
platforms, software tools and IT services, one informant also owns his own restaurant. 
Limited taxes, excellent infrastructure, fast and efficient bureaucracy and the ease of 
opening a firm on an EP (see Nico, this chapter) are some of the most important 
conditions in place.  
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 Zhang et al. (2017:14) argue that the quota which exist for foreign workers contribute to foreigners’ 
uncertainty towards life in Singapore. Similar to my interviewees, the authors’ highly skilled informants 
reported rejection by immigration authorities on basis of such quota. Officially, however, the quota only 
apply to lower skilled foreign workers with work permits and S-Passes and not the EP (MoM 2018c).  
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Nevertheless, only two informants so far fully live off their own company. Others, 
while officially being employed, work in unconventional jobs in the leisure industry or 
have become part of what they call a “community” rather than a firm and colleagues 
(see below). Severin and Mona represent the two poles of the spectrum of such 
entrepreneurial careers. The prevailing idea common to both stories is the intrinsic 
meaning they gain from entrepreneurial work, even when it means juggling two jobs or 
risking illegality in Singapore.  
Both informants choose their job because it fulfils them. Their security net and 
their salaries, however, could not be more different. Severin is a French software 
specialist who I met twice during his employment with an American IT start-up in 
Singapore. During our second interview, when Severin had worked roughly 3 years in 
Singapore, the 30-year old software developer revealed that he saved 3000 Singapore 
dollars, one third of his monthly salary, each month.
38
  
One year later when again exchanging emails, Severin had joined another high-
tech start-up which peers from university had founded: The team regularly moved and 
settled for several months in a global city that offered a stimulating business 
environment. When they came to Singapore, Severin joined. His work is now his hobby. 
Since the company does not have offices, Severin decides on a daily basis where he 
wants to work that day. While the young French does not know if the company keeps 
growing and if this at some point means to leave Singapore or the firm, he is content 
with his situation. Creativity and autonomy define Severin’s daily work, and financially, 
too, the organisational move was attractive.  
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   Equivalent to approximately 2260 US dollars at that time. 
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For Severin, a return to France would not entail unemployment. Thanks to the 
high salaries in Singapore’s booming high-tech industry, he is one of the best-earning 
informants. Yet, his tremendous salary increase – which he saw in real terms on his 
balance sheet, not as in France where tax deduction results in a much smaller net salary 
– and his currently secure status as foreign talent render other destinations 
unattractive.
39
  
Sometimes addressed as path-dependency (Scott 1995), the young Europeans 
often come to see their migratory pathways as irreversible. While they can technically 
return to their home countries – they are no political refugees nor did they flee famine or 
war – they cannot simply resume life at home where they left. Such awareness becomes 
a concern for many, yet one which they keep pushing away. Hubert, who together with 
his wife and toddler returned to their home country Germany, one of the EU’s best 
performing economies, looks at the downside of his return. He admits that “business-
wise– Financially [Singapore] is better. Lower taxes, the salary, the job, everything is 
somehow more attractive, better, nicer, more economical. If you look at the hard facts, it 
would be wiser to stay.”  
Next to Singapore’s business-friendly climate, the opportunities for early career 
advancement and the low taxes, which enable them to save, are assets the Europeans are 
unlikely to enjoy in their home countries. They benefit from the recent wave of start-ups 
and the incentives for entrepreneurial ventures which are open to foreign talent. While 
the migrants appreciate this environment, they also experience it as competitive. Ever 
tightening conditions for issuing or renewal of the EP and the general focus on business 
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 Income in Singapore is taxed at 15 per cent or progressive rates for higher-income employees. My 
informants all fall under the 15 per cent tax rate and compared this very favourably to the much higher 
income taxes in their home countries. In France or Germany, for instance, the amount is often more than 
double for young non-married professionals (Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore 2018). 
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and success in Singapore drive these migrants to devote much of their time to work and 
to professionalising. Job transfers in Singapore are common and these European 
migrants are no exceptions. Changing jobs is a way of career advancement in Singapore. 
What sounds like mere choice and opportunities however becomes a constraint for those 
who define ‘professional employment’ differently than the state.   
Rarely are informants’ employment trajectories as linear as Severin’s. Mona, a 29-
year old Italian designer, came to Singapore as an intern at a prestigious research 
institute and later switched to a full-time position. Yet, Mona felt increasingly 
unmotivated in her job and started to invest more time in her hobby yoga. She also 
considered returning to Europe but her Portuguese boyfriend, who she had met in 
Singapore five years earlier, wanted to stay.  
Mona reported how her hobby became the solution to her problem. “I did more 
yoga and found a reason to stay, and now, my reason to stay here is yoga.” After three 
years at the research institute she resigned and enrolled in a yoga instructor course 
instead. Mona started to teach every day. She did some freelance design work aside in 
order to top up her income and was fairly happy with her life. Yet, her legal situation 
became an issue.  
 
The problem in Singapore is you cannot stay without an [Employment] pass. 
For six months it was okay but then I needed to find something, a full-time 
job. I stayed as a tourist and went out once after three months. I just needed 
an [Employment] pass, any solution I was considering. The usual [thing to 
do] is getting married but I was like “No, I don’t think that’s a solution.” So I 
applied for a job, it worked out well and now I am okay.  
 
At the time of our conversation, the period of her uncertain legal status lay one year 
back and she had resumed ‘professional’ work. Meanwhile I had met a few people with 
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periods of an ambiguous legal status. Some left the country, travelled and, upon re-
entering, used their renewed three-month legal status as tourist to search for a job. 
Others again, as Nico, went for the more typical way of marriage.  
Mona’s case is striking for two reasons. For one, it confronts you with the great 
variations within the group of European migrants. A professional identity and finding 
meaning in one’s daily work causes some people to divert from their original profession. 
Mona felt like “I moved in circles [in my previous job in Singapore]. I couldn’t grow.” 
For her “growing” means developing her personality, but also nurturing practical skills. 
She obtained a license after an intensive three-month yoga course and enrolled in 
further classes to upgrade her qualifications. For Mona, being a professional is not the 
design job with her previous employer, the prestigious research institute.  
Nevertheless, the young migrants are not entirely free to choose their profession. 
Over time, life in Singapore on a low income and an uncertain legal status became too 
insecure and Mona resumed work in her original profession. When we met, her day-
time job with a small design firm – which grants her the EP – allowed her to stay in 
Singapore. Her passion however is teaching yoga which she continues to do aside. This 
is the price the young migrants have to pay for their mobility choice. In Europe, Mona 
would be free to work as a yoga instructor since EU’s freedom of movement does not 
require “professional employment” in the sense of Singapore government definition. 
Although the young Europeans can choose to leave their industry and have a certain 
amount of agency in directing their professional trajectories, rigid visa policies continue 
to impact on their professional development.  
Mona’s case, as an exception, actually underlines what is the norm. Mona is one 
of the few who dropped out of the scheme of the professional. For her, meaningful work 
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is an occupation which is not deemed professional for immigration authorities. The 
majority, however, and this is the first conclusion on Europeans’ work experiences in 
Singapore, interpret the pressure to professionalise, constantly build new skills and 
invest in their employability as something positive. They internalise the rhetoric of 
success and strive for status as a way to legitimise their presence in Singapore or 
elsewhere. A feeling of usefulness, worth and pride is important in weaving their 
personal story. In Sennett’s words “most people […] need a sustaining life narrative 
(2006:5).” Despite all the flexibility and mobility in Generation Erasmus’ lives, they 
still seek a coherent story. The professional identity feeds their self-esteem and allows 
them to nurture a sense of self.   
My second conclusion is linked with the first and concerns the issue of gender. In 
contrast to other forms of Western migration, the European women of the millennial 
generation do not forego their individual professional development. Mona’s and other 
women’s work trajectories show that they pursue their own career, independent from 
their boyfriends and husbands. When Singaporean visa regulations enforce the state-
definition of a professional, they adjust in order to stay independent. Mona, instead of 
foregoing her professional identity or her relationship, stayed in Singapore and re-
entered ‘professional’ employment.  
This is in harsh contrast to trailing spouses in expatriate assignments and lifestyle 
migration (e.g. Yeoh and Khoo 1998; Lundström 2014). These young European women 
neither consider marriage to be a solution nor do they stop working when their 
husband’s promotion would allow them to stay out of work altogether. Even the few 
who have children re-entered employment as soon as the children were old enough to be 
taken care of by a day care centre or a nanny. The professional is an identity these 
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women assume and, as I will develop later, an identity that is often tied to mobility. The 
competitive Singaporean labour market supports such professional trajectories 
regardless of gender whereas employment in Tokyo poses quite different challenges to 
the European women. 
 
6.2 Tokyo: Finding One’s Niche 
The young Europeans’ work experiences in Tokyo differ in several aspects from those in 
Singapore. Gurōbaru jinzai, or global human resources, is the key term for highly 
sought-after staff in the globalising Japanese labour market. The term vaguely 
encompasses anyone capable of working in international settings. Yet, this chapter 
unravels that the European migrants negotiate several forms of such gurōbaru jinzai. In 
contrast to the Singaporean labour market, the company type migrants initially enter in 
Tokyo entails specific employment trajectories. As I explain below, institutional factors, 
such as (varying levels of rigidity of) the internal labour market, weigh heavily 
(Lechevalier 2014). Therefore, I analyse Generation Erasmus’ work experiences in 
Japan with reference to the company types and the institional structures in which they 
work.  
To recall, a significant majority of informants in Tokyo (26 of the 35) had 
intermediate or above proficiency in Japanese when entering employment. At the time 
of finishing fieldwork for this dissertation, 24 of the 35 interviewees have at some point 
worked in a domestic company but only 11 stayed in domestic firms throughout. The 
pattern I found is that migrants target domestic, preferably large and long-established 
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firms first if they can. This mostly depends on their Japanese language proficiency. 
Later, many migrants transfer to foreign companies. A second group are those entering 
domestic SMEs, mostly in the IT industry, but also in other sectors such as translation or 
marketing. Informants’ work experiences and employment patterns differ considerably 
from those in the established Japanese firms. Young Europeans who enter foreign firms 
from the outset usually have quite clear reasons, which I examine below. I now analyse 
these three institutional types separately and discuss how employment patterns and 
migrants’ strategies unfold for each. Striking about Tokyo workplaces are diversity 
issues, which I consequently discuss after the three different types of firms. Migrants 
racial and gender features which make them stick out from the norm of the Japanese 
white-collar employee mark a clear difference of these Europeans’ experience in the two 
field sites.  
6.2.1 The Pinnacle of ‘Japaneseness’: Making it in (and out of) ōtekigyō 
I discussed earlier how the cultural enthusiasts, due to their love for Japan, study the 
Japanese language and often spend considerable time in Japan pre-employment. They 
are aware of Japanese firms’ preference for fresh graduates and know that a term at a 
well-known Japanese university increases their chances for what they consider to be a 
good job. More than in a professional sense, the cultural enthusiasts expect that a 
Japanese firm is their entry ticket to Japanese society. Furthermore, they expect to be 
welcomed with open arms. Below I demonstrate their hope of becoming permanent 
employees as this guarantees their status and recognition as members of society. Yet, 
their fantasies often come to an abrupt end. Not only are language and cultural issues 
more challenging than expected, but migrants have to realise that their pre-employment 
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fantasies were somehow distorted. Why that is so and how the Europeans react to the 
situation at stake is the focus of this section.  
At the time of graduation, the cultural enthusiasts possess “embodied cultural 
capital” (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) thanks to their familiarity with Japanese 
educational institutions and the language. Some interviewees regarded this as their 
chance of entering prestigious firms without having hard skills other than the Japanese 
language. This, as they are clearly aware of, would hardly be possible in their home 
countries. They strategically used the status that employment with established Japanese 
companies conferred to advance their careers. Alex, a Czech sociology and Japanese 
language graduate had a clear goal when applying for a famous Japanese trading group 
after his master. He was interested in aviation and knew that employment in this field 
was hard to enter in Europe since it required a highly specialised university degree. Alex, 
who had been interested in Japan for long, strategized on the particularities of the 
Japanese labour market. Knowing that Japanese trading groups catered to all kinds of 
industrial sectors, among them airplane technology, he studied the Japanese language 
diligently and completed a double master degree with a prestigious Japanese university. 
This positioned him as a suitable candidate to access his dream industry through the 
trading group despite lacking technical knowledge of the field.  
Employment with established firms provides stability, financial benefits and social 
status. Furthermore, it might give access to a highly specialised occupational field. Alex 
valued these advantages too much as to care about his company’s hierarchical structures, 
which he disliked. Alex did not join most of the socialising activities after work 
although he was expected to attend. It is likely that he was less worried about his 
outsider role and the tense relations with some colleagues because he was determined to 
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change employer from the beginning. After two-and-a-half years in his firm, Alex had 
gained enough knowledge of the field to appeal to specialised companies in the airplane 
industry. Family matters called him back home and Alex used his acquired expertise to 
apply for a smaller but more flexible competitor firm headquartered in Europe. He 
negotiated his desired return in the interview process and, after a training period in the 
Japanese branch, moved as an international sales assistant of his new employer back to 
Europe.  
Alex’ determination and strategic move through Japanese companies is however 
the rare case. More often, the cultural enthusiasts imagined themselves to function as 
bridges between Japanese and foreign businesses from inside Japan, their favoured 
country of residence. Lacking a clear occupational profile, they perceived it more 
realistic to rely on their embodied cultural capital – soft skills, language proficiency and 
familiarity with the prescribed way of gendered speaking and acting in the Japanese 
society (Aronsson 2012) – as Anita, a Romanian woman, remarks. 
 
Better you continue what you started than going back and later regretting 
because it’s harder to come back later. […] I applied mostly for Japanese 
companies. That was conscious, I wanted to experience [a Japanese firm] 
since I am in Japan. I’m sure there are good and bad parts and I wanted to 
see it. […] [My company is] a joint venture between the Japanese and 
American firm, so I thought that I could somehow be between those 
companies, be a bridge, experience both cultures. 
 
Anita’s account does not only reveal the curiosity for experiencing work in a Japanese 
firm. Anita expected to be assigned to a position in which she would be the link between 
“both cultures” and could thus use her embodied cultural capital. More than that, 
applying to an established Japanese company, also known as ōtekigyō, is strategic. As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, entering a company as permanent employee 
(seishain) directly after graduation is still regarded as the norm and as the golden path to 
social status in Japan. More than that, Japanese upwardly aspiring middle-class – and as 
a consequence many of the cultural enthusiasts who counted Japanese middle-class 
students among their university friends – target at well-known Japanese companies. The 
large manufacturers and trading firms are still associated with prestige, Japan’s decade-
long economic boom and the country’s famed production methods (Waldenberger 2016; 
Rikurūto Wākusu Kenkyūjō 2018). When probing it turned out that many interviewees 
had previously imagined to enter precisely such firms.  
Olga, a Baltic woman, was hired by a famous Japanese manufacturer. Her men-
only team was known for their successful work throughout the department. “We were 
the bestselling team, we had this experience and actually our team, they are real 
professionals. Looking at them, the way they work, I just loved it. Like, they are real 
professionals.” The “professional” image apparently boosted team members’ ego and 
installed a very exclusive team culture. Excessive working hours, frequent after work 
drink sessions and work on the weekend tied team members together and created a 
competitive and very ‘masculine’ atmosphere.40 Fresh out of university, Olga admired 
her senior colleagues for their business knowledge and imitated their intense work style. 
The colleagues seemed to like her, called her “princess” and included her in team 
conversations.  
Yet, eventually Olga as other respondents struggled with the strict hierarchy and 
the demands to conform to work extra hours and gender norms such as playing the 
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 After-work socialising and a strong focus on the team have been a common practice in Japanese firms 
(Brinton 1993). 
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‘hostess’ during after-work drinking sessions. 41  All of my informants in respective 
companies attempted to withstand the pressure but became gradually disillusioned. 
After months of working late and on the weekends, Olga tried to reduce the social 
commitments and went home earlier than her colleagues once. After this incident her 
team members, especially her mentor, started to attack her for making minor mistakes or 
blamed her for not knowing a Chinese character. While initially proud of her language 
skills and eager to ‘go native’, Olga, as other, especially female informants, increasingly 
felt being treated unfairly.  
While so-called power harassment is not uncommon in Japan (e.g. Kumazawa 
2000; Nemoto 2010), these Europeans’ experiences take on a certain quality. The 
criticism or punishment is directed at their deficiency in something which they cannot 
make up for: The fact that they have not been socialised in the Japanese society from 
childhood on. It often targets at mistakes with the Japanese language or the lack of 
cultural knowledge. While expectations to conform troubled all my informants, the 
feeling of exclusion encroached women more than men because they were 
overwhelmingly surrounded by Japanese men. In the male-dominated Japanese 
workplace where career women are still the exception and where employees forfeit the 
authority over their work to the company and superiors, the European women often lack 
the cultural (language and tacit cultural knowledge) and social (trust and supportive 
relations with mainly conservative male managers) capital to develop their careers (e.g. 
Ueno 2013; Ho 2018; Nemoto 2016).
42
 Olga first hoped that the situation would 
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 Nemoto (2010) illustrates how some white-collar women in Japan, expected to fulfil the gendered roles, 
normalise this as part of their job while others opt out instead.  
42
 Japan’s post-war economic boom has partly been attributed to the gendered division of labour where 
women were homemakers and caregivers. The breadwinner male was symbolised through the salary man 
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improve. After eleven months, however, she quit. “Yeah, it was a harsh experience. […] 
But you know I can now take the pink glasses and throw them away. I can see really 
good.” (sic) 
The metaphor of the “pink glasses” – more commonly known as rose-coloured 
glasses – provides the possibility to look behind the myth of the Japanese corporations 
as seen in these cultural enthusiasts’ eyes. For the cultural enthusiasts, employment, as 
the discussion on their migration motivations illustrated, is a means to the end of 
securing longer-term residency in Japan. However, since they long for acceptance if not 
integration in the Japanese society, a fair number of this subtype of Generation Erasmus 
strive for the prototypical Japanese career.  
Olga’s narrative took me to more complex issues being at stake than patriarchal 
bosses and hierarchical structures. Few informants explicitly named these factors, but 
they unravelled when I heard more stories like Olga’s. For the blonde woman, leaving a 
famous company like hers equalled personal failure. To recall her motivations for 
studying Japanese and working in Japan (see chapter four), Olga wished to become a 
“professional” in the Japanese language and not only mastering it as a “hobby.” The 
discourse on gurōbaru jinzai, who are proficient in English and possibly another foreign 
language, have intercultural skills and overseas experience, are all among Olga’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
who was committed to his company, to long work hours and to after-work drinking with co-workers and 
clients (Reskin 1993; Ogasawara 1998). Until today, women’s career prospects, salaries and corporate 
ranks in Japan are still considerably lower than men’s (Yamaguchi 2013; Nemoto 2010). The World 
Gender Gap report of 2016 which ranks Japan 111th – second lowest among OECD countries – reflects 
this (World Economic Forum 2016a).  
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attributes. Thus, her dream materialised when she received recognition for all her efforts 
in form of a job offer from a famous company. 
I suggest a two-fold relationship between entering such corporations and these 
European migrants’ subjective work experience. For one, the barrier to enter these firms 
is high and those who succeed feel confirmed when they receive an offer. However, 
informants’ pre-employment expectations and the reality of work are often incompatible 
as Olga’s and others’ examples evidenced. I will return to this dilemma in a discussion 
on the significance of race and gender in Japanese workplaces, but before that I now 
analyse the situation in SMEs and foreign firms. 
 
6.2.2 SMEs: Trading Stability with Flexibility 
Informants who entered employment in Japanese small and medium-sized companies 
(SMEs) or less traditional and less hierarchically structured Japanese companies report 
on their work experience very differently. Their experiences highlight that while they 
receive less in monetary terms and social security benefits they generally enjoy daily 
work more. This has two reasons. First, they are more often employed in their field of 
specialisation. As outlined earlier, Europeans in large Japanese firms and foreign 
companies are more often graduates of humanities or social sciences who lack the 
specific training. Among my informants in SMEs, science graduates – mostly male – 
report to be intrinsically interested in their jobs and appreciate the recognition they 
receive for something they like and are good at.  
Second, and at least as important, is the less hierarchical structure of the firms, 
less pressure to conform and often a more international environment. Although some 
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informants have quite stressful jobs, they value the flexibility and relaxed atmosphere. 
The software developers in this category generally work few overtime hours under less 
time pressure. Others, who switched from traditional Japanese companies to less 
hierarchical SMEs, emphasise the reduced emotional stress. In most cases, their new 
workplaces exert less pressure to conform to Japanese norms and migrants feel released 
from the rigid seniority principles they encountered in the bigger firms.  
My lunch interview with Vincenzo on a mild spring day was exemplary of what 
such a work environment could be like. Vincenzo brought his self-made bento (lunch 
box) and we sat down on a park bench for the interview cum lunch. While this was 
unusual for my field work in Japan, my interview partner’s appearance perfectly 
matched the situation. Office work in Japanese companies normally prescribes suits or 
at least formal clothes. Vincenzo however greeted me with his long hair loosely tied 
back and in washed denim and T-shirt. The Italian man, a software engineer with 
doctoral degree, decided to leave academia after his postdoctoral appointment at one of 
Tokyo’s prestigious universities. Since then, Vincenzo has worked in the same company 
for one-and-a-half years, a relatively small firm specialising in robotics where he was 
hired as a programmer. “I am really happy working here”, was one of his first comments 
on the job. His company developed a new robotic software and prepared to launch it in 
a few years. All employees are, according to Vincenzo, highly motivated and excited 
about the project. Since there are very few non-specialist positions, employees have 
high autonomy over their daily work and there are few hierarchical layers. Another 
feature Vincenzo appreciates is the multicultural environment at his workplace.  
 
Vincenzo: On a daily basis I can speak four languages. Not on work. On 
work I speak three because there is no other Italian. So the company is 
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absolutely international. I would say there is about half of foreigners and half 
of Japanese people. […] And different religions. It’s really a super 
multicultural environment. Even though it’s relatively small. We are, I don’t 
know, less than a hundred people.  
Me: Do you experience this as positive, this environment?  
Vincenzo: Of course. I mean that’s a good reason to be there.  
Me: So was it important for you when searching for a job here in Japan?  
Vincenzo: Absolutely. Absolutely, yes. It has grown on me because I have 
always been living in a multicultural environment, even though I was a lot in 
Japan. […] So, it was definitely a plus. Plus, if there is such an environment 
in the company I would say that the management is more- I would say more 
capable of understanding the different people and their different needs. 
 
Vincenzo’ case is fairly representative for the other Europeans I interviewed in the IT 
industry. Not everyone is as satisfied as him, either due to language issues or personal 
problems with a manager. In general, however, informants perceive the atmosphere to 
be relaxed and for those who can compare far more international than in traditional and 
bigger Japanese firms. This, in these Europeans’ eyes, enhances mutual understanding 
and tones down intercultural problems at the workplace. Moreover, as Vincenzo’s 
account vividly illustrates, the migrants are intrigued by the opportunity to use several 
languages at work and to work side a side with ‘interesting’ people, namely those of a 
different cultural or religious background. Probably most important is the fact that 
participants in this industry are considered to be specialists. Having autonomy over their 
work gives them the feeling of recognition, something which lacks from the narratives I 
collected from informants in large and hierarchical companies.  
The IT industry is a significant employer for men in my informant group as well 
as for foreigners in Japan in general. The ones I talked to either stayed in the same 
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company or moved within the same industry and a similar company size. Yet, a few of 
my respondents in SMEs and start-ups work in different industries and among them, the 
majority are women. They work in the language industry, design or advertising as well 
as in recruitment. In contrast to the male engineers and software specialists, this is 
usually not their first job. For those who are frustrated and quit a hierarchical firm, such 
smaller companies with more flexible hiring systems are a welcomed change. They 
appeal to the young Europeans by their flatter hierarchical structures and often lower 
requirements as to Japanese language proficiency or adherence to a rigid seniority 
principle. Lena, a German informant whose first job was with a famous Japanese 
communications company, moved to a recruitment start-up after a year. Lena 
appreciates the responsibility and learning opportunities that the dynamic start-up 
environment offers. It contrasts her previous employer a lot where she “had not learned 
anything” after a year.  
Table 6 at the beginning of this chapter seemed to suggest that domestic SMEs are 
the ‘least attractive’ types of employment for the young Europeans. This hypothesis now 
deserves a corrective. First it has to be stated that migrants with the most linear 
trajectories – those who have not changed company and who do not intend to do so – 
are people like Vincenzo. Three of my male informants have never changed employer 
over their five or more years working in Japan and all three firms are small software 
firms in Tokyo. In two cases this is a domestic firm. In the third case all employees are 
Japanese except of my informant. Although the firm is based in France, my 
interviewee’s description of the company structure and daily work resembles the two 
others’ stories. All three IT specialists state that they could find another job anytime they 
wanted but they currently see no reason to do so.  
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On the other hand, informants who left domestic SMEs did not necessarily do so 
because of problems. Lena, who was fairly happy in the female-led recruitment start-up, 
frequently travelled to Southeast Asia and Europe to explore market entry possibilities 
for her firm. She perceived this, despite being stressful and challenging, as an excellent 
training ground. The exposure to different work styles and problems sparked her interest 
in trying herself in a new environment after more than five years of permanent life in 
Japan.  
Ultimately, her refined professional profile secured her a job offer in Berlin. While 
Lena had previously excluded to ‘return’, the circumstances of working in a 
multinational team in one of the world’s leading start-up cities made the move attractive. 
She had left her first employer, the large Japanese communication firm, because she 
disliked the strict hierarchical layers and that learning was slow. The Japanese start-up, 
then, offered her the dynamic, challenging environment she was seeking. Lena’s case is 
not the only one where work in a start-up led to unexpected professional opportunities 
(often, but not always, abroad) and explains the transfer patterns to and again out of 
Japanese SMEs.  
 
6.2.3 Foreign Firms: Global Talent Factories? 
I opened this chapter with table 6 which suggests two striking issues concerning 
Europeans in foreign firms in Tokyo. First, after two years and above in Japan, the 
migrants show a tendency to transfer from Japanese to foreign firms. Second, however, 
slightly less than half of those who worked for some time at a foreign firm have 
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meanwhile left the country. This raises the question if adverse conditions at foreign 
firms cause the Europeans to leave the country.  
My data suggests a more complex situation. It reveals that the Europeans at 
foreign firms did not leave Japan because of unbearable workplace conditions. Instead, 
those without Japanese language proficiency viewed their time in Japan as limited from 
the outset. These informants almost exclusively worked in foreign firms. Also, a few of 
those who left Japan after having worked in a foreign company had worked at 
hierarchical Japanese firms before. The foreign company introduces them to jobs of a 
more international scope and thereby changes the course of their careers. It equips them 
with skills which are valued on the global labour market. At the same time, such jobs 
are limited in Japan – or inaccessible to the young migrants – but abound in other global 
cities. Therefore, a position in a foreign company in Tokyo is for many Europeans a 
temporary experience before they move elsewhere, in most cases another global city. 
The ones who stay in Japan even after some time in a foreign company have usually 
other than professional reasons to stay, an issue I will examine in the following chapters. 
Work experiences in foreign companies are contingent on the industry but even 
more on the employee’s language proficiency in Japanese and, if applicable, previous 
work experience.  Some Europeans function as bicultural bridges. They assist the 
foreign management of the local branch or communicate between the local branch and 
the head quarter. None of them completed a trainee period with rotation across various 
departments as it would be typical for fresh graduates in large Japanese companies, 
including the informants introduced earlier.
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 The Japanese rotation system aims at training generalists who are committed to their company and can 
be flexibly assigned to departments with current need for staff. Western firms, on the contrary, commonly 
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An intriguing case is Federica’s, an Italian woman with two years of work 
experience in a German engineering company in Italy and Germany and degrees in the 
Japanese language as well as Human Resource (HR) Management. She negotiated a 
move to Japan within her firm – albeit this meant sacrificing the social benefits that 
came with a German contract – and became leadership and talent development manager 
in the Tokyo branch. The position tremendously increased her authority as she became 
responsible for implementing global processes for talent development in the Japanese 
branch. 
Federica is the only foreigner in the office. She is also the employee with the 
highest proficiency in English. Thus, besides her official tasks in HR, she became the 
unofficial contact person for guests from headquarters. This placed her in a unique role 
and extended her network. “If I get to see people who are coming over from 
headquarters in Germany who are that [high] level of HR, if I was in Germany I 
wouldn’t meet them. I would have three people above me.” 
Other informants, even though not managers but assistants to foreign management, 
assess the responsibilities their position grants them similarly positively. Resembling 
Chinese graduates who secure challenging positions in Chinese-Japanese businesses in 
Japan (Liu-Farrer 2011b), the young Europeans, including women, seize professional 
opportunities in the transnational niche of European-Japanese businesses. However, 
high Japanese language proficiency is a prerequisite and even then such a position in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
hire specialists from the external labour market for specific positions (except some cases like the banking 
industry in Germany). Since job transfers are common, an internal rotation system is redundant. This is 
also valid in their Japanese entities which are usually small and have few internal divisions (Cole 1969; 
Komisarof 2011).  
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only one case led to promotion in Japan. Claire, a French woman with two years of 
experience in her firm assumed that “for a higher position, I would have to be Japanese. 
So although my current job is a great chance for learning […], I cannot grow further in 
this office.”  
As Achenbach (2014) demonstrates, Chinese women, upon their return to China, 
are sometimes hired into management positions in the Chinese subsidiaries of their 
firms. For the young Europeans, the situation is different. An Italian woman who 
returned to Paris for a job in the headquarter of her firm after two years in the Japanese 
subsidiary found herself in a position that lacked the scope of her previous job in Japan. 
In a follow-up interview via Skype she confessed to regret her return at times.  
Tsukasaki (2008) claims that Japan is unattractive for skilled foreigners, especially 
those from Western background because they cannot transfer their skills upon return. 
Both the language but also the distinctiveness of Japanese firms’ in-house careers, 
management practices and employee relations obstruct skill application in a different, 
i.e. Western organisational environment. Apart from the fact that very few of my 
informants have returned to their home countries within a few years, Tsukasaki’s claim 
seems to partly apply to foreign firms in Japan, too. For one, these Western firms’ 
headquarters are situated in saturated markets where the general trend is towards 
flexible labour and decreasing headcounts. More than that, a generally high educational 
level in these countries generates oversupply of skilled labour which translates into slow 
career advancement as upper positions are filled with experienced senior people.  
Nevertheless, the situation for these European migrants is not simply black and 
white. I found a complex picture of both opportunities for career advancement in 
foreign firms and drawbacks that had not necessarily been obvious from the outset. Nils’ 
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return to Germany came with a rise in salary and a position with global responsibilities 
in his German-based but globally present consulting company. He was hired for this 
position thanks to his three-year stint at the firm’s Japanese subsidiary directly after 
graduation.  
Nils was frank about the many barriers he, as a non-Japanese speaker, experienced 
in the Japanese office. What looked very attractive on his CV had been a fairly rough 
work experience, a finding that reminds us of the difficulties Indian IT specialists face 
in Japanese firms (D’Costa 2016). The young man reported that he had several conflicts 
with Japanese senior staff. When he voiced his concern over the implementation of 
projects which in his eyes were bound to fail he was ignored. Frustrated, Nils started 
looking for jobs with more growth potential. When a global position in the German 
headquarter opened he took the chance. Looking back during a follow-up interview, 
Nils assessed that from a European point of view, his overseas experience was 
impressive and suggested that he was versatile and capable of managing stress and 
unfamiliar situations. This was what secured him a global position at the age of 30 years.  
Nils himself, however, views his return and its impact on his career with 
ambivalence. With a bachelor degree in Asian studies Nils knows that he was lucky that 
the internship at the Japanese branch of his current employer, for whom he already 
worked as a student assistant in Germany, turned into a job. The subsidiary urgently 
needed someone with high proficiency in English and preferably knowledge of German 
head quarter and German language so they were happy to offer him a job. Upon his 
return three years later he had gained the credentials of a business person, which his 
university major alone would not have allowed him.  
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Nevertheless, Nils is critical of the scope of his work in Europe and his 
opportunity to quickly acquire new skills quickly. His role in Japan had exposed him to 
projects with other subsidiaries around the globe, which he appreciated as a way of 
learning international business and expanding his network in the company. At the same 
time, as a non-Japanese speaker he could not exploit learning opportunities in the 
domestic market. Furthermore, he experienced work back in Europe as somehow 
unsatisfying, similar as the Italian woman cited above. For both informants, the job 
suddenly feels mundane and they wonder if they took the right decision.  
Eventually, however, Nils was able to advance internally again. Business 
opportunities in the Buenos Aires branch led to a position in South America with 
attractive conditions. For Nils, the job enabled him to leave behind the familiar once 
again and challenge himself in new surroundings. Meanwhile, his CV has become 
tailored to such global positions. Likewise, Nils is less and less excited about working 
in German surroundings. Despite potential safety issues and language problems in his 
new country of residence, Nils embarked on a new phase of an incalculable yet 
appealing “worklife pathway.” It is this combination of international experience, social 
and cultural capital gained in the course of previous mobility, neoliberal attitude 
towards work and cosmopolitan aspirations which propelled some informants’ careers.  
Berna, the Italian woman, on the other hand has meanwhile stayed in the French 
headquarter of her firm for more than 2.5 years. She cannot help feeling that work in 
Tokyo was more challenging but also more interesting. Life, as she pensively uttered in 
our last conversation via Skype, seemed to pass by in the more comfortable but less 
dynamic environment of the Paris headquarter. While she enjoys being closer to her 
family in Italy and benefits from French socialist employment regulations – almost 
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twice as much paid annual leave as in Japan and an all-encompassing health insurance 
system – Berna herself is ambiguous about the way her professional and private life is 
unfolding in Europe.  
 Nevertheless, foreign companies in Japan are not always short-term work 
experiences for the Europeans. Alexiou is Greek and studied the Japanese language for 
years. At the time he completed his master programme in Tokyo, he was fairly 
proficient in the language and was hired as a business analyst in a French financial 
services firm. When I first met Alexiou, he told me about his clear preference for a 
foreign firm. “I wanted to try to work in a foreign bank. Don’t even bother to try to get 
into a Japanese one. Japanese companies [pay] bad salary.” Despite the company being 
French and his international team, Alexiou felt urged to conform to the Japanese 
business style which his Japanese senior team member set as example. In order to prove 
himself and set the course for future promotion, Alexiou bought academic books on 
Japanese business etiquette and continued to study the complex honorific language after 
work hours.  
 
My problem is I am not Japanese and not French. I try to survive, I have to 
say it in English because I don’t know the nuances. So, I always feel 
between the chairs and have to fight. […] The French know the system, the 
Japanese [are competent] for clients and manners. It’s tough for me, I’m not 
on either side; the Korean [team member] speaks Japanese as a native, and 
the Algerian speaks French. 
 
Alexiou’s insecurity regarding his acceptance as capable employee and as a foreigner 
among advantaged colleagues is striking. He mentioned his interest in other countries 
such as Singapore, but when we met again two-and-a-half years later, Alexiou had 
married his long-term Japanese girlfriend. The couple considered buying an apartment 
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in the future when Alexiou, who had applied for PR (permanent residency), would be 
eligible for housing loans under his new status of residence.  
As an employee in his fifth year he had meanwhile been promoted to an associate 
from his initial position as an analyst. “Next year I’ll become vice president, but it’s just 
a title. Always after 3 - 4 years it’s changing and you are stepping up,” he explained. 
The Greek was on the standard career track in the Japanese office of his firm and his 
narrative revealed that his foreignness had ceased to matter as an issue for career 
advancement (though not in terms of identity issues which I discuss in chapter seven). 
Five months later, however, Alexiou moved to the Japanese office of one of the world’s 
leading banks. I have not talked to him since. That said, his upward career mobility and 
the couple’s plans to invest in property in Tokyo suggest that he will stay in Japan for an 
indefinite period of time. 
 
6.2.4 Race and Gender at Work 
The last three sections elucidated that the young Europeans had varying expectations 
and imaginations of working in Japan. To recall, the cultural enthusiasts in particular 
thought they would somehow enter as preferred employees who push forward 
traditional companies’ efforts to globalise. As a matter of fact, Europeans mostly enter 
SMEs on grounds of their specialised skills and the objective to work in the field of 
their training. A third group of migrants consider foreign companies as the most suitable 
work environment, either because of their lack of proficiency in Japanese, because of 
better salaries or they expect a less hierarchical environment. In this section, I further 
trace how and why such expectations, which in the prevailing case of the cultural 
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enthusiasts often amount to idealisations of the Japanese work place, came about. I link 
them to the salience of race in Japanese society and investigate the gendered aspect of 
migrants’ struggles.  
The analysis demonstrates the need to understand migrants’ dreams and 
expectations as products of their racialised and gendered identities as white foreigners in 
Japan. My data suggests that pre-employment experiences prompted some of the young 
Europeans to adopt such racialised identities and to consider permanent employee status 
in an established Japanese firm as attractive. Europeans in domestic SMEs and foreign 
companies faced fewer problems which I ascribe to their different expectations but also 
to their different positions in these firms. However, negative cases do exist and 
‘resituate’ the discussion on race and gender in the larger context of the Japanese labour 
market. 
Returning to my hypothesis that many of the Caucasian cultural enthusiasts 
expected to be welcome with open arms even by conservative Japanese companies, one 
might consider why they extended their stay after studying or returned to Japan after 
graduation back in Europe. Some frankly admitted that they liked life as a foreigner in 
Japan. Lena started her professional career in a large Japanese communication company. 
The German woman recalled how she had enjoyed the year with her host family in 
Tokyo as a high school student so much that she wanted to return for work later. Apart 
from her enthusiasm for Japan, the return to Germany as a teenager was disillusioning. 
“I was really sad. Here [in Japan], I was a foreigner. You stick out which was kind of 
cool at the age of 16. I enjoyed it and desperately wanted to come back. In Germany, 
you find yourself simply being the same as everyone else.”  
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Other narratives hint at whiteness as a factor positively influencing their 
experience in Japan more explicitly. Respondents talked of the attention, sometimes 
admiration they enjoyed, something they had, as ordinary citizens and Caucasian among 
other Caucasians in Europe, not encountered before. Alexiou, the Greek who has 
worked in foreign financial firms for his entire career, frankly admitted the racial 
element underlying this treatment, stating that “One thing I like and everybody likes 
about Asia, and if they don’t say it I think they are liars, [is that] you feel a bit special. 
In Hong Kong maybe not so much or in Singapore, but in Tokyo you feel a bit special.”  
Olga, too, was conscious of her visibility in the job application process. However, 
her narrative reveals that her perception of this visibility changed over the course of the 
interview stages. “If you’re foreigner they are interested in you, right? They are all 
Japanese, right, and you just stand out,” was her comment on the attention she received 
in job interviews. In the early interview stage, questions circled around her motives for 
being in Japan, which was easy for her to answer. At least initially, her visibility was 
advantageous.  
Later, however, when she was invited to group discussions together with other 
applicants, Olga felt treated unfairly by her competitors and implied that her visibility 
was working against her. “And you speak like with nine people, nine students. And they 
just ignore you because you’re a freaking gaijin.” Gaijin, although literally the 
(derogative) abbreviation for foreigner in Japan, is often associated with either non-
Asian foreigners or explicitly with white foreigners (Komisarof 2012; Debnár 2016). 
Olga obviously used the term in the same sense. As I learned later, there were other 
foreigners at these events but she did not meet any non-Asians. According to her 
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complaints it was her different looks, or race, that drew attention to her and made her 
feel extremely uncomfortable.  
 
Everyone looks at you, I tell you. […] Somehow, I didn’t meet any [other 
non-Asians]. Like Chinese sometimes but I was really standing out and I 
hated the way they looked at me, in the interview, the mensetsu-kan, 
everyone was looking at me like a clown. Like “What do you think you do? 
Like exchange student?”  
 
Olga’s unease was probably not only rooted in others’ looks at her.  She admitted that 
she expected one of the companies to reject her on grounds of her inadequate answers 
during the advanced interview stage. Her account reveals what Sennett called “narrative 
agency” (2006:188). Throughout our conversation, she scrutinised the events which 
culminated in her exit from the famous company. In her search for explanations, Olga 
tried to make sense of a story of seemingly contradictory actions. Why did she, in spite 
of so many job offers and her high proficiency in Japanese, fail? As her account 
demonstrates, she attributed her poor performance to her discussion partners’ unfair 
treatment rather than her language deficiency or lack of the appropriate debating skills.  
Other informants, too, complained about the fact that in their Japanese offices 
they were supposed to be as fluent in Japanese and behave exactly as Japanese 
employees. Similar to Olga, they were frustrated with the fact that a few other 
foreigners – Koreans and Chinese, who know kanji from childhood on – did better than 
they themselves, and used the language as a justification for what they perceived to be 
their personal failure.  
Olga’s comment also reveals her assumption that people doubted her capability of 
obtaining a job offer. When she received several offers from big companies she was all 
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the more confident that her language proficiency was sufficient. Her choice to tell me 
about the offers without me probing might signify her pride of the fact that such well-
known Japanese firms wanted to hire her. In a more critical tone, however, she added 
that one famous company offered her a job despite a bumpy interview. Olga suspected 
that her foreignness – which for her means whiteness as we can see in the following 
quote – was the central factor for this offer.   
 
I got the naitei [job offer]. I don’t know [why], there is no logic. They just 
want a foreigner. It’s probably just the same as [in my current company]. 
They will give you a naitei, you will start working at this company but they 
don’t know how to treat you. Because they don’t even speak English. They 
see only your blue eyes. 
 
Her remark that the firms hired foreigners just for the sake of having foreign employees 
hints at the significance of the context of globalising Japanese firms. Amidst the calls 
for opening up Japanese business and society to the global stage, visibly foreign faces 
seem to have become symbols of a company’s level of globalisation. My research 
suggests that especially the ones whose phenotype clearly demarcates them as coming 
from Western and thus technologically advanced globalised countries are used as icons, 
even in a literal sense. For instance, another blonde woman was asked to participate in a 
video shooting that advertised the ‘global face’ of her company.  
The problem however roots deeper. Indeed, some firms seem to deliberately hire a 
few (white) foreigners and use them as poster children for a global company image. 
Nevertheless, the data reveal that neither the personnel department nor the majority of 
Japanese staff support foreign employees’ special treatment or heightened attention. 
Fieldwork with HR personnel from large Japanese firms revealed that they expect 
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exactly the same performance from foreign new recruits as from Japanese ones. In 
general, these firms make no exceptions – and do not provide extra support – if foreign 
employees cannot meet the requirements (Liu-Farrer, personal conversation).  
Europeans’ accounts of other types of firms are insightful here. They enable the 
observer to contextualise the bitter experiences which migrants make in traditional 
Japanese firms. The Europeans who did not enter established Japanese firms, despite 
their fairly high proficiency in Japanese and thus the possibility to do so, deliberately 
decided against what they expected to be harsh work environment. They spoke about 
how they preferred a more “Western” work style and employment conditions. 
Importantly, they emphasised that they felt more at ease in a multicultural workplace, 
which is a marker of SMEs in certain industries and foreign firms, at least if compared 
to large Japanese firms.   
At this point, it is insightful to mention that only two of my informants in Japan 
are non-Caucasians (one woman with Arabic features and one biracial man with a 
Southeast Asian mother). Thus, their cases do not allow to establish causal relationships. 
Nevertheless, it is illuminating that neither did they speak of any preferential treatment 
because of their looks nor did they consider big firms. The Arabic woman, who was 
fluent in four languages, one of them Japanese and held a master degree from one of 
Japan’s elite universities, only focused on small companies in the design and arts field 
when she searched for jobs and the biracial man founded his own one-man company. 
Gender, however, strongly impacts informants’ perceptions. Leila, a German 
woman who left her German-Japanese joint venture after over three years in order to 
obtain a fresh perspective, had imagined start-ups as a conducive work environment. 
Instead of the flexibility envisaged and more dynamic processes, the Japanese 
  204 
marketing firm was heavily micro-managed. Given her mid-career position, Leila 
voiced her opinion and made suggestions how to improve business practices. This 
however stirred conflicts with her bosses. As the only foreigner and the only woman in 
the regular management meetings, she felt isolated and saw no chances for 
improvement. Leila left the firm after only eight months, and, after a similar experience 
in another Japanese start-up, resigned and switched to a foreign recruitment company.  
With prolonged fieldwork in Tokyo, a pattern regarding the direction of transfers 
emerged. That is organisational moves from big Japanese to other firms, and from 
Japanese SMEs to foreign firms or directly abroad. Of course, there are exceptions, 
depending on the industry and informants’ length of stay in the country. However, 
foreign companies, too, challenge the young Europeans and again, gender surfaces as a 
contested social category. Ann, a Dutch woman who does not speak Japanese, thought 
her American fashion company would run the American way. Her assumption proved 
wrong and she found herself to be the only female manager and the only non-Japanese 
speaking foreigner.  
Ann met huge resentment by her Japanese male subordinate who refused her 
advice and accused her of being incompetent. She noticed that the respective employee 
did consult with other, more senior Japanese male managers. A befriended colleague 
suggested that her peculiar characteristics – as a young and female foreign manager on a 
local contract – were unprecedented and caused the subordinate’s suspicion.  The fact 
that Ann did not speak Japanese made her vulnerable. Although she enjoyed her own 
superior’s support the situation escalated and only found an end when Ann, pregnant 
and increasingly emotional, quit the job. 
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What can be observed here as the major problem is ambiguous. From the 
company’s side, especially the prestigious Japanese firms which receive many 
applications every year, there is a lack of understanding of foreigners’ struggles with 
hierarchical structures, male-dominated teams and patriarchal management styles or 
language and communication issues. Drawing from gender studies and organisational 
sociology explains my female informants’ struggles in traditional Japanese workplaces 
to a further extent. Acker (1990:152) claims that organisational structures in the white-
collar workplace are inherently gendered. “While women’s bodies are ruled out of order, 
or sexualised and objectified, in work organisations, men’s bodies are not.” The ideal 
worker, thus, is a man, and, whereas in Western countries this man is supposedly white 
(Delgado and Stefancic 2001), in Japan he is Japanese (Dasgupta 2003; Holbrow and 
Nagayoshi 2016).  
As above HR managers’ accounts as well as informants’ experiences reveal, the 
general principle in traditional Japanese firms is still that ‘the nail that sticks out gets 
hammered down,’ which means that female white employees need to conform to the 
ideal of the male Japanese salary man. My experience as a trainee in the German-
Japanese company in Tokyo qualifies the above saying. Both my internship and several 
informants’ accounts confirmed that foreign companies’ human resource policies often 
encourage diversity and promote gender equality and work-life balance. Nevertheless, 
as a matter of fact, client companies are mostly Japanese. As such, once client relations 
are involved, the gendered power relations of Japanese workplaces weigh heavily.  
An episode from my internship illustrates this. At evening events organized by the 
chamber, participants were mostly mid- or upper-management. Representatives from 
Japanese companies were in all but very few cases senior Japanese males. The events 
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which were mostly meant for networking purposes and served alcohol reconfirmed what 
Nemoto (2013:161) argued about organisational masculinity in Japan: At one occasion, 
a Japanese manager involved the other female intern and me in a conversation about 
alcohol drinking behaviour, urging us to respond to his pushy questions even when we 
tried to leave the conversation. He saw himself in the position of power – as a client, a 
manager and a man – and objectified us in a similar way as Nemoto (ibid:161) describes 
Japanese women’ subordination as “listeners or sex objects.” 
This illustrates Japanese firms’ continued reluctance to accept diversity and 
demonstrates the extent to which gender norms are entrenched. The cultural enthusiasts, 
for their part, expect special, maybe even preferential treatment that is to be exempt 
from the expected gender roles. Their narratives, especially those of female informants, 
evidence that the European women were taken aback when they experienced 
objectification or became aware that male Japanese colleagues did not take their 
professional aspirations seriously.  
I suggest that such expectations partly stem from the celebration of gurōbaru 
jinzai and migrants’ misunderstanding of the meaning of the term. More than that, 
however, these Europeans’ distorted perceptions are fuelled by the particularly positive 
experiences they had in Japan pre-employment and which at least some of them tacitly 
relate to their white or Western symbolic capital. If their managers do not show special 
consideration to their needs and if cultural misunderstandings or language problems 
arise, the young migrants, insecure and hurt, sometimes attribute the treatment to the 
one social category of whose significance in Japanese society they know – their 
visibility, or more explicitly, their racial difference.  
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The cases I observed – all of them Caucasians and the majority women – 
demonstrate that after one or two years of gradually rising pressure, migrants take off 
their “rose-coloured glasses” and quit their jobs. In contrast to the cultural enthusiasts, 
those without pre-employment study experience in Japan and others who are specialists 
in their occupational field, display less skewed expectations towards their treatment. 
While this does not spare them cultural or language problems, it less often causes 
bitterness towards colleagues and work in Japan in general.   
 
6.3 Skill Acquisition under Different Types of Asian Capitalism 
This chapter centred on Generation Erasmus’ work experiences in Asia. By examining 
my respondents’ employment practices along with their hopes, expectations and 
changing strategies over time, I attempted to understand what employment as migrants 
in Asia entails from a career perspective. In Singapore, once granted a valid work visa 
which classifies migrants as foreign talents they strive to live up to the professional 
image. Failure to do so risks losing their eligibility for the EP whose requirements are 
high and keep rising. As a consequence, the young migrants try to professionalise 
themselves by navigating the dynamic labour market. Strategic job transfers promise 
career advancement. Intrinsic meaning of daily work and success in one’s job are ever-
present elements of their narratives. It is important to acknowledge migrants’ varying 
interpretations of success. They range from objectively identifiable markers of career 
advancement to feeling appreciated or perception of personal growth.  
The scripts the young migrants use illuminate how strict migration policies and 
meritocratic principles in Singapore shape the Europeans’ notion of a career. The young 
  208 
adults assume a professional identity through organisational, occupational, but often 
also spatial mobility. This mechanism reveals the link between the professional identity 
and mobility. It helps us to understand migrants’ rationales towards mobility and their 
strategies for navigating the labour market.   
In Tokyo, labour market competition is less pronounced also because the internal 
labour market discourages organisational mobility. Cultural enthusiasts who are 
proficient in Japanese and aspire living in Tokyo strive for a permanent employment 
status in large Japanese firms. These Europeans reckon that such employment 
legitimates their status in Japan and functions as access to Japanese society. Yet, 
business practices in traditional Japanese firms, the expectation of conformity and the 
ignoring of cultural diversity pose severe problems for the migrants. Many transfer to 
less hierarchical firms or to foreign companies. While SMEs and start-ups seldom 
guarantee comparable conditions in terms of stability, security or status, they are more 
open to diversity and mid-career hires. Consequently, they are more accessible and seem 
to offer higher work satisfaction.  
Other Europeans are less certain that they want to stay in Japan indefinitely. While 
limited proficiency in Japanese is one of the reasons, more often do they regard 
Japanese hierarchical institutional structures as unattractive. They try different ways of 
building a professional profile. These migrants strive for recognition, either in start-ups 
with growth potential or in well-paying subsidiaries of foreign firms. For them, success 
usually sets an end to their time in Japan. To advance in their career is to move to the 
next promising position which might be elsewhere in Asia, in Europe or in completely 
different (emerging) markets.  
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Race and gender shape migrants’ work experiences in Asia, for many 
unexpectedly. In Singapore, which celebrates diversity and multiculturalism, informants 
are surprised and often uneasy when Singaporeans approach them as ‘elite whites.’ This 
contrasts with the few non-Caucasian informants’ narratives who neither experience 
prejudice because of a perceived elite status as whites nor because of their ethnically 
mixed background. In both national contexts, white European migrants feel 
uncomfortable at such unfounded respect – or scepticism – but they are ambivalent in 
their reactions. They know that the status of being white and European gives them 
advantage. Uneasy to acknowledge the continued significance of race, some revert into 
a self-subscribed role of the marginalised other. One example is Olga, who in her own 
words saw Japan through “pink glasses.” She increasingly felt treated unfairly not only 
by colleagues but by the Japanese society in general. At the time she quit her Japanese 
employer, she felt alienated by Japanese people in general and remarked that she “hated 
how they look at me, even in the subway.” Other informants, however, are able to break 
the boundaries and build cordial relationships with local or Asian colleagues (Giacomo).  
The discussion elucidates that migrants are aware of their particular role in either 
the perpetuation or questioning of racial inequality. Their reactions to the uncomfortable 
truth are two-fold. Some are able to contest the historical ethnic barriers and are 
accepted in their teams at the workplace. In contrast to their senior expatriate co-ethnics, 
the more equal footing of this young migrant generation on one side and (at least the 
same-aged) local employees on the other side seems to encourage interethnic bonding at 
the workplace.    
The analysis illuminates different outcomes in the different national contexts. 
Gender marks the most obvious difference between the two field sites: European 
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women in Singapore appreciate the favourable conditions for advancing their careers, 
which some evaluate as more gender-equal than in Europe. In Tokyo, female informants 
struggle in male-dominated workplaces, especially in traditional corporate Japan where 
patriarchal structures are still dominant. They feel to be outsiders in a double sense, both 
because there are few Japanese career women around them who could act as role 
models or could become friends and because they lack the cultural and linguistic ability 
to fit in smoothly. Since the European women can hardly imagine a professional future 
in such workplaces, many transfer to foreign firms or domestic start-ups within one or 
two years. For a few, gender norms are among the main reasons to leave Japan. 
The comparison reveals more profound implications of the different types of East 
Asian capitalism in which the young migrants attempt to build a career. Some 
exceptional cases confirm the norm of Japan’s internal labour market: A few Europeans 
are able to turn the particularities of Japan’s organisational culture into an advantage. 
These are the ones who are able to match their disciplinary training in a highly 
specialised industry with excellent Japanese language skills. Furthermore, few use 
Japanese companies’ indifference towards graduates’ majors in the hiring process as an 
opportunity to enter occupational careers that are regarded highly competitive in other 
countries. Yet in most informants’ eyes, the conformist organisational culture does not 
allow them to develop adequate skills for a business career.  
The findings show that the Japanese firms which invest in these young employees’ 
training are likely to lose the majority of them. This is counter-productive, both for the 
migrants who feel they are wasting their best years as young and capable workers but 
more so for the firms which are in urgent need of diversifying and expanding an 
internationally-minded work force. It is in contrast to Singapore which reveals the 
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possibility of a much more fruitful marriage between migrant workers and host country 
firms. While many of the Europeans in Singapore are prone to move on, too, their time 
as employees in Singaporean workplaces bears immediate fruits for both employees and 
employers.    
Overall, the young Europeans are grateful for gaining overseas work experience 
as white-collar employees in the Asian cities. This alone allows them to construct a life 
narrative – not one as ‘lifestyle migrant’, ‘victim of EU economic crisis’ or ‘disoriented 
millennial’ but one of a foreign professional in a sparkling global city. Among their 
multiple identifications the professional identity provides them with respectability and 
“legitimacy” (Sennett 2006:190). Identity construction however is a struggle. Insecurity 
over their future pushes many to upgrade their skills and professionalise themselves.  
Over time, their professional profiles sometimes align with the domestic labour 
market. More often, however, their profiles appeal to positions on the global labour 
market, typically located in one of the hubs that connect global business. In either case, 
their growing cultural, social and geographical distance from their home countries 
simultaneously alienates them from their home country labour markets. They 
accumulated work experience far away from Europe and thereby adopted different 
perspectives on who the future economic players are. Additionally, the rapid growth of 
formerly peripheral regions alters these Europeans’ perception of their options. They 
start to grasp that their chosen biographies hold compelling opportunities in store. Yet, 
seizing these chances demands sacrifices, for instance regarding free time or frequency 
of visits to family members. 
Migrants’ personal development, too, unravels changing strategies and desires. 
The ideal types, which I outlined in chapter four, distinguish the Europeans in their 
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initial motivations for moving. However, this chapter underlined how types gradually 
dissolve and converge. Even many cultural enthusiasts’ focus shifts away from Japan 
and sometimes translates into repeated spatial mobility. However, work and career alone 
cannot explain migrants’ changing strategies and practices. In the following, I turn to 
migrants’ social world in their Asian host cities and investigate how socialising shapes 
the migration experience. 
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7. Migrants’ Social World 
“Tomorrow I am flying home. Wherever that is– “ I was on a Skype follow-up interview 
with Nils, the German who, after three years in Tokyo and another two years back in his 
home country, was just about to move to Buenos Aires for his new job. Nils had just 
been on a business trip to Argentina and agreed to Skype from his hotel room before he 
would return to Europe for another week to sort out last bureaucratic issues. Everything 
to come after was still open and Nils seemed too jetlagged as to think about his new life 
further.  
The Skype interview stuck in my mind when writing the last parts of this 
dissertation. I thought of Deborah, a Greek woman who I met during my first field trip 
to Singapore in 2015. She was the first informant to pin down issues of home and 
mobility when she answered my question about her plans for the future with the words, 
“We never know, for most people like us, like who left many years ago […], it’s not 
easy to say that I’m going to stay somewhere permanently. Okay, just call me in a year 
and maybe we’re here or maybe in Dubai or London, you never know.” I was unable to 
contact her during my second visit to Singapore in 2017, but on this spring afternoon in 
2018 I dropped her another email and was lucky. Deborah, in contrast to Nils, is still in 
Singapore. I learned that she has three children meanwhile, started her own company 
and has lived in the city-state for nine years. These two interviewees’ trajectories 
accentuate the range of possible meanings which place and home can assume in the 
process of migratory pathways. 
This chapter connects Generation Erasmus’ sense of place and the meaning of 
home to their socialising and community building practices. Drawing from the concepts 
of ‘boundary work’ and ‘place making’ I approach the following questions: How do 
  214 
migrants manoeuvre the physical place of their host societies and already existing group 
boundaries within? Which boundaries do they draw, contest, or tear down and how do 
they align socialising practices with their cosmopolitan aspirations and with a sense of 
place? In the first part of this chapter, I sketch the Europeans’ geographies in Singapore. 
The second part then shifts the focus to Tokyo. Assessing common features and 
differences between the migrant groups in both cities allows me to sketch a more 
refined picture of this European generation and their (lack of) embeddedness in the 
Asian host societies.  
 
7.1 Singapore 
By underground, bus, ferry, taxi, (Singaporean) acquaintances’ private car and most 
often on foot, I gained an impression of the social make-up of the places where the 
European migrants spend most of their time – and of the places they do not frequent. 
This enhanced my understanding of the “spatial modes of distancing” (Galasinska 
2010:947) which the various ethnic groups and other, for instance occupationally 
defined communities use. Singapore has two faces. There is the showpiece Singapore: a 
successful multicultural, multiracial and multi-ethnic society. But in recent years, there 
has also been the fragile Singapore whose news report on ethnic communities’ 
segregated living, racial tensions and online xenophobia (e.g. Mathews and Hong 2014; 
Ho 2014; Yang, et al. 2017). The European migrants’ social relations are as complicated 
and multidimensional as the societal composition suggests. A common thread of 
informants’ narratives and my observations point to their identification with an 
internationally minded group of ‘foreign talents’, including a few cosmopolitan 
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Singaporeans. At the heart of their collective identity lies the shared experience of 
mobility and foreignness.  
 
7.1.1 Singaporean Place-identity versus Migrants’ Place Making  
The startling fact about Singapore is its officially harmonious mix of numerous races 
and cultures but the de facto separation of the very same in most spheres of life. While 
studies as well as my interviewees agree that people are used to foreigners of various 
ethnicities, anything beyond inter-ethnic instrumental interaction is scarce (Ho 2014; 
Kathiravelu and Ye 2015). Business is somewhat different as many offices are 
multicultural.
44
 Still, my field work suggests that inter-ethnic friendships seldom 
develop at the workplace, and in many cases even lunch breaks are separate.  
In this section, I look into the given Singaporean place-identity and young 
European migrants’ attempts and practices of carving out their own place. Moving away 
from the realm of work, ethnically and class-based separated places of socialising are 
salient. One of the most obvious divisions is housing (e.g. Velayutham 2007; Ho 2014). 
The base line for division is the kind of housing people can access. Most lower middle-
class and middle-class Singaporeans live in affordable government-subsidised housing 
(hereafter HDB) whereas wealthy citizens, as well as most foreigners who can afford 
live in condominiums.
45
 The latter are equipped with a range of facilities such as gym, 
                                                             
44
 Not all industries are multicultural. For instance, Ye and Kelly (2011) claim that the financial industry 
hires employees based on racial and cultural capital. The industry is dominated by Caucasians and 
Chinese whereas Malays and Indians are denied access or are excluded from promotion because of 
historical racial power relations, colour of the skin or a non-standard English accent.  
45
 The Singaporean Human Development Board (HDB) is a Singaporean government organisation. It 
coordinates the ethnic make-up of the state-leased flats in which the majority of Singaporean citizens live. 
The acronym HDB is associated with these government-subsidised apartments, which are, in contrast to 
private condominiums generally more affordable (Matthews and Hong 2014).  
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pool, shopping facilities and guards, and are generally more expensive than HDBs. 
Work visa holders, however, are not eligible for the HDB scheme. Thus, they either 
have to look for a room to rent within a Singaporean-owned HDB, or they move into 
condominiums.  
Most of my interviewees chose to share a condominium for economic reasons. 
Usually there are two or three, sometimes even four or five parties in the apartment. The 
decision for a condominium almost necessarily precludes interaction with Singaporeans, 
who opt for the more affordable HDBs. Moreover, according to my informants, young 
Singaporeans, even when working full-time, often stay with their parents until marriage 
since family bonds are strong in most Chinese, Malay and Indian households and high 
rents discourage young workers from moving out. As a result, public image portrays 
condominiums as the place of foreigners and often emphasises the exclusivity of the 
‘rich expat condos.’ Contrary to the stereotype, however, few informants (including 
couples) could afford a condominium on their own.  
A few others moved into HDB flats which they shared with several parties. The 
strict rules, however, that came with HDBs, were a drawback in the eyes of my 
informants: They stated no visitors, only ‘light cooking’ and no noise but cleanliness as 
a must. Nevertheless, the choice for an HDB was conscious, less for an economic but 
for a cosmopolitan rationale. Andras appreciated the experience of living in an HDB 
during his first three years in Singapore.  
 
If I go to a country I want to fit in, so I went to an HDB. […] In condos there 
are only few locals, they might buy it but then rent it out. In an HDB the 
whole flat is rented out, they share. In condos you don’t learn and meet 
others. In HDBs you get to know locals. The man who managed it was a 
retiree and explained me quite a few things. He took the time to walk me 
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through those markets, explained food, etc. He showed me all those little 
things and I am grateful, but we are not friends. As soon as business is over 
it’s done.  
 
Andras’ narrative reveals both appreciation and disappointment. Against his hope, even 
living together with locals and the friendly introduction to Singaporean life by the 
caretaker did not lead to deeper interaction. The housing situation mirrors young 
Europeans’ social world and the role place assumes as access or barrier to socialising. 
From the locations where Generation Erasmus socialise to membership in hobby circles, 
the notion of foreignness is omnipresent. The ones who first chose an HDB usually 
moved into a condominium later. Firstly, well-maintained HDB where foreigners are 
accepted are limited. Furthermore, different “cultured behaviour” (Middleton 1989) 
among the parties sharing an HDB flat – concerning privacy, cleanliness and noise – led 
to my participants’ disillusionment over the feasibility to create close bonds to locals or 
simply the chance to have more privacy.  
Cosmopolitan Singapore has a distinctive place-identity (Carter et al. 2007). 
Expatriate magazines and business forums emphasise the image of the global city with 
its pool parties in expatriate clubs, party nights along the Quays (the central nightlife 
area) and casual networking in the bars around Club Street. The people who inhibit 
cosmopolitan Singapore are featured in suits, mostly Chinese or Caucasian looking, 
managers and expatriates.  
Such place-identity constitutes a view from the top and is “subject to an imposed, 
created and manufactured place construction” (Carter et al. 2007:765). While it is 
associated with (particularly Western) foreign talents, this is a place-identity my 
informants barely share. They obtained a sense of it when informing themselves about 
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Singapore pre-migration. However, once having secured a job and having made friends, 
few of the young migrants frequent such places. For example, Club Street is an irregular 
meet-up to gather with friends easily – given its centrality and easy access – rather than 
making new ones. Participants named less well-known areas and local restaurants close 
to their residences as their preferred places to “hang out” or to exercise.  
Singapore’s media has debated the city-state’s alleged association with being a 
‘money-making’ machine but lack of authenticity or, as termed by Iwabuchi (2002:455) 
in a different context, of being “odourless.” Efficient, clean and business-driven, 
characteristics most other global cities could only dream of, have gained Singapore the 
image of a boring, impersonal place – good to make money but with little incentives for 
people to lay down their roots. Several informants seemed to agree with this estimation 
and some of them have meanwhile left the country. Comments like “Singabore” or 
“Switzerland of Asia” punctuate the reputation of an impersonal business centre.46  
The majority, however, developed a sense of place for Singapore through 
activities and memories tied to distinctive localities over time (Carter et al. 2007). Their 
sense of place is different from Singapore’s official place-identity, be it “odourless 
Singapore” or “cosmopolitan Singapore” (Yeoh 2004; Bork-Hüffer 2016; Ho 2014; Ye 
2016). Such activities include cycling around the island, joining dragon boat clubs, 
basketball groups or amateur photographer circles. Such activities link socialising to 
specific places like Singapore’s parks and waterways, residential areas’ basketball fields 
and scenic nature spots, respectively. Others actively engage in home-making processes. 
Sarah, who earlier criticised Singapore for its “lacking emotion”, describes how she 
                                                             
46
 The term “Singabore” blends ‘Singapore’ with the adjective ‘boring’ and is an allusion to the country’s 
alleged “odourlessness.” 
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became more satisfied after she actively looked for places that would create a homely 
feeling.  
 
What I’ve been doing here was seeking out the more unique kind of places 
in terms of restaurants, bars, shopping. […] It takes a while but I try to find 
those little places that have character and are really unique and that keeps me 
happy. And they do exist, I happened to move into a neighbourhood, it’s a 
hipster hood. It’s got lots of little cafes and a new beer bar and I’m pretty 
happy to be there. 
 
While Lena sought out Singapore’s hidden gems because she was dissatisfied, Hector’s 
sense of place for Singapore developed along with his hobby, running. It structures his 
life in Singapore, which he might have already left if it was for the job. The Portuguese 
is in banking and found his way to Singapore via detours and contingencies more than 
five years ago. He complaints about poor working conditions and strained relations with 
bosses. As a passionate sportsman, however, Hector started to explore options for 
outdoor activities soon after his arrival in Singapore. He discovered lush areas in the 
island’s many parks and water reservoirs, all fairly accessible thanks to the well-
developed public transport system. Together with a group of enthusiast runners from 
different continents, Hector spends his Sunday mornings in the various corners of 
Singapore.  
During a half-day trip to one of Singapore’s islands Hector examined the island’s 
running course suitability for his jogging group. He keenly explained Singapore’s 
infrastructural projects to me. The government was in the process of extending the 
running course, which so far spans half of the island, to a full circle. Hector seemed 
fully immersed in his hobby, which to pursue with the current intensity few other places 
than Singapore might allow.  
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7.1.2 Myth of the Pool Party Lifestyle: Socialising Contextualised 
In the “smart(phone) nation Singapore” (Hooi 2014), many of the young Europeans 
organise their lives via the internet. I am interested in migrants’ socialising practices 
here as these practices are shaped but also how they contest the official discourse of 
foreign talents’ typical lifestyles and socialising activities. Upon migration, social media 
are one of the most important sources for contacting others, as they are for maintaining 
bonds and scheduling get-togethers later. I joined several online groups which 
informants mentioned and followed the activities posted on open platforms.  
LinkedIn, the world’s largest online job portal, is popular among the young 
migrants beyond its original function. Furthermore, the migrants are actively involved 
in facebook groups – both nation-based groups as well as interest-based groups –, 
InterNations, and Meet-ups. InterNations, as the name suggests, is a network that “helps 
you feel at home around the world” (InterNations 2018).47 At least initially, all of my 
interviewees used one or the other service, although many stopped attending events or 
engaging in groups once they had found a network of friends.  
A group of European and Singaporean women drew my attention to the so-called 
“Newby gatherings.” These parties are organised by the social network platform 
Meetups. The five women had met at a previous similar event and so I anticipated an 
informative research site. The event took place at a small bar close to Boat Quay, a 
lively night life district in central Singapore. At the entrance, I received a sticker that 
                                                             
47
 InterNations spans 390 cities worldwide and boasts 2.9 million members, proudly calling itself the 
“Largest Global Expat Network” (InternNations. 2018. Available at https://www.internations.org/about-
internations/). Meetup is another online social networking service with various groups and functions 
similar as InterNations (Meetup. 2018. Available at https://www.meetup.com). 
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marked me as a “Newby.” It turned out to signal others to address me. Single men 
dominated the scene and I understood why most women came with a group of friends.  
The most intriguing conversation I had was with a mixed group of Asians of both 
sexes, among them Singaporeans, with an age range of 20 to 50. This group struck me 
as locals or long-term foreigners in Singapore who were eager to meet new people of 
non-Singaporean background. When they found out that I was in Singapore only 
temporarily their interest decreased. As informants told me later, both Singaporeans as 
well as long-term foreign residents – including the young Europeans – befriend other 
permanently staying people purposely. In the dynamic hub, it is all too common that 
bonds are cut because people frequently leave. Some interviewees described it as a 
waste of time and energy to invest in such short-term friendships.  
In contrast to that, men seemed to use the event as a chance to meet women. Some 
of my female informants reported the same impression and most of them stopped 
attending the events once they had found friends. Others, being single and active on 
mobile dating apps like Tinder, continued to sporadically visit the parties. With 
reference to participants’ narratives and my own observations that night, I discovered 
the range of options newly arrived migrants have in terms of different communities to 
socialise. Ultimately, however, meet-ups are a one-time experience for many. Migrants’ 
use of online social networking services and their preferred places for socialising 
changed upon becoming familiar with Singapore and having established personal ties. 
Initially, meet-ups might lead to a new friendship or to a romantic adventure. Later, 
migrants are introduced to acquaintances’ friends and they enlarge their networks on 
their own initiative.  
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The experience of mobility and a foreign identity strongly shape with who the 
young Europeans comfortably mix. Drawing on Brewer’s social identity theory (1986), 
Wimmer’s (2009) ethnic boundary making and Jenkins’ (1996) writings on collective 
identity direct analysis to the interplay of two dialectic processes, namely out-group and 
in-group definitions. That is, individuals define their in-group along several shared 
criteria which create the feeling of being part of a community. The same individuals 
display commonalities that allow outsiders to objectively define them as members of 
one group. With this theoretical approach in mind, I now turn to migrants’ boundary 
making practices. 
 
7.1.3 The In-group: Young Mobile Professionals  
Early during my second field trip to Singapore, a Portuguese informant invited me to a 
barbeque party. The get-together took place at one of the huge condominium complexes 
in the heartlands, Singapore’s suburban residential areas with supposedly few foreign 
talents. People at the party ranged from Singaporeans, Asians from most parts of Asia, 
to Europeans of almost every European nationality. Occupations, too, covered a wide 
range, and I was surprised that one of the other hosts, another Portuguese, was working 
as a tennis coach. Age – from late 20s to late 30s – and higher education were the only 
easily observable characteristics of the group but I would discover more commonalities 
as the evening went on.  
It was already dark when an Asian woman and a Latino man approached me and 
involved me in an intriguing discussion. When they found out that I was living in Japan 
the conversation switched to Japanese. The Japanese woman was, like the other party 
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members, fluent in English and obviously enjoyed conversing with the mixed crowd of 
people. The ability to speak several languages, and the fun of doing so, were traits I 
found among many of my interviewees. Marcos, 34 years at the time and originally 
from Lisbon, had lived in Japan before and so our conversation circled around life in 
Japan and Singapore and our experiences of mobility.   
That evening, I started to understand what the “international atmosphere”, 
“cosmopolitan environment” or “diverse cultures”, to adopt my informants’ terms, 
means for them. The gathering revealed what was (from a European perspective) 
distinct about these migrants’ social world. While I learned in one-on-one interviews 
that the majority of my informants’ close friends are European, approximately half of 
the wider circle of friends, as I witnessed at the barbeque party, are Asians. What these 
young adults actually have in common is their foreign identity, their desire to explore 
the unfamiliar, but also the shared concerns of establishing a career and the pursuit of 
happiness abroad. Those who have a similar “reference point,” as one Belgian woman 
phrased it, are Europeans, Asians and sometimes people from other continents, as well 
as a few Singaporeans.  
When I talked to a young Singaporean couple, the man relayed that he felt 
inspired by discussions with people from diverse backgrounds at these get-togethers, 
something he could not find among Singaporeans without mobility experience. Race 
and ethnicity lost their dominating power among that evening’s young middle-class 
crowd. On a different occasion, John, a young British interviewee noted that having 
Asian friends was simply natural. He started his first job in Singapore at the age of 22 
after having completed a year at a Singaporean university.  
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I don’t know any British people here. There are many here but they mostly 
don’t work in construction. Actually – that’s not true, some of them do but 
they are like expats, like 40 or 50 years old. But [my friends are] mostly 
Singaporean and yeah, just the normal thing here. It’s normal to have friends 
from China, Indian, Pakistan, Philippines definitely, Indonesia. 
 
Certainly, not all informants would have agreed. Yet, John’s socialising habits roughly 
represent those of the younger Europeans who migrated alone without prior work 
experience. They show more common features with other Asians – foreigners and 
Singaporean citizens – than with the established and privileged European community of 
a post-colonial Singapore. This fact however underlines that other kinds of privilege 
than race have not waned. Middle class, the millennial generation and a certain attitude 
towards life as a project to manage and to improve – for instance through organisational 
and geographical mobility – are the most obvious markers of this group. Following and 
participating in that evening’s conversations, I noted that the majority of those present, 
regardless their background and including the locals, were highly educated people 
working as professionals. Secondly, all but few had experienced mobility in their lives, 
often repeatedly. This accounts for both the Asian as well as the European migrants, 
whereas the Singaporeans had usually not migrated but counted foreigners among their 
close friends and frequently travelled the region. Last but not least, they were all 
millennials.  
For this cohort, distinction and forging ever new ties go hand in hand. They 
understand social media as main means of private and professional communication. 
What’s app groups, facebook and LinkedIn are, next to email, the different tools they 
use for business but also when answering my requests for an interview or when inviting 
me to their group activities. They are open to challenges and to new contacts, which 
  225 
initially helped me to approach them and win their trust. This attitude is necessary for 
starting a new life abroad in the first place and turns the migratory process into an 
exciting if undeniably exhausting one.  
At times, I sensed that such enthusiasm for new contacts was more than mere 
personal interest. Particularly those who own a business or plan to establish one see 
broadening their networks as a fruitful and necessary instrument. For instance, an 
interviewee with the business idea to develop models for foreign talents’ successful 
human resource management proposed a future collaboration. He apparently assumed 
that my qualitative research could complement his statistical analytics.  
To sum up, these Europeans are keen to tap a pool of possible business ideas, to 
travel new places and to make friends of different backgrounds. Their international 
friendship (and sometimes business) networks are not only fun or instrumental – they 
become a way of defining themselves, a collective identity. Deborah, the Greek woman 
who has lived with her Greek husband in Singapore for nine years, is not the only one 
who is proud of her friends’ diverse demographics. “My friends are from everywhere. 
We got married in July in Greece in a remote place. There were 180 people. 130 were 
foreigners from 26 different nationalities. Imagine all the Greeks in that small village, 
they were like “what’s going on here?”  
For Deborah as for others, a large network of people from different national, 
ethnic and cultural backgrounds is an asset she carefully nurtures and maintains. These 
are the people the young Europeans feel most at ease with rather than senior co-ethnics 
in their host societies or some of their peers at home who cannot understand their 
hunger for “leaving one’s comfort zone.” This was only revealed over time and piece-
by-piece thanks to the ethnographic lens which enabled me to observe and participate in 
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a range of socialising activities and everyday get-togethers. Only interviews or a strong 
theoretical approach – like one directed by race or gender – would not have unravelled 
the emergence of the ethnically, nationally and culturally diverse in-group of young 
professionals and what defines membership in this community. My data powerfully 
points to the complexity of migrants’ boundary work in the Asian context. The 
following section illuminates how Generation Erasmus deliberately distance themselves 
from the co-ethnic expatriate community but also struggle to not revert to “ethnic 
boundary making” (Wimmer 2009).  
 
7.1.4 Navigating Co-ethnic and Inter-ethnic Boundaries 
In colonial Singapore, the British colonialists were on the top of the social hierarchy. In 
postcolonial Singapore, the British maintained their dominance, evident in their 
diplomats’ and managers’ top positions, the unchallenged status of British English 
among other English accents, and the exclusive British clubs whose membership 
testified wealth and power (e.g. Beaverstock 2011; Meier 2006; Wee 2007). My 
informant group are part of the next generation. Decades have passed since the 
described omnipresence of post-colonial structures. Also, they are the first generation to 
have grown up with the EU’s cultural policies that promote a European identity. 
Furthermore, their young age and low or middling status in the company hierarchy 
clearly separates them from the senior, affluent expatriate community. Some of the more 
senior interviewees in their mid-thirties seemed to be troubled by their lower status. 
Singaporeans’ and other Asians’ expectations of them as “ang mos” – rich and white 
Westerners – constantly reminded them of not living up to this image. Most of the 
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participants, however, younger and embracing cosmopolitan ideals emphasised their 
difference from such “expats.” 
 
There are two kinds of Westerners here: the young ones who want to 
understand and are open. And the others who are older and just want to make 
money. […] There are people like this everywhere, they don’t really want to 
integrate. There is this facebook group “Singapore nana” where they 
complain, mostly house wives [complaining] about maids. Stupid, [they are 
just] following their husbands. “How can I make my maid understand-?” The 
way they are speaking about the locals– no respect, nothing. For me, they 
should go home! 
 
Chantal resembles others’ voices and accentuates migrants’ conflicting thoughts. They 
do not want to be taken for what they describe as “self-righteous” or even “supremacist.” 
She contrasts the “older” Westerners with “her” group, the young Westerners, by 
criticising the former that “they don’t […] want to integrate.” Such deliberate boundary-
making practices deserve closer examination. The previous section illustrated that the 
young migrants find a group of like-minded young professionals with whose features 
they increasingly define themselves. They, however, struggle to find their position vis-à-
vis senior co-ethnics and Singaporeans of a different class and generation – or, simply, 
locals who lack their mobility experience.  
Chantal’s account above as well as Andras’ anecdote of moving into an HDB flat 
demonstrate the young migrants’ desire for integration. Yet, deep inside they seem to 
anticipate limits to differentiating themselves from the senior expatriates. Most of the 
migrants admit moments of disillusionment or frustration when they cannot surpass the 
borderlines separating them from Singaporeans. One example is Andras’ earlier account 
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on the lacking possibility to befriend the elderly Singaporean who managed his HDB 
flat.  
In other cases, Generation Erasmus try to justify what they regard as their own 
failure of not being able to strike up friendships with locals. They use the notion of 
cultural difference, citing Singaporeans’ different interests and leisure activities – 
shopping, dining out and watching TV. Several informants contrast such free time 
activities with “their” – young Westerners’ or Western educated people’s – interests like 
discussing political and social issues, travelling or consuming arts. By this, they 
inevitably fall back into classical prejudices against an (ethnic) out-group, argued by 
Blumer (1958) as one of four factors that foster a sense of group position.  
The migrants long for upward career mobility which naturally comes with salary 
rise and probably the means to rent their own flat in a condominium. As such, their own 
lifestyle might align with that of the senior expatriates in more and more aspects on the 
long run. They know that non-Westerners will then be quicker to subsume them under 
‘ignorant expats.’ Their desire to transcend ethnic and cultural boundaries sometimes 
results in resignation when they fail. Some retreat into their national or ethnic European 
networks whereas the majority feels an enhanced sense of identification with the 
community of young mobile professionals. 
European humanistic education with its emphasis on cosmopolitan ideals 
proclaims equality among humans in general as well as in the EU context between the 
European regions. Andras, the Hungarian hospitality manager, however contends that 
ethnic and national divisions continue to exist in the European setting. He experienced 
subtle discrimination in France where he had worked for four years before coming to 
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Asia. “Parisians are […] so obnoxious, they are really arrogant. They kind of look down 
on- they make jokes about Eastern Europe.”  
Such hierarchical notions which still surface within Europe seem to have largely 
disappeared in the context of being a European foreign talent in Singapore. Depending 
on the context, informants refer to themselves as world citizens or as European 
millennials. Being a world citizen for them means sharing a cosmopolitan orientation 
whereas culture and growing up with a positive notion of mobility is, for them, rooted in 
their European identity. As tertiary educated European millennials, they perceive 
themselves as a group who share the benefits (e.g. educational geographical mobility) 
and burdens (the labour market crisis), which shaped their lives as young European 
citizens.  
 Nevertheless, some national groups among the European migrants seem to stick 
together more than others. Marcos, the Portuguese architect, points to this in his remark 
on language use in the young European community. “I think expats tend to create 
clusters. French don’t mingle so much, British of course– I think Portuguese, we are a 
very mixed group, people from all over the world. And if someone doesn’t speak the 
language, is from another country, we start to speak in English.” His comment supports 
findings from interviews with French informants and other informants’ views (see 
Andras above). For instance, a French informant referred to language as one of the main 
factors why after years in Singapore he increasingly turned to the French community. In 
his opinion, language was the only tool to communicate humour particularly and 
insisted that language impacts one’s ability to think deeply. “You have to understand 
that the language is one of the main supporters for thought. You don’t have deep thought 
if you don’t have a deep mastery of your language.”  
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Several interviews revealed that next to the language issue the French identity, too, 
was somewhat enhanced compared to most other European national identities. This can 
partly be attributed to the fairly large number of young French who have been observed 
to have emigrated to Asia. Besides newspaper articles (e.g. Marlowe 2013; Moutet 
2013) and my informants’ accounts, the statistics on V.I.E.s highlight the strong role of 
Asia-Pacific as destination region for V.I.E. interns (Business France 2017) and hint at 
the young French community’s growth in Asia, including Singapore.  
In addition to that, I found that my French interviewees – who indeed are the 
dominant national group among my informants in sheer numbers – are well connected 
to other French across Asia. In most cases, they had either found their jobs through a 
French friend or had helped other French to access the Asian labour market themselves. 
Furthermore, they support their peers when they search for accommodation in a new 
migration destination. Interestingly, the awareness of Chinese first-tier cities’ pollution 
and the perceived bad quality of life seemed to have triggered a kind of chain migration 
among some informants’ acquaintances and friends as the following example reveals.  
Chantal, a 29-year old French trade lane manager at an established German 
logistics firm, considers herself to be part of a group of young French who move 
repeatedly ‘within’ an informal French network to Asia, across Asia, and sometimes 
back to Europe in circular migratory pathways. “When I arrived here, one of my friends 
from Shanghai followed me. [Then there are] other French we met here. And last year 
we had a couple of French from Shanghai who moved here. […] My brother was with 
me in Shanghai as well and moved last year back to France.”  
Socialising practices and the boundaries the Europeans draw to define their in-
group of young mobile professionals vary depending on the wealth of migrants’ social 
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and national networks. The young French in Asia are stronger in numbers than most 
other European national groups and are well-connected enough to allow their members 
to mainly stay within their national network. It is within this network and the 
information it provided that Chantal, her brother, and several of her friends moved to 
China, from Shanghai to Singapore, and a few of them back to European economic 
centres.  
Others, like the Portuguese migrants I met, are less well represented in numbers. 
Their socialising – for instance the barbeque party I attended – testified more diversity 
and seemed to invite, next to non-Portuguese speaking Europeans, also a considerable 
number of non-Europeans and locals. While national and regional hierarchies within the 
young European migrant community largely ceased to matter in the Asian context, 
divisions continue to exist in their socialising practices and shape further migratory 
trajectories. The persistence of such divisions only emerged as preeminent after 
extensive field work. I was then able to compare and contrast informants’ mobility 
experiences and their socialising behaviour in different contexts over time. This finding 
again testifies the value of the grounded approach which a strong theoretical reading 
through the lens of, for instance, whiteness would not have allowed.  
 
7.2 Tokyo 
“Singapore and Japan are like the two extremes.” 
(Caspar, Singapore, author’s field notes) 
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This was Caspar’s first impression when I told him about my research. I met the French 
during my early field work in Singapore in 2015 and even before sitting down or 
turning on the recorder, he expressed his thoughts about the two countries. Later during 
the interview, I probed what he had meant with this impulsive initial statement. “In 
terms of openness to– position regarding migration, Japan is one of the most closed 
countries in the world. They don’t want.” Our earlier conversation had revealed that 
Caspar spoke about Japan’s identity of an “island nation” as he phrased it.  
People who did not have experience with Japan, like many of my interviewees in 
Singapore, thought of Japan as ethnically homogeneous. For scholars and informants 
living in Japan, including Caspar who held a double degree from a Singaporean and a 
Japanese university, this was certainly different. And yet, the feeling of being a foreigner, 
especially different from the majority of ethnic East Asians in their appearance, was a 
constant in my informants’ lives in Japan. How it influences European migrants’ 
socialising and what this means for their feelings of belonging are the questions that 
guided my field work in Tokyo. 
 
7.2.1 Convenience and Cultural Abundance in the “City of Contrasts” 
Chapter five and six revealed that many of the migrants are ambivalent towards their 
work experience and career opportunities in Tokyo. The puzzling question then is why 
they stay. I demonstrated that they often react to adverse working conditions with job 
transfer or perseverance during the first two or three years. After more than two years 
working full-time in Japan, however, the situation looks different: 12 of the 35 
interviewees in Japan have left the country. Seven of these 12 Europeans had studied the 
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Japanese language intensively at university. While three of them left because of their 
spouse, others left despite their long-term romantic partner living in Japan and their 
intention to maintain the relationship.  
One of those who is still in Japan is Olaf. The Baltic man is after two years at a 
Japanese manufacturing firm still dissatisfied with the job. After my follow-up 
interview with him and on the underground ride home, I thought about his persisting 
frustrations. Meanwhile, the train left Kagurazaka station. Kagura refers to the spiritual 
music traditionally dedicated to Shinto gods. The Tokyo district is known for its French 
flair and shops, but at the same time boasts with exquisite Japanese dining places and 
geisha houses in the back alleys. The quarter is one of the migrants’ countless ways to 
spice up routine life in Tokyo. I had come here twice for an interview, and Kagurazaka’s 
popularity among interviewees punctuates their fondness of the combination of fancy 
French and traditional Japanese, of a cultural mix they consider hard to find elsewhere.  
On my walk home from the station I made a short stop at one of the more than 
10,000 convenience stores that provide Tokyo residents with everything from warm 
food to tooth paste to insect repellent 24/7, 356 days a year (statista 2018b). 
Withdrawing money from the store’s ATM machine and grabbing a bottle of milk that I 
had forgotten to buy earlier, Lena’s story came to my mind. The German woman first 
came to Japan for a year during high school where she attended regular classes and 
lived with a Japanese host family. When I asked what kept her in Japan after almost 11 
years that she had spent going back and forth between the countries, she did not think 
long to explain why Japan had become her “second home.” 
 
When I was here in high school, I sometimes couldn’t sleep at night. In the 
morning at 2am I thought “I’ll now go and get myself an ice cream.” And 
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there was a specific one I wanted. I left the house and went to the conbini 
[convenience store], alone, as an under-aged girl. I bought the ice cream I 
wanted and sat outside on the pavement. And I thought “this is the greatest 
freedom I have ever felt.” I got what I wanted, when I wanted it, and I was 
outside alone and felt safe. And this is what keeps me staying. This is the 
lifestyle I have here.  
 
The freedom Japan offers to the young Europeans is a recurrent theme. Lena referred to 
both the safety but also the high standard of living and convenience, which enabled her 
to lead this lifestyle. For others who were less familiar with the country, the fascination 
of “different Japan”, in addition to living in a safe and sophisticated society sum up 
what appeals to the young Europeans. It were Tokyo’s attractions that were most 
important to many: As the biggest city on earth and yet, with a less international and 
thus more “exotic” atmosphere in terms of the limited number of non-Japanese and 
especially non-Asian people and English not that widely in use, it offers the little 
something extra which few global cities have. This does not mean that life outside work 
is hassle-free. To understand migrants’ interaction with other Tokyo residents, how joys 
and frustrations differently affect their perceptions and ultimately their embeddedness in 
Japan one has to disentangle their social world.  
Earlier, I used the typology of the cultural enthusiast to describe the motivations 
of the majority of my informants who migrated to Japan. Based on their cultural interest 
in the country, and in a few cases a romantic relationship, the majority studied the 
language before they started to work in Tokyo. Also, as I mentioned earlier, many 
Europeans had spent a year or longer in the country before they, through entering the 
labour market, committed to a long-term sojourn. This means that despite initial 
struggles such as language, cultural misunderstandings, geographical distance to home, 
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the overall experience meant they saw the upside rather than the downside of living in 
Japan. In this respect, we must recognise that their positive perception of Japanese 
society and living in Japan is inseparable from their symbolic white capital (Lundström 
2014), an issue I look into in the following section.  
 
7.2.2 White Others and Intra-ethnic Boundaries 
Wimmer (2009:245) problematises the method of treating “ethnicity as self-evident 
units of observation and self-explanatory variables” since it easily misleads to 
explaining ethnicity as unambiguous and given rather than a “range of possible 
categories” (ibid:251). In agreement with him but without denying the historical 
significance of whiteness and Westernness in Japan (e.g. Ching 2006; Iida 1997), I 
conceptualise the unit of analysis – the European millennials – not as one of ethnicity.48 
Rather, when approaching potential interviewees, I focused on their tertiary degrees, 
their (main period of) upbringing in the EU and socialisation through European 
institutions and, most importantly, their belonging to the middle-class millennial 
generation; this is, having experienced mobility at a young age, internalisation of 
European values and middle-class dispositions and aspiration. Consequently, there are 
also mixed-race and non-Caucasians among my informants. Apart from ethnicity, 
however, my attention was also drawn to the significance of other variables. I want to 
discuss these in the following and suggest that ethnicity is but one social category that 
                                                             
48
 For a discussion on race relations in Japan, especially Japanese society’s ambiguous orientation towards 
the West as well as Japanese people’s consequent positioning towards black people see for instance 
Russell (1991).  
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explains these migrants’ internal and external definition as others (Jenkins 1996) in 
Tokyo.  
All except two of my interviewees in Japan are white. Of the two non-whites, one 
has a mixed ethnic background with one parent being Asian and the other being of 
entirely Arabic background. Among the rest of the group, informants repeatedly 
remarked how they, as Caucasians, benefited from positive discrimination. They spoke 
of Japanese people’s curiosity and welcoming attitude, which they describe as “kind”, 
“friendly”, or “respectful.” Debnár (2016:116) calls this the “‘small benefits’ of 
everyday life,” which white foreigners enjoy in Japan, and argues that such positive 
experiences “translate to feelings of apparent acceptance (ibid:117).” 
Supporting Debnár’s (2016) findings, my field work points to a double-edged 
experience of whiteness in Tokyo. On the one hand, I uncovered immigration authorities’ 
racial bias towards migrants from different racial background. While people from 
developing countries or “coloured” migrants are often subject to surveillance in Japan 
(e.g. Wadhwa 2017; Russell 2009) this rarely applies to white people (Komisarof 
2012).
49
 For example, some informants referred to the tacit consent when they violated 
the law by minor but obvious acts such as drinking on the beach, which is prohibited. 
Police on patrol simply ignored them. Others mentioned how they had witnessed that 
Asian foreigners were treated less favourably whereas they enjoyed unfounded respect.  
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 The long field work period requires a qualification of the statement. In 2018, when having almost 
finished writing this dissertation, I collected several voices opposing the privileged treatment of white 
people, including my own experiences. A Caucasian woman and former informant reported being stopped 
and checked for no reason by the police. In my case, I was stopped twice when riding my bicycle and the 
officers checked my persona as well as my bicycle’s registration as a proof that it was my own bicycle 
and that it was not stolen. On both occasions, the officers’ first question was if that was my own bicycle 
and if the lock I was using was the original. As such, the police officers’ suspicion of myself having stolen 
the bicycle was obvious. I relate this to the rapid increase of foreigners of all ethnicities in Japan in recent 
years and the Japanese bureaucrats’ understanding of Caucasians no longer always being elite, a notion 
which seems to directly translate into negative – in contrast to the former positive – discrimination in 
specific cases such as the one above.  
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Last but importantly, Jonatan, a Spanish interviewee, did not report when losing 
his job but stayed in Japan and so became an over-stayer. When he finally found 
employment and reported to the authorities, the official instructed him that “you should 
have come and report[ed] to us.” The informant apologised “Oh sorry, I didn’t know 
that” and received his new visa with the words “Okay whatever. Next time come and 
report it to us.” While his breach of law was obvious the situation did not entail legal 
consequences.  
Despite such privileges, the young Europeans encountered structural 
discrimination as foreigners. Their lack of social capital for example meant that they 
were often unable to rent an apartment. It is a commonly known fact that many Japanese 
landlords do not rent out to foreigners, and easily available “expat apartments” are too 
pricey for the young Europeans. While the problem has different causes in Japan than in 
Singapore where law prohibits lease of HDBs to foreigners on work visa, the effect in 
Tokyo is similar in that migrants experience discrimination on the housing market.
50
  
At other times, the Europeans were denied concluding contracts for mobile 
phones or a Japanese credit card despite providing all necessary documents and 
disclosing their income. Despite such discriminatory practices towards foreigners in 
Japan regardless nationality or race (e.g. Suruga 2017), the young Europeans are in 
general positive about their private life in Tokyo. Yet, migrants’ social relations are 
complex and often cause ambivalence towards living among Japanese.  
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 The difference in the structural discrimination regarding housing for foreigners lies in the fact that 
Singapore has the two types of housing (condominiums and HDBs) and thus channels foreign labour who 
can afford into condominiums. Since there is no official distinction between types of housing, foreigners 
in Tokyo simply have to search until they find a landlord who accepts foreigners. Given the much smaller 
proportional number of foreigners in Tokyo compared to Singapore and the lack of a European quarter, 
the young Europeans, once they have secured housing, usually live in an area where the majority of their 
neighbours are Japanese people.  
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Apart from a few non-Japanese speakers, informants emphasised that they did not 
want to be seen as the “typical expat” who comes and leaves without interest in the host 
country. They are aware of the stereotypical image of the non-Japanese speaking, 
sometimes “embarrassing Westerner.” The attribute of the West is important since it 
signifies – to both informants themselves and Japanese people they know – greater 
physical size, unfamiliarity with non-Western tradition and habits such as eating with 
chop sticks, as well as an “imperialist” attitude as some informants remarked. Thus, 
they are assertive about their difference.  
The boundaries they draw between themselves and the stereotypical Westerners in 
Japan recall those of first-generation immigrants elsewhere. In Japan, Le Bail (2005:4) 
found that the Chinese “oldcomers” strove to distance themselves from the newcomers 
“in order to preserve their own image as a model community.” This happened in the 
context of the 1990s when the newcomers aroused negative attention in the media 
which changed only recently. Interestingly, in the case of the young Europeans who 
consider themselves cosmopolitan and knowledgeable of Japan, the order of distinction 
is reversed. It is the young ones, the newcomers, who feel embarrassed by the older, or 
in their eyes, the ignorant non-Japanese speaking Western migrants in Japan.  
Tobi is a peculiar case and displays quite well the boundary making dynamics 
between the co-ethnic groups. He is discontented with his own slow progress in 
Japanese and his consequent alienation in Japanese society. Evident from his account, 
the young Europeans erect boundaries between their in-group, young and ‘cosmopolitan’ 
Europeans, and senior co-ethnics. 
 
It bothers me that I don’t speak Japanese but not because of work. I always 
hated Americans who go to a country and are so ignorant that they don’t 
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learn the language. This attitude is just not cool. But I simply didn’t have 
time to study Japanese. Most people learn it through their wife or a friend or 
at university. […] But I’d find it awful and I’d be very disappointed of 
myself if I left here one day and could not speak Japanese.  
 
Tobi is not the only one who presents reasons for what he regards his failure to learn 
Japanese. Also, he is not alone with pointing to the recent stereotype of the native 
English speakers – often associated with the low-status job of English teachers – who 
are supposedly male and stay in Japan because of their Japanese wives. It is the other 
salient boundary which the young European migrants frequently draw. They seek to 
protect themselves from stereotypes of not being interested in the country as well as 
from the status loss of someone who does not or only poorly speak the domestic 
language.  
The Europeans’ reactions towards Japanese people, who obviously regarded them 
as tourists, changed over time. One of the standard phrases addressing foreigners in 
Japan – especially if easily identifiable foreigners such as Caucasians – is the iconic 
nihongo jōzu desu ne (your Japanese is good). Many informants mentioned how often 
Japanese people curiously commented on their Japanese language skills although they 
had barely said a word in Japanese. When the migrants were still new to Japan and their 
language level basic they seemed to be proud of the compliment. After some time, 
however, it became a symbol for their ambivalence towards and sometimes frustration 
regarding living in Japan. Many reported how they heard the same words even after 
years in Japan when they had become fairly fluent in the language. 
Informants often complained about the fact that Japanese people, despite the 
recently rising numbers of foreigners, still did not expect them to know the language. 
Worse for the Europeans is that, even if they answered in flawless Japanese, their native 
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conversation partners sometimes seemed not to believe that an ethnically different 
foreigner could actually speak their language and therefore kept replying in broken 
English.
51
 For the young migrants, such situations reminded them of Japanese people’s 
reluctance to accept them as members of society and their continued alienation in Japan.  
 
7.2.3 Attempts to Bond with Japanese  
The Europeans know that until shortly it was natural that the image of the foreigner, 
especially the white and Western foreigner, was that of someone from far-away who did 
not intend to stay, even less to integrate. Thus, they make great efforts to distance 
themselves from this image. For instance, several interviewees experienced the Great 
Tohoku Earthquake in 2011. At that time, the derogative term ‘flyjin’ became a synonym 
for mostly Western foreigners who fled the country for fear of radiation.
52
 Thomas, a 
French who studied at a Japanese university in spring 2011, stressed that despite his 
parents begging him to return home, he stayed in Japan since “I could not just leave and 
run away.”  
The fact that he as many others wanted to share this with me, without me 
initiating the topic, hints at the importance the migrants ascribe to differentiating 
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 My data, similar to Debnár’s (2016) findings, demonstrates that co-ethnic foreigners such as Chinese 
people are often expected to speak Japanese fluently whereas white people experience the contrary. This 
renders them privileged but at the same time marginalised foreign residents in Japan. 
52
 The Great East Japan Earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 occurred on March 11, 2011 and triggered 
huge tsunami waves that devastated large parts of the north-eastern coastline of Japan’s biggest island 
Honshu. The tsunami waves severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and caused 
nuclear meltdowns in all three reactors. The natural disaster and the consequences of nuclear 
contamination of parts of the surrounding area, the ocean, and the soil cost thousands of lives and 
destroyed hundreds of thousands of homes, drawing the country in tragic economic and social problems. 
Many foreigners who had resided in Japan for work or study at the time, hastily left the country due to 
fear of radiation. This earned them the sarcastic nickname ‘flyjin’, which is a variation of ‘gaijin’, the 
abbreviated informal expression for foreigners in Japanese and the English verb ‘to fly’, as they left the 
country by airplanes (e.g. Budmar 2012). 
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themselves from the flyjins. Their accounts reveal how determined – sometimes 
desperate – they are to strive for recognition or even belonging. Many confide their 
concerns when friendships do not become as intimate as they wish. In fact, many of the 
Japanese-speaking Europeans suffer from not living up to their own ideal of penetrating 
the Japanese society. In the interviews, the young migrants tried to explain – and often 
justify – their behaviour. Federica, a 29 year-old Italian woman who works as junior HR 
manager in a German firm, contrasts the friendships with her “foreigner group” with 
those with her Japanese friends.  
 
For me, the fact that I speak the language and know the culture to a certain 
extent did not create me many problems. But if you ask me do I have a lot of 
Japanese friends? No. I would like to have more but it is so ermüdend 
[tiring; added by author, the informant used a German word here]. Because 
you create the relationship first but then when you ask to meet for a coffee 
they need to know one week ahead. And then you arrive and somehow, it’s 
always a bit set. Pre-booked, they know already the plan. If I am into cultural 
discovering then I like to go but if it’s Friday night and I’m exhausted then I 
go out with Italians. And I’m not the type of person that is looking for 
Italians abroad but I discovered my origins here. I love to go out with 
Japanese but it’s not fun. It’s interesting […] Plus really, there are two girls, I 
maybe met them three times and we have been rescheduling 23 times. So, at 
some point I don’t want to do it anymore. 
 
Federica contradicts herself several times in this short interview excerpt. This is most 
explicit in her sentence “I love to go out with Japanese.” This is a strong, empathetic 
statement. However, she discredits her assertion in the second part of the sentence with 
the words “but it’s not fun.” Federica seems to be aware that she contradicts herself. She 
quickly adds explanations and justifies her rationale with her exhaustion after work and 
the infeasibility to meet spontaneously. Her remark captures many others’ inner 
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conflicts. Although they have Japanese friends, structural factors like time or distance 
but also cultural factors prevent them from developing the friendships into more 
intimate ones.  
Olaf, the Baltic man who I mentioned above, tried to describe this feeling by 
using the Japanese word iwakan (literally: feeling of unease, that something is out of 
place). He referred to it in a double sense. He himself did not feel to be part of his 
Japanese surroundings. Furthermore, Olaf sensed that his Japanese interlocutors 
regarded him as someone different, an alien. The word accentuates classic boundary 
work by in-group and out-group definition, as does Federica’s use of framing devices 
such as “they” versus “Italians” which she links to her origins. Migrants’ experiences 
resonate with the overall impression that swept through my interviews with Japanese-
speaking informants. The young Europeans appreciate their friendships with Japanese 
and long for more integration. Yet, they inevitably encounter barriers that seem 
insurmountable. The barriers, however, cannot be reduced to ethnicity or more explicitly, 
whiteness. Federica’s comments on a “set” atmosphere and the fact that her meeting 
preferences depend on the day of the week imply that there are other issues at stake. 
Language is one. While many informants are fluent in conversational Japanese, 
they face their limits when talking about feelings and expressing intimacy or humour in 
the foreign language. Another aspect is communication style – implicit rules how and 
what to communicate with friends. Some share their concerns over work and relations 
with colleagues with young Japanese employees and so create bonds. More often, the 
young migrants interact with Japanese friends over sports or nightlife activities. 
Nevertheless, an important part of their lives is the experience of being a foreigner in 
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Japan, a constant issue in their minds and a reason why they sense limits to close 
friendships with Japanese.  
In combination with language, these factors leave the friendships somewhat 
lacking for both parties. Federica experiences friendships with Japanese as “tiring.” 
After an exhausting week, she prefers after-work gatherings where she does not need to 
use a foreign language nor adjust herself to Japanese cultural conduct, such as planning 
in advance. Likewise, her Japanese friends’ repeated rescheduling points towards their 
priorities lying elsewhere. While Federica stresses that she does not want to miss her 
Japanese friends, she reserves a different time frame for these intercultural friendships: 
weekends and less busy times when she is fresh and thus willing to do the additional 
emotional work these friendships afford; that is, sensitivity to different cultural norms 
and willingness to engage in linguistically challenging conversations.  
Although they experience it as exhausting, informants report that they enjoy 
having ‘different friend groups.’ These friendships seldom go beyond shared hobbies, 
outdoor activities, or having drinks together. And yet, they are precious enough for both 
parties to continuously initiate meet ups despite time constraints and considerable 
distances. All in all, friendships with Japanese are part and parcel of how the young 
Europeans define themselves as foreigners in Japan and having these reference points 
reassures the migrants that their lives in Japan – including all work-related struggles – 
are meaningful.  
That said, the young Europeans feel the need to balance the joyful but tiring 
emotional work which their friendships with Japanese requires. Moreover, they long for 
people to vent their frustrations over daily struggles as foreigners in Japan. This leads 
many informants to socialise more with other foreigners over time. Some informants are 
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conscious of this fact and explain during the interview why they have increasingly 
turned to an “international community.” Others, like the Italian Emilio, become aware 
that they are missing close friends when their foreign friends start leaving. “All other 
friends that I got sooner or later would go away for some reason.”  
In search of new friends, the young Europeans turn to people in a similar situation 
or with a multicultural background. These are easy to meet in sports clubs, church 
networks or music events in Tokyo. Those who seem to be most content are the ones 
with extensive networks, both foreign and Japanese. Resembling Frederica’s rationale, 
they choose which group to meet depending on the occasion. This practice of socialising 
enables the migrants to harmonise the different ‘qualities’ of each friendship and settle 
conflicting desires; the longing for intercultural encounters, that for embeddedness in 
Japanese society and that for more intimacy.  
While migrants’ narratives demonstrate that there is room for improvement, they 
also emphasise how much the young Europeans value their lives in Japan, the 
multicultural friendships and the possibility to socialise in two or three different 
languages. The Greek Yiannis provides a summarising statement for his satisfaction 
with life in Tokyo and the people who are part of it.  
 
Tokyo can offer you- you know, there are always things to do and things to 
see. So it never gets boring. My friend has a home party or we go outside or 
there is a club event. […] My friends are half and half [Japanese and foreign, 
added by the author]. My closest people are maybe foreigners, or Greek 
friends. No, I even talk to colleagues, it is not decided, it depends on the 
problem. And there are of course the Greek friends back in Europe with 
whom I will email. I am still in close contact with them. […] My boyfriend 
and me converse in Japanese. His friends as well [are] more Japanese but he 
has a lot of international friends and other foreigners would come […] to 
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visit so there is a lot of going out with visiting friends. That has to do with 
the EU I guess.  
 
This diversity of networks, then, might portray migrants’ attachment to Japan, to Europe, 
and to their home countries best. They neither absolutely identify with one or the other 
and their feelings of belonging are at least bifocal (Brettell 2006). They have grown 
roots in Japan, yet they intensively engage in their transnational networks as well. Code 
switching (Fleming and Roses 2007:371), depending on which group they interact with, 
is a highly appreciated and versatile tool that these migrants have adopted to varying 
extent. Those who can adeptly manoeuvre Japanese cultural capital generally enjoy their 
time in both worlds, although it, at times, reminds them of their limits to transgress the 
barriers fully which continue to separate them from Japanese society. Migrants’ 
situational practice of balancing different friendship networks is the key to 
understanding how they bond and seems to offer a fairly satisfying life.  
 
7.2.4 Approaches to Difference: Between Resignation and Freedom 
Not all my informants are comfortable Japanese speakers and some only picked up 
basics of the language. They admit that they at times regret that they are not able to 
communicate more extensively with the majority of the Japanese citizens. Although 
they know that their language deficiency limits their deeper penetration of the Japanese 
society, they generally seemed to be more confident than their Japanese-speaking 
European peers. Given that they could not try to follow conversations in Japanese, they 
did not have to care about linguistic mistakes and losing face or about unconsciously 
shaming their conversation partners. This was an issue many Japanese-speaking 
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migrants worried about and often learned the harsh way, for instance when they lost 
friends after repeated miscommunication. In contrast to the group of Japanese speakers, 
the Europeans who do not speak Japanese seem to feel more equal to their friends – 
other foreigners and a few Japanese – who are proficient in English.  
Tobi, the German who followed his Italian girlfriend Federica to the country of 
her dreams despite not speaking Japanese himself, recognises two ways to look at his 
language deficiency. Overall, he is very positive about his outsider position maybe also 
because he directly experienced Federica’s conflicting thoughts on her friendships and 
the enormous emotional work this entails.  
 
Even after 2.5 years I speak only very limited Japanese which is good and 
bad. [...] I cannot ask anyone why people are doing things differently. But I 
enjoy talking for hours about all these things that I am marvelling about. And 
yet I will never really be part of it, I mean entirely. [...] I like being the exotic 
person here but I also miss having more contact to people. Still I know that 
even if I spoke the language there would always be a barrier. [...] You just 
feel that. [...] But when my Swedish friend calls we meet up the same day, 
no problems at all. 
 
Both Federica and Tobi have close foreign friends who they can rely on. But Tobi, who 
has apparently accepted the fact that he will stay an outsider in the Japanese society, 
seems more at ease concerning socialisation and friendships in Japan. Federica, as we 
learned above, is still hoping to deepen her friendships with Japanese. Yet the longer she 
is in Japan and her language proficiency is improving, the more she understands that 
there are obstacles she cannot overcome. While I observed that Europeans like Tobi 
simply enjoy meeting with friends, Japanese-speaking informants often put pressure on 
themselves to develop what they deem an intimate friendship with Japanese people.  
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Friendships based on English as main language are limited because of the smaller 
amount of people who speak English fluently. Non-Japanese speakers are thus excluded 
from certain conversations and activities. Yet ironically, they experience their limited 
integration in Japanese society also as one of few constraints. They feel like a welcomed 
outsider, especially if they compare their situation with feelings of unsettlement in their 
European home countries. Nils, the Slovakian-born but naturalised German, strongly 
expressed this sense of freedom.  
 
Nils: You are here - how they call it? As a gaijin. Something different, not 
the mass. But at the same time, you are not discriminated for something. 
You’re not a black person in Germany or a Muslim in Germany. You’re 
something different but still from a very privileged perspective. And I really 
like that in Japan. It gives you something to be in Japan. To be a foreigner 
who is still much appreciated, in a kind of way. [...] I was always in 
Germany an Ausländer [foreigner]. [...] I came to Germany as an immigrant. 
So no matter how integrated you are, like my family right now, we are total 
upper middle class. [...] But the point is when [...] I was young in Germany, 
we were- no money, no status. I went to schools only with other immigrants, 
poor people, Turkish, Kurdish, whatsoever. Like Ausländer, gaijins. I was 
growing up in a society of outsiders. [...] But suddenly it feels so nice to be 
an outsider and to be appreciated for what you are. [...] I always thought I 
was not mainstream. I’m not part of the mainstream German society through 
my experience in my youth. Like coming into the kindergarten and not 
speaking German.  
Me: But nowadays, you enjoy it?  
Nils: Yeah, I enjoy it very much. [...] I learned to love the status of being [an] 
outsider. And again, in Japan, you’re not only an outsider but you’re a 
privileged outsider. Everybody is interested in you, what you are doing here. 
Okay, you still get a lot of discrimination in the workplace like you don’t 
speak Japanese so who should care? But still, having a special status.  
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Nils’ appreciation of living in Japan is related to his childhood experience as a migrant – 
an outsider in German society – as much as it is to him being one of the ‘desired’ 
foreigners in Japanese society. The fact that his look marks him as an outsider means 
that people do not expect him to understand, or to know the rules and thus to conform. 
This allows him to act outside of social norms and constraints which he, in Western 
Europe where he grew up and was part of an ethnic but not racial minority, could not so 
easily do.  
Nils resembles a few other of the Europeans in that they felt as ‘others’ even pre-
migration. Two gay informants as well as Andras, who after his childhood migratory 
stint to the US never felt at home in ex-communist Hungary, considered themselves 
more at ease in a society where, in contrast to their home countries, their physiognomy 
singled them out in the first place. Tobi, who I cited above, feels a different kind of 
freedom from social pressure. He grew up in an idyllic town in Southern Germany 
which was known for its fancy sailing clubs and wealthy community. Tobi’s background, 
however, disturbed the pretty image. He is from a lower middle-class family and his 
parents, who worked in mechanical jobs, had not obtained higher education. This, he 
suggested, might have been the reason why he never felt really comfortable in his home 
town and developed, from as early as the age of 15, a longing for far away countries. As 
his narrative conveyed, being an outsider has good and bad sides, but he emphasises to 
enjoy his life in Tokyo. 
Two qualifications are necessary here. First, these migrants are only content with 
their position as others because it does not translate into discrimination as it does in the 
case of many non-Western and particularly non-white migrants. Second, one should not 
idealise their otherness since the majority of the migrants, especially those who invested 
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in Japan for instance through language study, long for inclusion. Nevertheless, the 
‘positive’ experiences of otherness sensitise to the diversity of the migration experience 
and warn against one-size-fits-all approaches to the complexity of boundary work.   
To conclude, non-Japanese speakers like Nils and Tobi who are content with their 
somehow marginalised status in the Japanese society point to migrants’ differing 
approaches to otherness. Their inability to communicate with the majority of the society 
frees them from social pressure which they experienced in various forms in their home 
societies. As Caucasians among other Caucasians, they were always expected to fit in. 
In Tokyo, most people expect them not to fit in. Nevertheless, locals treat them with 
respect, often even curiosity and friendliness. These Europeans’ freedom, however, 
implicates that they feel less embedded compared to their Japanese-speaking peers. 
Both Nils and Tobi have meanwhile left Tokyo and moved to a third and, importantly, 
not their home country.  
The majority of the European migrants in Tokyo have a quite different approach 
to otherness. They sacrificed much time and energy to fit into the Japanese society and 
are thus troubled by their otherness. Despite their language proficiency they cannot fully 
overcome the barriers that separate them from the Japanese society. This causes a 
constant sense of lack and deficiency. They are grateful for their extended network in 
Japan with both locals and other foreigners and value the extent to which they feel part 
of some Japanese networks. Yet, their ambivalence towards their otherness has not 
ceased even after years.  
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7.3 Vertical and Horizontal Boundaries 
Migrants’ everyday interactions and socialising patterns emphasise the existence of 
different social hierarchies in Singapore and Tokyo. These can be traced back to 
Singapore’s and Japan’s distinctive (colonial) histories and result in two very different 
contemporary societies, the multicultural Singaporean and the Japanese where 
foreignness is still considered alien.  
The young Europeans contest and transform such hierarchies with the help of 
boundary work (Lamont and Mizrachi 2012:367). The concept of boundary work 
enables to recognise a comprehensive issue in the young Europeans’ socialising 
patterns: They (aspire to) practice openness – to the world, to other young professionals 
of various cultural, national and ethnic backgrounds, and to the host society, although 
we saw that this has clear limitations. At the same time they draw clear lines to their 
senior co-ethnics, the Western expatriate community. As Roose, van Eijck, and Lievens 
(2012:492) suggest, theirs is a “distinction through openness.” The out-group from 
which they distinguish themselves includes both the ordinary public in their home 
countries – who supposedly display less “openness” through their relative immobility 
and rootedness – and the co-ethnic expatriates in the host society who have been 
criticised for their snobbery exclusionary socialising practices.  
The in-group, then, is a community of young highly educated people who are 
mostly, though not exclusively, foreigners in these Asian global cities. They share the 
mobility experience, both its assets and the concerns that evolve along with a mobile 
lifestyle. Next to the mobility culture, their middle-class dispositions, tertiary education 
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and the characteristics of a ‘millennial childhood’ are the defining properties for group 
belonging.  
That said, there are striking differences between migrants’ approaches to and 
opportunities for socialising in the two global cities. In Singapore, the housing situation 
entails migrants’ mingling with other foreign talents as do initial networking activities 
via online groups and ‘expat’ events. The multicultural composition of society and the 
ease of navigating one’s ways even as a foreigner facilitate settling in. However, the 
local circumstances also mean that while the migrants are relatively smoothly integrated 
in a community of foreign talents, deeper interaction with Singaporeans is limited.  
In Tokyo, many migrants’ first touchpoint with the host society is during 
university days. Young and often single, the young Europeans have the time and 
motivation to invest in language studies and to develop friendships with Japanese. 
Nevertheless, the Europeans experience a peculiar, elevated yet marginalising treatment 
as white foreigners. This continued salience of otherness in Japan underlines their 
struggle to become part of the Japanese society.  
A closer look at the composition of migrants’ friendship networks reveals 
qualitative differences. In Singapore, the strong presence of foreign talents from various 
backgrounds translates into great diversity of Europeans’ networks. Some nation-based 
young migrant communities like the French are tightly connected in and across Asian 
cities and as such develop more independently from the multi-ethnic and multi-racial 
crowd of foreign talents with who the majority of Generation Erasmus socialise. In 
Tokyo, with few European migrants compared to the much larger foreign community of 
middle-class East Asians, Europeans tend to mingle with Europeans on the one side and 
Japanese friends on the other.  
  252 
Europeans’ bonding practices with young locals are the most striking difference 
between the two cities. The Europeans with Japanese language proficiency are able to 
bond with same-aged Japanese even if their local friends lack any mobility experience. 
The characteristic which is defining for the European migrants as a group, a propensity 
for and identification over mobile life trajectories, becomes second priority when the 
Europeans sense their chance of developing deeper bonds with Japanese people.  
Yet, as much as the young migrants appreciate these friendships, they feel a lack 
of intimacy if they compare them to their friendships with foreigners and mobility-
experienced Japanese. Ultimately, they maintain two friendship networks, one with 
Japanese of their age, using Japanese as language of communication, and one with other 
migrants, mostly but not exclusively from Europe. Although switching between these 
two networks can be tiring, it allows them to engage in ‘two worlds’, the Japanese and 
the international.  
These two worlds are, at least to some extent, exclusive. They require extra effort 
on part of the migrants as it costs time and energy to keep up with both networks. Yet, 
and this is perhaps the most intriguing finding of the comparison, it seems to pay off. 
Although Japanese-speaking informants in Tokyo ponder more about their deficiencies 
in the language and lack of integration than those who do not speak Japanese or the 
migrants in Singapore, many of them have come closer to their goal of being part of the 
society than the two former groups. Their practices and strategies reveal that they are 
the ones who have grown some roots in the host society. Furthermore, two of the 
informants who had left Japan for a while came back and a few others seem to settle – 
perhaps the only ones among the 70 participants of this study. Thus, despite and perhaps 
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because of the higher barriers to ‘access’ the local society, Japan might ultimately be 
more accessible in terms of growing roots and eventual settlement.  
The discussion directs the conclusion to migrants’ commonalities in both cities. 
Japanese-speaking Europeans in Tokyo, despite their appreciation of the two friendship 
networks or worlds in which they live, are nevertheless disappointed with the barriers 
between them and their Japanese friends which they cannot fully overcome. As a 
consequence, all but few gradually invest more into their friendships with other 
foreigners. Ultimately, the majority of migrants in both cities strikingly resemble each 
other in their socialising patterns. While the Japanese speakers mentioned do not cut 
their ties with Japanese friends, they more and more resemble non-Japanese speaking 
migrants in Tokyo and the majority of those in Singapore. They feel most at ease in a 
community of young and mobile foreign professionals with who they identify over the 
shared mobility experience and their life as foreigners.  
Again, similar to the preceding discussion on migrants’ work experience, the 
initial motivational types for moving to Asia dissolve. The analysis of Europeans’ 
socialising practices illuminates that migrants who were culturally or regionally 
focussed in the beginning – for instance the cultural enthusiasts with their fondness for 
Japan – start to widen their perspective. Step-by-step, they become more integrated into 
a community of internationally-minded, mobility experienced young professionals than 
one that is ethnically or linguistically defined.   
As a consequence, migrants in both cities find themselves in a dilemma. They are 
caught between the senior and affluent Western expatriates, who they avoid, and the 
lacking chance to satisfy their cosmopolitan aspirations by becoming an integral part of 
the host society. The young adults are aware of the post-colonial image of typical 
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European expatriates in Asia and try to differentiate themselves painstakingly. To a 
varying extent, migrants challenge inherent power structures such as the post-colonial 
legacy of white privilege and face the walls that separate them from the host society. 
Examples are shared apartments in Singapore and the investment in the Japanese 
language and a considerable network of locals in Tokyo. This statement, however, holds 
true only for the in-group which is ethnically and culturally diverse yet more 
homogeneous in terms of class, educational background and generation.  
To sum up, Generation Erasmus’ boundary work elucidates two diametrical 
dynamics. They erect vertical boundaries which separate them from their co-ethnics 
who are ‘above’ them in terms of age, income and status. At the same time, they (to 
some extent) horizontally cross ethnic boundaries. Their middle-class professional 
dispositions form the base of the community. The shared mobility experience is at its 
heart. These migrants identify as young mobile employees who are used to coming and 
leaving. They sometimes alter their place of residence and their career goals flexibly 
when opportunities come up. Thus, they have multiple belongings. Although they regard 
one or several places their home, they might not return to their home countries for long, 
or never. They find like-minded young adults practicing mobility in a foreign 
community. At the same time, such boundary work often denies growing deeper roots.  
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8. Emotional Geographies 
8.1 “Home is where the Heart is”  
The preceding chapters attempted to sketch the young Europeans’ lives in Asia. While 
the migrants often display determination and rationality in the work sphere and draw 
from cosmopolitan discourses concerning their friendships, issues of love and intimate 
relationships suggest that emotions constantly guide their actions. This chapter places 
home and identity at the core of the analysis. Tying together the links between migrants’ 
narratives of love, mobility and belonging I argue that only by recognising intimacy as 
crucial for guiding migrants’ lives can we obtain a coherent picture of their geographical 
pathways.  
The following parts of the chapter are structured as follows. First, I briefly 
describe my informants’ experiences of romance and relationships in Asia. The 
Europeans exhibit several patterns of intimacy and feelings of belonging. These patterns 
lead to different, sometimes overlapping outcomes for migrants’ (continued) 
geographical mobility. For reasons of simplicity, I adopt the term partner when referring 
to both a spouse or a romantic partner in a long-term relationship.
53
 For analytical 
purpose, I divide the patterns into the following four: i) those with a home-country 
national partner, ii) those who find a local, Singaporean or Japanese, partner, iii) those 
with a third-country national partner (hereafter TCN), and finally iv) the ones who are 
and stay singles. I then discuss how each relationship pattern influences migrants’ living 
                                                             
53
 In an analysis of the details of all interviews I found out that it does not make a significant difference 
whether to subsume or to differentiate these two forms of partnership, but it might have blurred the results. 
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experience abroad differently and how they navigate feelings of belonging and multiple 
identities.  
8.1.1 The Relationship as a Fix Point 
In chapter four I introduced different types of movers. Among them, the lifestyle 
migrants and occasionally Europeans of other motivational types are those who moved 
to Asia as couples. Moving as a couple in few cases means that migrants actually 
migrate at the same time, set up a home together and work in the host society for the 
exact same period. Instead, their migration resembles what I call a relationship project. 
In most cases, these couples decided to embark on an overseas work or lifestyle 
experience together (with either factor being more dominant) and think of themselves as 
moving together.  
In reality, timing seldom allows them to do so. As none of the partners wants to 
give up his career and financial independence, they regard a full-time job, preferably in 
their occupational field, as the minimum requirement for moving. This means that one 
partner often migrates first. The other one follows when the time for a job transfer is 
convenient or when he or she secures an attractive position. Therefore, many couples 
live through one – or in case they move repeatedly – several transition phase(s). Long-
distance relationships of several months are not uncommon.  
A few keep up their relationship despite physical separation over years during 
which they visit each other only for short periods of time. Especially recent graduates 
who start working full-time as interns, trainees or in contracted positions abroad 
maintain a multidimensional transnational lifestyle, often with both partners working in 
different foreign countries. Only after finally being in a more stable (though not 
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necessarily long-term) position they resume life together. Paul, a French logistics 
specialist who moved to Hong Kong as a V.I.E. trainee, remarks about this first full-time 
position, 
 
[A position like mine is] normally for one year. If you do well, one more year. 
Most people go back, they seldom stay unless the guy is getting married with 
an Asian girl. I had a girlfriend already, French. She was in New York, I was 
in Hong Kong, we were from the same school. […] [We are now] in a 10-
year long relationship. We met in France. I moved to Shanghai, she came to 
visit and managed to find an internship for […] company. After that I came 
to Singapore and she could move […] here, too. It’s a complicated story […] 
I get married in France in August, then I will be coming back here afterwards, 
of course. I wanted to stay [in Singapore] but if I become a father I 
understand that my future wife wants to go home. 
 
Despite his long-term relationship, Paul’s account is all about independence. Over the 
past ten years, he had been to Scotland, Bali (both not mentioned in above quotation), 
Shanghai, Hong Kong and now Singapore. While his girlfriend was able to visit him in 
Shanghai, joined him in Hong Kong later and is nowadays living with him in Singapore, 
they did not move together once. Even now she will return to France to prepare for the 
wedding, while he is still in Singapore and busy with his job. Apart from that, 
throughout the time in Asia, she did not always follow him, as her stint in New York 
reveals. They both pursued their professional and lifestyle interests for years. 
Nevertheless, after ten years and many different countries, they now enter an institution 
that promises permanence.  
To juxtapose this apparent contradiction, we can see that the couple were only 
able to sustain the fleeting and temporary nature of their mobile pathways comfortably 
because they could rely on each other. Their relationship has always been a fix point. 
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No matter how mobile their daily lives and how great geographical distances are, their 
pathways are interwoven. They regularly crossed each other’s circuit until they finally 
shared a home in Hong Kong and Singapore. Now again, one of them is leaving, but 
only because they know that they meet again for the wedding in Europe.   
Mobility characterises these couples’ life. Nevertheless, mobility and their long-
term relationship – which they at times sustained even over great physical distance – are 
not dichotomous but complementary elements. These couples have the cultural and 
social capital to cross borders in the first place. Their nationality and the educational 
institutions from which they graduated provide them with contacts to obtain internship 
positions. They hold tertiary degrees, speak English on a high level and many of them 
have mastered one or two other foreign languages to a certain extent. In combination, 
this increases their chances of obtaining a visa and thus a job. However, their limited 
financial capital demands two incomes. Despite all the opportunities which mobility 
grants, the young migrants try to protect themselves from being uprooted by anchoring 
themselves in the romantic relationship.  
Paul’s narrative, while optimistic and invigorating, also draws attention to the 
sacrifices. He mentions that most people return to France after their V.I.E. internship 
unless they marry an “Asian girl.” For him, neither of the two is the case. His stable 
romantic relationship offers him the security that his life otherwise would lack. 
Meanwhile, Paul is in his early 30s, and turning the comfort of his intimate relationship 
into the legal institution of marriage might alleviate concerns over being alone in a 
competitive neoliberal labour market.  
The legal recognition, contrary to many European peers who settle down when 
marrying, allows these migrants to maintain their mobile lifestyle. They are not alone, 
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neither emotionally nor legally. They have known each other for long enough to be 
assured that they can rely on each other. Apart from that, they share the experience of 
having grown up in the same country with the same mother tongue as well as the 
experience of challenging themselves abroad. Thus, no matter how far away from each 
other and their home country they live presently, they do not feel alone. Rather, the 
romantic partner becomes a support, insurance, friend and source of comfort in their 
exciting yet insecure mobile pathways. 
Nevertheless, such floating lifestyle is bound to have an end. As Maehara 
(2010:954) notes, migrants’ stage in the life-cycle significantly influences how “they 
change their priorities, concerns, expectations, goals and plans, all of which affect, and 
are affected by, emotional processes.” Talking about children and the probability that his 
wife wants to return to France for good reveals Paul’s inner struggles. After the wedding, 
he “of course” intends to return to Singapore, but he does not include his wife in this 
remark. Ultimately, Paul expects his mobile life to end soon. While for years, the couple 
sacrificed the time they might have had together, they will have to give up their 
independence and flexibility if they want to adopt the social role of a spouse and parents. 
Not all of the couples that come from the same country move so often or live apart 
from each other for so long. Nevertheless, “doing mobility together” characterises their 
migration to Asia. Some stay and move on across Asia whereas a few migrants return to 
Europe (though not necessarily to their home country) after two or three years. The 
relationship project is the fix point in their lives and it means that they eventually start a 
family, have shared assets or even settle down. The couples who perceive their mobility 
as a shared project display stronger attachments to their home country than most other 
interviewees. They speak of the same “home” – associating home at least partly with 
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their home country – when thinking about childhood and their natal families. When they 
occasionally visit their families, they book flights to the same country and sometimes 
city where they both do not need to clear immigration. The shared images of and 
nostalgia for the same country of origin tie them close to each other. Yet, this does not 
mean that they return – home can also be a place one decides, for practical reasons, not 
to live, as Lam and Yeoh (2004:154-55) note, a notion that is reflected in some of these 
couples’ narratives.  
Caspar, the French entrepreneur who has been living in Singapore for seven years 
(the first two years as an MBA student with his wife still being in France), says he is 
“more French than ever.” Still, the vibrant Singaporean labour market and the 
constrained situation in France deter the couple from leaving Southeast Asia. Instead, 
Caspar considers their marriage as a small nucleus in a world which he perceives as 
very uncertain. Sceptical of Europe’s and Singapore’s future development, the childless 
couple stick together and try to stay independent from state control and national systems 
as much as possible. 
  
I don’t know what France’s going to be in ten years, I don’t know, no one 
knows actually. I think our situation will become more and more the norm. 
[…] And here you feel as a French, as a European, well, you feel lost, and 
you feel scared, because you really know, you take care of yourself and 
that’s it. 
 
When I met Caspar again in Singapore two years later and probed his view on Europe 
and his feelings of belonging, it turned out that he felt stronger about his situation than 
ever. While his account of 2015 hints at uncertainty and speaks of themselves rather 
than his country France nor his host country Singapore as a point of reference, the 
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couple has taken the initiative to manage their situation as individuals rather than 
citizens by 2017.  
 
That’s our worry number one, savings. For two years I paid [my pension tax] 
in France, it is mandatory. I have no hope to get this money back no matter 
what happens during whatever elections. When moving here I very naively 
thought “okay let’s continue to pay […].” After one month I realised that it is 
so […] expensive for such a poor quality of service. To pay for something 
that I don’t get anyway- no! So [we] do our own savings. The good news is 
that taxes is good in our case. There are less taxes so we can save much more. 
[…] This is our situation but the problem is in which asset you put? So far 
[there is] no answer, that’s quite scary. […] We prefer to have liquid stuff to 
be able to react fast. […] We don’t want to be stuck with a property- It’s very 
worrying, with that mobility thing you have no stable play if – you don’t 
even know in what currency you should get your assets. Financial 
globalisation has been great for firms but for individuals it’s a nightmare.  
 
Caspar went on and on. Later, when he mentions the designated President of the United 
States Donald Trump as well as Singapore’s increasing control of immigration, both low 
and high skilled, it is obvious that he does not want to rely on his current place of living, 
nor his home country or future global developments. His narrative illustrates how even 
a French couple, with professional jobs, recognised degrees, nearing middle age, do not 
simply return to Europe although they value their shared French background and the 
“European values,” which Caspar repeatedly mentioned. Ultimately, they see 
themselves as a two-men entity, partners and each other’s insurance and as such pursue 
their own path.  
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8.1.2 Growing Roots or Turning Native? 
Another group of migrants (13 of the 70) are in a stable relationship with a host-country 
national. I define stable here as either married to (eight of my informants) or living 
together with their long-term Singaporean or Japanese partners. At first glance, the two 
cities differ vastly in this regard: Only one of my European informants is married to a 
Singaporean, whereas seven interviewees in Japan have a Japanese spouse. Yet, this 
statement needs qualification: Among the seven in Tokyo, one woman and her Japanese 
husband already completed their divorce, and another male informant is still sharing the 
house with his Japanese wife because of their daughter but has technically ended the 
relationship.  
Two factors explain the numerical difference of European migrants’ liaisons with 
locals in Singapore and in Tokyo. First, the different composition of both societies 
entails that in Singapore, where roughly one third of the population are foreigners and 
predominantly from Asia, several European migrants found a spouse from one of the 
neighbouring Asian countries. Second, migrants invested differently in the country of 
residence. As discussed above, many Europeans in Japan studied the Japanese language 
and dreamt of staying in Japan for long. During their first years, they tried to find 
Japanese friends (and a few were determined to find a native partner) and actively 
socialised with Japanese people.  
This differs from most of European migrants’ socialising practices in Singapore, 
also because migrants arrived at a slightly higher age on average and more often moved 
together with a romantic partner. Initially coming to Japan as students meant that the 
Europeans in Tokyo socialised very differently from the ones in Singapore. The life 
stage is significant here. Above examples underline that Tokyo is difficult to access for 
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couples given the requirement of at least intermediary language proficiency in Japanese 
for most jobs. We thus find that the choice of destination depends on potential migrants’ 
life stage which again entails that those in Tokyo are more likely to find a local or third-
country spouse in the host society than those in Singapore who more often migrate as 
couples. 
In turn, having a Japanese partner or spouse allows for deeper penetration of the 
Japanese society. All Europeans in this group nowadays use Japanese as the main 
language for communication with their partners. However, many did not speak Japanese 
fluently first, so their partners are all Japanese people who can communicate in English. 
Nevertheless, Japanese became the main mode of communication for the Europeans on 
the long run. Other aspects of migrants’ lives gradually turned Japanese, too. This 
includes banal habits like sleeping on futons in tatami rooms as well as more profound 
ones like fully relying on medical treatment in the Japanese tongue and the national 
savings and pension systems. 
While their partners’ proficiency in foreign languages might enable these couples 
to live elsewhere, migrants’ accounts reveal that they see their future in Japan. The 
degree of their Japanese proficiency and their familiarity with Japanese social norms 
and institutional structures leave no doubt that staying in Japan is most pragmatic. In all 
but one case, the Japanese partner lacks sufficient language ability to work abroad or 
does not want to leave Japan, or, most often, both. This suggests that intimacy is 
decisive for migrants’ prolonged stay in Japan. Olga is a Baltic woman who felt 
marginalised both at work as well as in the Japanese society when I first met her. Yet, 
she had been together with her Japanese boyfriend for long and made her point clear. “I 
don’t know, if I wasn’t with him, I can’t actually imagine being here alone, working in 
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this kind of strange companies and so on. […] I don’t like the people any more. […] No, 
yeah, somehow I still love my boyfriend.” When I asked her if they considered other 
countries, she shook her head.  
 
That’s difficult. Well, he wants to live in Japan. He actually can’t imagine 
himself working in any foreign company. And probably he won’t be able, I 
think so- Yeah, it’s this problem with Japanese, really. They know how to 
work here and that’s it. So yeah, I think that I have to stay here.  
 
Olga’s solution was to quit the job at her Japanese company and enter the Tokyo 
subsidiary of a foreign firm. A year later, she married her boyfriend. Eighteen months 
after her marriage, Olga changed company again in the hope for higher work 
satisfaction and, ultimately, life satisfaction.  
Scholarship has frequently pointed to Western men’s popularity among Asian 
women. Affairs, relationships, and families between Western men and Asian women 
attracted much attention (e.g. Kelsky 2001; Woan 2008; Prasso 2005). The cases of 
European migrants who are married to Japanese citizens do not clearly support this 
gender bias. While eight European men and four European women among my 
informants are in a stable relationship with a Japanese partner, the ratio looks different 
for those who are married: Four women, and thus all of those in a stable romantic 
relationship with a Japanese eventually married their partner, while only three of the 
eight men did.  
In the case of Tim, a Dutch man of mixed Asian-European background, his wife’s 
Japanese family were valuable supports when their first child was born. Their case is 
noteworthy since Tim’s wife is the main breadwinner. As an employee of an established 
automotive corporation, she follows a career track position and provides the family with 
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not only a stable income but also insurances and the like. Tim is an entrepreneur and his 
one-man firm yields only enough money for grocery shopping.  
When his wife’s health was unstable before child birth she had to stay in hospital 
for three months. During that time, the expecting father, still struggling with the Chinese 
characters and bureaucratic terms in Japanese, managed the household and his firm, his 
wife’s health issues and the huge amount of paperwork that came along with her 
hospitalisation as well as the child birth and insurance issues for the newly born. 
Nowadays, the family has a routine with Tim organising the toddler’s nursing schedules, 
taking care of the household, cooking and working on his company while his wife is a 
full-time employee. Every few weeks, however, her parents visit them from the 
neighbouring province for a weekend and this is when the young couple can lean back 
for some time.  
 
Her parents visit every few weeks. Then they cook and I am not allowed to 
help. They support us a lot, they bring pickles and other stuff. […] Since our 
parents finally met this year the relationship has become much better. Before, 
her mother was very sceptic but now she is really easy-going. […] They are 
so happy to have a grandchild! 
 
Tim enjoys his life in Japan and the couple recently had a second child. While his 
account indicates that the relations to his wife’s parents have not always been so smooth, 
the first child changed the situation and nowadays he feels to be part of his Japanese in-
laws’ family life.  
Another example of slowly turning native with time, yet with more ambiguous 
feelings, is Alexiou’s. I met the Greek financial analyst twice, the first time in 2014. At 
that time he had already been together with his Japanese girlfriend for several years and 
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they were planning their wedding. Alexiou was proud of his high level of Japanese and 
his linear career advancement in the French bank he had been working for since 
graduation. In our follow-up conversation in 2017 he was still in the same firm and his 
initial struggles with technical language or Japanese honorific expressions had also 
ceased. Having been in Japan for eight years and having just submitted his application 
for PR, Alexiou did not consider other countries for the future. However, he admitted he 
sometimes was uncertain about his increasing “Japaneseness.” 
 
Some days you feel like you want to be integrated a bit more and the other 
days you feel like “uh, screw it.” […]  What is my strong things - because I 
speak Japanese, or because I am a foreigner? What should I be? Realistically 
I will never be as good as Japanese in Japanese [language]. On the other 
hand, I am way better than somebody who has no idea what’s going on. But 
then if that’s so I should not try to become fully Japanese but keep my 
foreign identity. […] I guess I need to keep a certain originality? It’s fun with 
my wife, sometimes I behave as a Japanese and she gets pissed. Then she is 
like “why do you do that?” […] But I think she is expecting me a bit to not 
go for the full foreigner thing. It’s a difficult point, how to keep the balance? 
I don’t know. […] I’m trying hard, trying to understand more about Japanese 
life and Japanese people, but it seems I have to keep some of my non-
Japanese self.  
 
Alexiou’s account reveals great ambivalence towards his position facing the Japanese 
society. With decreasing language problems, he is increasingly treated like a Japanese 
person. Yet, the way he questions his situation detects his inner struggles. While he 
seems to have come very close to his previous desire to “integrate” into the Japanese 
society, it has also made him aware that he would never feel the same as a native. Who 
he was expected to be and what the right “balance” was has become an identity issue 
that is accentuated by his high degree of formal integration in the Japanese society. That 
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is, his native wife and Japanese in-laws, his entire career in Japan, savings in Japan and 
Japanese language as main mode of communication at work and at home.  
 The language and with it a particular way of thinking shape the young Europeans’ 
lives as spouses of Japanese citizens. With regards to the Turkish diaspora, the 
particularities of the Turkish language and its difference from the diaspora’s host 
language in Germany, Landau (1996) argued for the language as a mentality shaping 
factor. In Japan, several of my informants are increasingly identifying with the Japanese 
society, especially those with a Japanese spouse. Yet at the same time they feel 
ambivalent when they realise this change.  
In Singapore, Nico, the Portuguese who married his long-time Singaporean 
girlfriend, faces a different issue. His wife and her family are Malay Singaporeans and 
thus Muslims. Only when he finally proposed to his girlfriend and received her family’s 
acceptance, he felt confident enough to convert to Islam. “They accepted me and told 
me, which was the biggest turning point for [my] decision, that they would always 
respect our relationship. But if we married I had to [convert] because it would look bad 
in front of others.” It took Nico years to overcome the unease with clarifying his stance 
towards a religion and its culture.  
Calling such emotional work “emotion cultures”, Maehara (2010:960) explained 
the case of Irish-Japanese families where Japanese mothers are troubled to raise their 
children according to Catholic values. In contrast to Maehara’s example of a Japanese 
woman who tried to accept her child’s Catholic education but failed, Nico considers his 
conversion to Islam as a formal step that hardly affects his daily life. At the same time, 
it allows him inclusion in a caring in-law network which deepens his feelings of 
belonging to Singapore.  
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The difference to the European spouses of Japanese citizens however is that 
Nico’s religion does not affect his daily life nor his sense of identity: When asked, he 
frankly admitted that his conversion was a merely formal procedure and that nothing 
about his attire, eating habits or the like had changed. For the migrants in Japan, the 
language issue becomes symbolic for their identification dilemma. They feel torn 
between the cultural Japanese identity they have acquired to a considerable extent over 
the years and through marriage to a Japanese citizen; and the identity of a foreigner in 
Japan which, despite it keeps reminding them of their “lack” of something, they 
gradually rediscover and suddenly fear to lose. 
 
8.1.3 Third-country Couples and the Search of a Home 
So far, I examined two kinds of love relationships which inform migrants’ 
identifications and perception of belonging differently. In simple terms one could 
describe them as the two opposite poles of a continuum that spans a wide range of 
possible variations of attachment and identifications. On the one end there are the same-
country couples who form a two-man unit. They relate to a shared background even 
though this does not mean they return to their home country for years to come. On the 
other end there are those with a host-country national which increases embeddedness in 
the host society, though with differing outcomes. I now turn to yet another constellation, 
couples with complex identifications and attachments that could be located somewhere 
in the middle between the poles. These are couples whose cultural, linguistic and 
national backgrounds differs from each other and from that of the host society. For 
reasons of simplicity and with reference to international human resource practices on 
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employing third country nationals in a foreign subsidiary, I call them relationships with 
third-country nationals (TCNs). 
In both Singapore and Tokyo, I met Europeans who are in a relationship with and 
sometimes married to a TCN. In all but one case – an Italian woman who met her future 
German husband in the headquarter of the German firm where both were employed – 
they met their partners in the host society. With 15 of my interviewees falling into this 
category they make up more than 20 per cent of my informants. The large percentage of 
foreigners in Singapore and European migrants’ socialising patterns in the city-state 
could explain why TCN couples are common. While low when compared to Singapore, 
Tokyo’s foreign population is high when compared to other Japanese provinces (see 
figure 7). Additionally, Tokyo boasts with a range of institutions and services which 
cater to foreigners. As such, many informants socialise at least partly among foreigners 
or in mixed groups (see previous chapter).  
A few TCN spouses are of Western origin, sometimes Australia or the US, yet 
more often Europe. The majority of the TCN spouses are Asians from Southeast-Asian 
(in Singapore) or East Asian countries (in Tokyo). These relationships balance 
seemingly contradictory elements. One is tied to temporariness. The fact that the current 
host country is neither partner’s home country means that they do not have family 
nearby and that both partners’ legal status depends on a work visa. This denies them 
security in terms of their future and allows for only vague ideas regarding settling down. 
Therefore, these couples prepare themselves – mentally and often literally – to become 
mobile again. Hence, as discussed in chapter six, they strategically accumulate skills in 
order to be employable elsewhere. If they are both Europeans, they imagine their return 
to Europe at some point in the future but anything beyond, again, remains vague.  
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If one day we returned together… where to? It is quite easy to decide 
because Portugal is not in the best financial condition nor Italy. So likely not 
either. We spoke about it, probably it would be Germany. The other reason 
for Germany is that it is half way for both of us, so kind of the right 
compromise. […] It wouldn’t be very fair to move to one country or the 
other.  
 
Mona’s account pinpoints the compromises likely to arise if she and her Portuguese 
boyfriend Andre seriously considered returning. Thus, although aware of their 
temporariness in Singapore, the couple displays what I call “imagined mobility.” They 
have been in Singapore for approximately five years and do not plan to move again at 
the present. Mona was close to leaving Singapore roughly two years before our 
interview. Yet, Andre wanted to stay and given the question of the next destination, she 
dismissed her plan.  
These couples find themselves in a state of limbo. While they do not see 
themselves staying in Asia forever, they are generally satisfied with their current 
situation and both partners have an equal standing; none sacrificed his or her career or 
adapted to the spouse’s country with all its linguistic and labour market demands. They 
have opportunities for career advancement and a decent living standard in Singapore or 
Tokyo.  
Additionally, the return to Europe is a risk in itself. For example, in Andre’s and 
Mona’s case, their home countries suffer from economic stagnation. Making a living 
would be a challenge. Considering other EU countries and the chances of finding jobs 
and enjoying life, not many destinations are left. The English-speaking UK is a huge 
question mark for many since the start of the Brexit negotiations. Germany, which many 
perceive as the professionally most interesting place, seems hard to access without 
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German language skills.
54
 Thus, while a notion of temporariness underlies these 
European couples’ lives, they continue to stay and might do so for more years to come.  
To some extent the situation is different for Europeans with an Asian partner or 
spouse. Seven of the 15 TCN partners come from a third Asian country. Most of them 
are married meanwhile. My informants in this category in Singapore, most of them men, 
have Indonesian and Filipino girlfriends and wives, while in Japan I met European 
women and men who are engaged or married to Thai, Burmese, Taiwanese, or Korean 
nationals.  
The difference is that not all of the Southeast Asian wives of informants in 
Singapore hold a professional visa. For them, obtaining a secure legal status is much 
more difficult than for the European men. Furthermore, Southeast Asians who work 
with work permits in Singapore’s hospitality industry are stigmatised as unskilled 
workers or maids with few rights. One couple left Singapore where they did not feel 
welcome as employees in the hospitality industry and therefore moved to Hong Kong 
where they married. For them, the Filipino wife’s home country is an option for the 
future, but Andras, the Hungarian interviewee and husband, also knows that career 
opportunities are favourable and the living standard higher in global cities.  
In Japan, language again is a salient factor. While one male English informant is 
content with life in Tokyo and does not consider his long-term Korean girlfriend and 
himself to emigrate for the time being, Madeleine, a French woman married to a Korean 
national, presents a rather different rationale:   
 
                                                             
54
 A public referendum in June 2016 decided over the UK’s exit from the European Union. Along with the 
heated debates between supporters and opponents, the term Brexit, a fusion of “Britain” and “exit”, was 
coined.  
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In our case, I think if I was not with him, I would be back to France already. 
I’m always a little bit tired of Japanese society. […] In our case we are kind 
of stuck in Japan because it’s the only place where we can both find work. 
He has been here for 10 years, he already went through what I am going 
through now.  
 
Madeline speaks about her mixed feelings of staying in Japan frankly. She knows it is 
the only realistic place for both her husband and herself to find work. Japanese is their 
only common language and thus Japan the only country where they both have the 
chance to secure work. As long as they can both find employment and can lead a 
satisfactory life, the young migrants, despite their desire for repeated migration or return, 
are unlikely to take action. Madeleine’s narrative hints at her struggles in Japan that 
drove her to consider repeated migration seriously. Since this option has become fairly 
unlikely, she goes on to speak about the positive side of staying in Japan.  
 
In the beginning I was always wondering when to go back. Now I know I am 
here for a while so I am kind of settling down more also. In the beginning I 
wouldn’t buy anything because I didn’t know if I could bring it back home. 
Now I see something and I am like “wow, cool, I can buy it.” My real life is 
here in the country, memory of friends from home getting far. 
 
Madeleine’s narrative reveals migrants’ inconsistent, often contradictory attempts to 
manage their emotions (Hochschild 1979). She emphasises the positive side of her 
migration experience. Spending on items for her flat allows her to surround herself with 
objects that help her create a homey atmosphere and soothe her ambiguous feelings and 
agitation. Although many migrants value their mobility and freedom, they long for a 
home and thus, try to see the positive sides of immobility. This is also true for the ones 
with a TCN partner. Home, however, is not necessarily bound to a geographical place. 
  273 
While TCN couples neither have family nor legal security in the host society, they can 
still build a new life together and create a sense of home through the relationship.  
 
8.1.4 Bachelor Circuits: Between Freedom and Deracination 
The final section of this chapter addresses intimacy from a different point of view. 
Roughly one third (22 of the 70) of the young Europeans are not in a long-term 
romantic relationship or marriage. Some of them long for a stable romantic relationship 
whereas others seem to regard their migration as a period of independence and fun, as 
depicted by other research (Knowles 2015). The young Europeans are aware of 
stereotypes regarding interracial desires such as white men’s popularity in Asia and their 
promiscuous relationships with Asian women (Ma 1996; Woan 2008). A few 
interviewees referred to Singapore as the “place where relationships crash” or as 
“playground.” Some explicitly addressed the racialised and gendered notion of this 
image, which sketches white women’s bodies as “devalued” (Fechter 2016:73) 
compared to Asian women, and in opposition to white men, who are associated with 
sexual adventures.  
Other informants however, men and women, questioned the stereotype and added 
that they or their friends had found their future spouse in Singapore or Tokyo. All 
European women who married a Japanese national did so before the age of 30 and had 
met their husband in their early twenties. Eager to understand the Japanese culture and 
befriend locals, they socialised with Japanese people and happened to find their future 
husband. Their physical difference did not obstruct, but rather facilitate mutual feelings 
of attraction. In both cities, narratives suggest that most of the male and female 
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informants who felt attracted to Asians developed their romantic interest through what 
Paquin (2014:31) calls “experientially generated preferences.” That is, only when they 
frequently engaged with Asians of the other sex and eventually became intimate did 
they adopt racial preferences, if they did at all. In brief, racialised sexual preferences or 
the availability – or lack – of intimacy sometimes influence decisions to stay in Asia or 
to leave. However, such preferences scarcely trigger initial migration to Asia.   
Regardless the city, migrants’ attitude towards romance varies significantly 
depending on gender. Men’s narratives more often than women’s suggest that they enjoy 
their independence and sexual adventures. No man reported problems to meet women. 
This could however be related to interviewees’ perception of my positionality: as both a 
researcher, but also as a white woman and thus someone who might be biased or might 
disapprove of white men’s predatory behaviour. While women sometimes opened up 
and told me even private anecdotes, men were generally more reserved although a few 
implied their popularity with Asian women. Nevertheless, a fair number of the 
Europeans found their future partner or spouse in the host country (see 8.1.2).  
In contrast, for a few informants the lack of a suitable romantic partner seemed to 
be decisive for their repeated migration. The respective informants are all women and 
their cases confirm that at least some of the stereotypical images of racialised femininity 
are true (e.g. Ma 1996; Lan 2011; Prasso 2005; Woan 2008). Isabelle, a mixed-race 
woman of North-African and French descent, commented neutrally on Singapore being 
a playground. She returned to Europe after only a year although she was fond of 
Singapore as a place of residence and of her job. Berna’s reasons for leaving Japan are 
more explicit. Her return to Europe was clearly driven by her frustration with foreign 
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men’s attitude towards promiscuity, which she witnessed over her two-year sojourn in 
Tokyo and commented on in our follow-up interview via Skype.  
 
Maybe more the fact that I was different from average Japanese women- Of 
course physically, but also expectations, lifestyle, how I use to talk. I think 
that was one of the points that was becoming kind of an obsession. I 
remember sometimes I was joking to friends. “Here in Japan, I don’t feel 
like a woman any longer.” Because the typical ideal woman partner for my 
foreign [male] friends was not what I could have been myself. It was more 
the childish cute Japanese girl and I think that was a bit painful for me. […] 
For example, I had some French colleagues. […] I understand that if you are 
in a foreign country, as a boy you really want to explore and that can be 
exploring local girls. But the fact that this had become a kind of habitude. It 
was always like this. I was kind of suffering. […] I knew that I could not fit 
that structure, that was my perception. So for me I was saying “I am not in 
the category of an ideal woman here, so I’m not a woman any longer for 
society or as a reference for male society.” 
 
Berna’s example leaves no doubt over the dissatisfaction she experienced regarding love 
and relationships in Tokyo. However, I also met European women who established 
serious love relationships in Asia. In the case of Tokyo in particular, where the migrants 
often arrive at young age, trained in the Japanese language and enthusiastic about living 
in Japan for a longer period of time, the actual problem seems to lie in society’s gender 
norms and a gendered division of labour. While most of my female informants’ 
Japanese spouses support their wives’ careers and appear to favour gender-equal 
relationships, structural constraints are among the most influential adverse factors my 
female informants cited (Roberts 2011). For instance, the male breadwinner model and 
the norm of long working hours in Japan meant that European women’s Japanese 
husbands, even when they supported their wives’ careers, bowed to their companies’ 
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rules of long working hours and after-work drinking. As a consequence, these women 
felt left alone with household chores but also concerning time together with their spouse 
who often came home late and was then too tired to listen to their concerns or enjoy the 
time together. 
One more aspect explains some European women’s ambivalence towards 
romantic relationships in Asia. I found that many women expect intimacy not only from 
their spouse, but, especially when considering offspring, long for proximity to their own 
parents. In one (male) interviewee’s eyes, women wanted to be closer to “home”, 
namely their natal family, during pregnancy. In the respective interviewee’s case, his 
fiancée had recently started talking about having a baby and had expressed the wish to 
return to her home country to have a family in the future. While few women explicitly 
state such feelings, many speak of their wish to meet their parents frequently when they 
have their own child. This is an emotional desire but also instrumental. Many of the 
women hope to receive support from their parents because they plan to stay in their jobs.  
In terms of family planning and settlement, women who are single and approach 
the typical age of giving birth perceive Asia as an unsuitable place to find a partner with 
who they could return home. Karina, a 34-year old Greek woman, had left Japan and 
moved to Bangkok. In a Skype interview after two years in Thailand, she deliberated on 
her new relationship with a Thai man and her desire to have children.  
 
I think I am getting old. My answer is very private. If I was younger, under 
30, I would probably leave Thailand because I already have two years of 
working experience. […] But now I am thinking about a family and this has 
limitations. I don’t have that much time any more. Now I have a boyfriend 
and I am so confused. […] My plan was to go to Europe and settle down and 
have a family. Here maybe not, it’s very different. My family is too far away 
and it’s hard to have a family here. It’s maybe different for guys, women 
  277 
have the baby and birth issues. You can maybe combine family and career 
but your partner has to be caring then.  
 
Karina voices a concern which many bachelors share with increasing age and prolonged 
time in Asia. Their friends at home buy houses and have children, and migrant couples 
around them make family plans, too. Considerations over who could be a marriage 
partner inevitably involve issues of culture, family, visa and how these variables 
influence family life. Male bachelors sometimes state that they expect their future wife 
to be interested in their home country. However, married European men, when facing 
decisions on the place of residence upon child birth, usually leave the decision to their 
wives and her in-laws, especially when these are locals of the host society. I found 
examples in both field sites.  
In Singapore, the interviewee and his Malaysian Muslim wife stick to her family’s 
Islamic traditions at least formerly and the question of leaving Singapore never arose. In 
Tokyo, a European informant and his Japanese wife returned to Japan after a two-year 
stint in his home country, because the wife wished to be closer to her natal family to 
raise their child.  
The discussion suggests that the life cycle impacts quite differently on the 
migratory decisions of the two sexes. European single women around age thirty and 
above are torn between the wish to extend their life abroad on the one hand and their 
desire for children on the other. Karina’s account underlines the insecurities involved in 
either decision. Staying with her Thai boyfriend in Asia constitutes a major challenge if 
they want to have a family. With her parents being far away, Karina doubts that it would 
be possible to raise children and to pursue a professional career. On the other hand, for 
the first time during her five years in Asia, she is in a serious relationship with a man 
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she loves. 34 years old and anxious to postpone pregnancy for too long, she feels 
pressured to take a decision but is concerned about either outcome.   
 
8.2. The Mobile Identity and Multiple Belongings  
In the first part of this chapter I identified different constellations of intimacy in or 
outside of romantic relationships. These are first of all, European migrants who have a 
same-country partner or spouse and exercise their mobility together. They plan their 
migration as a couple and think of themselves as a unit. This however does not 
necessarily mean they always move and live together. Secondly, those with a host-
country partner or spouse are more profoundly embedded in the host society. Migrants, 
however, are ambivalent about their identity. They fear to lose the very same otherness 
which singles them out. Being different allows them to maintain multiple identities. 
Their conflicting feelings capture the dilemma of the inability to be accepted into 
Japanese society without assimilation.  
Thirdly, some of the young Europeans find a partner from a third country. These 
couples enjoy their life in an Asian global city for the time being but insecurities over 
their future loom in the back of their minds. Finally, single migrants are torn between 
the joy of independence and the longing for a serious relationship. Age and gender 
significantly affect migrants’ perception of the feasibility to find a partner abroad and 
shape their rationale towards continued migration or return.  
Single migrants describe their independence and spontaneity with shining eyes. 
Yet, with increasing time abroad many admit that friends cannot make up for an 
intimate relationship. They become increasingly conscious of the times they ‘stay put’. 
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With neither a partner nor family members around who randomly call or wake them up 
when the alarm clock crashes they always weigh their options. ‘Free to move, maybe 
somewhere else is better?’ is the notion sweeping through their narratives. Awareness of 
the freedom to leave makes it hard to stay as Sandra’s accounts evidences. Her 
utterance– “Europe [as] my home but [not] the place to be” – opened this dissertation 
and her reflection on mobility seems suitable to close the main part.  
The young Irish-American woman in grey business attire gazes over Singapore’s 
cloudy skyline. From our armchairs in the visitor lounge on the 28
th
 floor of her office 
tower the city sprawls out below us and Sandra’s pensive expression evidences that 
Singapore, for her, is not ‘home.’ Sandra tells me that she hopes to “break the cycle of 
running away - Why do I keep moving? You know, I’m obviously seeking something 
that I haven’t found yet.” As so many times before, the young woman is anxious that 
others could leave her present place of residence before her and contemplates her next 
destination. What sounds like a luxury problem is also alarming. The celebration of 
mobility and the appeal to embrace the world might have uprooted some of the young 
adults. Remarks like Marcos’, a Portuguese who sees himself as a “citizen of the world”, 
make one think so.  
 
I’m turning 35 and I’m not married or have a family – I don’t mind moving 
to a nice, interesting new challenge but to start all over again with friends 
etc., I don’t think it’s that easy. […] At the same time, you tend to become a 
little bit a nomadic person. I have been here for 5 years and lately I am 
criticising– not criticising but I feel my time here is done. 
 
This is where the longitudinal study bears fruits. Marcos is still wandering. He might 
even keep moving. There are singles who indeed appear to be fulfilled with their 
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bachelor life. Nevertheless, the majority of my interviewees, and probably most human 
beings, long for someone to care about – and in times of crisis even for – them in an 
intimate romantic relationship. Sandra, Andras, and most others have found partners 
meanwhile and with them, a sort of roots. These roots are not necessarily bound to a 
place. Yet, against the image of the floating, unbound lives of the mobile professional, 
these roots do anchor the young migrants.  
The difference between experiencing life in Asia as part of a group of foreigners, 
as I illustrated in the previous chapter, and in a stable romantic relationship is that the 
former group is constantly changing and ties are only temporary. Sandra’s account 
demonstrates that as long as the Europeans fear emotional loss – for instance by friends 
who leave and make them feel left behind – they might not dare to confide in someone. 
In contrast, the couple relationship is more persistent. Migrants create a home through 
the relationship, a home which they can take with them. After years of a “gypsy 
lifestyle”, as Andras calls it, he built a “home” in Hong Kong together with his Filipina 
wife. The home, however, is not their apartment nor Hong Kong, which they might 
leave again, but their relationship and his decision to end his runaway lifestyle. In 
Leavitt’s (1996:527) words, then, “affective or felt associations […] are collective as 
well as individual.” 
In this chapter I demonstrated that for many of the migrants mobility has become 
an intrinsic part of their lives, almost a part of their identity. While they might feel at 
home somewhere, they seldom rule out the possibility to leave again. Singles have a 
higher sense of mobility. They enjoy their independence and the excitement of living 
abroad but it also makes them move on, feeling both liberated and insecure about where 
their life is heading. Without someone to root them, the temptation to keep looking for 
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better options is strong. Nevertheless, couples do not stay put. After all, they have two 
careers to match and repeatedly, an unforeseen job opportunity for one partner triggers 
the move of both.  
Their examples demonstrate that mobility is different from deracination. When 
visa regulations or labour market conditions alter or migrants’ personal situations 
demand change, the couples move on, taking with them the core of what home means to 
them. Mobility and roots, and thus the possibility to have a home abroad without 
settling down, do not contradict. However, it is necessary to review the understanding of 
roots. Conceptualising them as an attachment to someone with whom one has built life 
abroad rather than attachment to a physical place, appears useful to understand these 
Europeans’ feelings of belonging.  
That said, there is a qualitative difference with regards to place. In the case of 
those in Tokyo with Japanese partners, or TCN partners from East Asian countries, a 
specific place plays a central role. Japan, and Tokyo in particular, is the place these 
couples are bound to for practical reasons. As such, place gradually becomes something 
worth of more profound investment as migrants’ home-making practices and investment 
plans demonstrated. While the European partners often sustain multiple homes through 
transnational practices, their cases stand out from the narrative of mobility displayed by 
the majority of the geographically mobile informants.  
To conclude, for the majority mobility has become normative. For these young 
adults, mobility is increasingly a tool for sustaining a middle-class living standard and 
an upward mobile career in the uncertain times of a globalised world and the 
opportunities and risks of an integrating European Union. Their middle-class 
background, tertiary degrees, EU passports and the availability of modern 
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communication and transport technology all facilitate their geographical mobility. Along 
a neoliberal logic, they see mobility as one of the – or maybe the only – promising and 
for many the most rewarding solution for a satisfying life. At the same time, 
inconsistencies and ambivalent feelings abound. Reluctance if not avoidance to tackle 
issues of planning the future and eventual settling down underline migrants’ ambiguous 
experiences and struggles to manage their multiple identities.  
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9. Conclusion  
In the opening to this dissertation, the meaning of young Europeans’ migration to Asia 
in the 21
st
 century was set as subject. As chapter two revealed, two different streams of 
literature have looked at related migration flows. The one observes atypical migration in 
the European free movement space, the other European expatriation in Asia. While the 
latter scholarship lays the basis for the migration phenomenon of this dissertation, it 
cannot explain the motivations, channels of movements, work experiences and identity 
formation of highly educated European millennials to Asian cities. In short, the 
generational point of view and the “worklife pathways” approach unravel a migration 
phenomenon that is specific of its times and context. That is, Generation Erasmus is 
determined as a group of young professionals who design their lives as a project, 
supported by and oriented at geographical and organisational mobility.   
On the remaining pages, I discuss how and to which extent mobility has taken on 
an identity-shaping significance for the young adults. Reviewing the findings of 
chapters four to eight, I test the idea of mobility as an orientation towards life. By this I 
wish to elucidate how ‘mobile’ strategies and practices can construct a coherent life 
narrative. I then propose to consider these young Europeans as a group that displays a 
new form of individualism that has not been attributed to European migrants so far. 
They present one possible version of managing one’s career and sustaining middle-class 
living standard in a globalised, increasingly connected but all the more complex world. 
At the same time, migrants’ trajectories bring out the limits of a life oriented towards 
mobility. I close by suggesting that theirs is a case of the gradual approximation of the 
young and educated middle classes around the world, a consequence of a 
reconfiguration of the Western concepts of core and periphery in the 21
st
 world.  
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9.1 Summary and Discussion 
In chapter four, I argued that the generational perspective helps to discern the distinctive 
conditions under which the young Europeans came of age. Despite political, cultural 
and economic differences between the European Union’s member states, the frame of 
the millennial generation enables one to see common features across countries and to 
define the highly educated middle-class European graduates with previous mobility 
experience as Generation Erasmus. After a carefree childhood in Europe’s relatively 
peaceful and prosperous 1990s, the young adults reach out for the manifold 
opportunities which open up once they start to consider employment. With rising 
competition on EU labour markets and the availability of alternative options, this choice 
involves considerations of less conventional middle-class pathways and far-away places 
of residence. The dissertation revealed that the young adults embark on overseas 
employment often without a clear career or life plan in mind; yet, they gradually come 
to scrutinise their choice, as well as its irreversibility.  
On the basis of this comprehensive feature of the group, I differentiated four ideal 
types of migration motivations. These types accentuate the differences between 
migrants who move to either Singapore or Tokyo. They differently emphasise work and 
lifestyle aspects, and based on their purpose of moving, differently ‘prepare’ for their 
acceptance as global talents in the respective host society. That said, I suggest that their 
motivations for moving can only be conceptualised by the interrelatedness, as opposed 
to the separation, of economic or non-economic motives, for which the “worklife 
pathways” concept provides a suitable framework.  
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Global professionals are the prototype of the mobile self. They see the global city 
as a reference point for their professional and personal trajectories. In opposition to 
cultural enthusiasts and lifestyle migrants, global professionals, and to some extent 
economic refugees, do not target at a specific country in which they plan to stay (as the 
cultural enthusiasts do regarding Japan) or a specific region as a temporary adventure 
before they envisage return to Europe (lifestyle migrants concerning ‘Southeast Asia’). 
Yet, even economic refugees could have found some sort of job in their home countries 
or in other European countries. However, they value the Asian global cities for their 
high living standard, employment opportunities and an internationally minded 
community of young culturally and ethnically diverse professionals.  
Chapter five unravelled several paths of European labour migration to Asia. The 
existence of poorly understood institutional channels and the rising numbers of those 
who compete with the native population for local jobs hint at a new trend within skilled 
labour migration. As such, these Europeans’ independent migration patterns offer an 
intriguing case of the reconfiguration of core and periphery in the globalized world.  
Related to this finding, the dissertation illuminates the transformation and 
decrease of white privilege. The two field sites, different as they are, offer a fascinating 
insight into the changing layout of historical power relations. A comparison 
demonstrates context-specific nuances of the changing meaning of whiteness in 
Singapore and Tokyo but also unravels a general trend. Generation Erasmus still benefit 
from the structures created by their forebears. The remnants of Western hegemony 
materialise in long-established as well as more recent European governmental and 
cultural institutions in Singapore and Tokyo. Europeans’ symbolic capital renders them 
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attractive candidates for entry-level positions in the global labour market in Singapore, 
Tokyo or elsewhere.  
That said, the young Europeans’ status and positioning in Asia clearly differs from 
that of earlier European migrants. They hold junior positions with correspondingly 
moderate salaries. Their contracts usually are local and stipulate working conditions 
typical of the host country such as less paid annual holidays than in most of Europe. In 
short, they experience what it means to be at the lower end of organisational hierarchies, 
social status and political protection.  
This is highlighted by migrants’ diverse employment patterns in the two global 
cities. As chapter six revealed, these Europeans’ professional trajectories include 
repeated job transfers. Both migrants’ differing migration motivations and differences in 
the East Asian capitalist systems affect employment strategies and job transfers. In 
addition to that, racial and gender issues shape European migrants’ employment patterns. 
As Western and predominantly white employees, who at least initially are non-
managerial, the migrants stick out in the Asian workplaces. They sometimes meet 
suspicion and feel marginalised or alienated. While this diminishes their satisfaction on 
the job, it seldom constrains career advancement, at least on the non-managerial level.  
The situation looks different when considered under the aspect of gender. It also 
marks the biggest difference of the two field sites. European women in Singapore 
perceive their professional opportunities to be better than in Europe’s often more gender 
biased corporate structures. Women in Tokyo, on the other hand, realise how their 
“double otherness” as foreigners and women work against them. They face the same 
obstacles which continue to constrain Japanese women in Japanese corporations and, in 
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addition to that, they experience the disadvantaged position of being foreigners in 
Japanese firms.  
Overall, the young migrants in both cities, while grateful for gaining overseas 
work experience, feel highly insecure concerning their future prospects and thus attempt 
to upgrade their skills and to professionalise themselves. Some Europeans stepwise 
integrate into the host country domestic labour market. This is more often the case in 
Tokyo where a long-established organisational culture and Japanese as main working 
language require employees to ‘commit’ to the particularities of the labour market.  
That said, the chapter revealed that many Europeans continue to struggle in Tokyo 
workplaces. Their cases show clearly that Japanese firms are still reluctant to accept 
changes to their decade-long organisational practices. This is especially obvious when 
contrasted to the Singaporean labour market where migrants see opportunities for career 
advancement. In Tokyo, even those who prepared for years to fit in often become 
disillusioned and eventually leave, causing a brain drain of those internationally-minded 
global talents Japan has lately been able to attract, yet not to retain. As such, the 
comparative lens underlines the peculiar intersections of categories of difference. 
Neither is it the organisational culture alone that obstructs foreigners’ effective 
incorporation in the Japanese labour market nor can race or gender fully account for 
migrants’ struggles at their workplaces. Examining migrants’ strategies and practices in 
depth and contrasting them with the Singaporean case then allows to capture a more 
nuanced picture of the difficulties to incorporate foreigners in the Japanese labour 
market.  
Chapter seven and eight complemented the discussion on these Europeans’ 
multidimensional experiences by examining migrants’ social world and romantic 
  288 
relationships. The young adults in both field sites struggle to carve out their own space 
in the host society and engage in complex place-making practices. They contest existing 
hierarchies which stipulate Westerners to be senior and affluent expatriates, temporary 
visitors who do not seek deeper interaction with the local population. The young 
Europeans try painstakingly to differentiate themselves from the post-colonial image of 
the classic European expatriate in Asia. Their boundary work shows two diametrical 
dynamics. They erect vertical boundaries which separate them from their co-ethnics 
who are “above” them in terms of age, income and status. At the same time, they, to 
some extent, cross ethnic boundaries horizontally.  
Migrants’ socialising also demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of their relations. 
It accentuates divisions inside the group of the young European migrants. Some 
socialise more in their mother language while others count more diverse ethnic and 
linguistic networks to their immediate friend circles. The discussion shows that to some 
extent socio-economic and cultural differences between the EU member states travel to 
Asia. Thus, it is all the more intriguing to observe how such intra-European differences 
become less pronounced when migrants mingle with ethnically different migrants and 
locals in the receiving cities as I argue below. 
Everyday interactions show the existence of different social hierarchies and ethnic 
communities in the two cities. In Singapore, a clear class-boundary and the presence of 
a large community of skilled migrants from all around the world means that the young 
Europeans mainly socialise with other foreign talents of various backgrounds. This 
feeling of belonging to an in-group demonstrates that membership is defined by 
generation, class and mobility experience rather than nationality, ethnicity or culture. At 
the same time, the Europeans in Singapore only count few locals among their friends, 
  289 
namely those who show similar professional and cosmopolitan aspirations. The major 
ethnic communities of Singapore’s citizen population have little other than instrumental 
contact to foreign talents. This has to do with Singaporeans’ ‘privileged’ image of 
European and white people, their belief that foreigners only stay temporarily but also 
the Europeans’ preference for a community which shares their experience of mobility 
and of being foreigners.  
Since the majority of the Europeans in Tokyo are more or less proficient in 
Japanese, and many of the East Asian foreigners in Tokyo speak Japanese better than 
English, the young migrants usually have same-aged Japanese and a few East Asian 
friends. Yet, they sense barriers to deepening these friendships. This is a source of 
frustration and disappointment and means that by the time many Europeans socialise in 
two separate communities, a foreign, mostly European one and a Japanese one. This 
constantly reminds them of the lack of possibilities to integrate as much as many of 
them hoped initially. Gradually, most of the Japanese-speaking Europeans resemble 
their non-Japanese speaking peers who display similar socialising patterns as the ones in 
Singapore: in a community of mobility-experienced young professionals from around 
the globe. 
Nevertheless, only one third of these Europeans has left Singapore or Tokyo 
meanwhile (appendices I and II). The community of mobility-experienced young 
professionals offers a satisfying life, at least temporarily. To understand repeated 
migration or potential settling better, chapter eight then discussed intimacy, another 
crucial dimension of migrants’ lives abroad.  
Patterns of intimacy shape the young Europeans’ geographical mobility in various 
ways. Age and gender significantly affect their perception of the possibility to find a 
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partner abroad. Moreover, the Europeans traverse several life stages in the period 
studied: from student to full-time employee, from independent early-career employee to 
an adult in one’s thirties, where marriage and sometimes children become an issue. This 
considerably affects their rationale towards continued migration or return and has clear 
gender-related implications.  
Of all migrants, single women above 30 ponder most about the life cycle. They 
expect difficulties to find a partner in Asia or to raise children abroad. Couples who live 
in a country where both partners are foreigners – no matter if they hold the same 
nationality or not – build a new home through the joint experience of daily interactions 
and engagements with their surroundings. Once children become an issue women, 
regardless nationality and background, feel the urge to return home. However, the cases 
of some same-nationality couples who continue to stay in Asia as a family prove a new 
dimension of independent European migration to Asia with the long-term commitment 
to a migratory life. 
Furthermore, the comparative perspective reveals significant differences of the 
receiving cities when studied under the aspect of intimacy. Europeans in Tokyo 
generally migrated at a younger age and more of them are married to locals than in the 
case of Singapore. The fact that their Japanese spouses are seldom capable or willing to 
work abroad entails that a fair number have worked in Tokyo for years. While intimacy 
has induced them to stay for the time being, the particularities of the Japanese labour 
market continue to suppress diversity and put pressure on the migrants. This partly 
explains the earlier finding of repeated job transfers since migrants hope to find a 
workplace that allows them to be different. They see limits in what they can achieve 
professionally and socially in Japan and as such continue to entertain the idea of 
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becoming mobile again – an idea of which they know it will be difficult to realise with 
their Japanese spouses.  
In Singapore, on the other hand, the notion of the fluid hub discourages the 
Europeans to envision their future in the city-state. Professionally, the majority is fairly 
satisfied which contrasts to the situation in Tokyo. Personally, many are embedded in 
wide friendship networks, too. Yet, the clear-cut separation from local society and the 
uncertainty regarding the tightening visa regulations allow only few of the migrants to 
imagine settlement. The TCN couples generally appreciate the high quality of life and 
sophisticated labour market situation which enables both partners to develop their 
careers. Thus, Singapore neither seems to be a place to stay.  
As such, the chapter rounded off the dissertation by emphasising the necessity of 
the life course perspective for understanding migration. By connecting the findings of 
the thematic chapters one can understand the multiple facets of the migration experience 
and how these affect geographical mobility over time. 
 
9.2 Mobility as an Orientation: The Life Narrative of the Millennial Migrants 
I demonstrated that for many of the migrants mobility has become an intrinsic part of 
their lives, almost a part of their identity. While many feel at home in their present place 
of residence, they seldom rule out the possibility to leave again. Singles have a 
heightened sense of mobility. They enjoy their independence and the excitement of 
living abroad but it also pushes them to move on, feeling both free and insecure about 
where their life is heading. The temptation to keep looking for better options is strong. 
Nevertheless, couples do not necessarily stay put. After all, they have two careers to 
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match and repeatedly an unforeseen job opportunity for one partner triggers the move of 
both.  
Mobility and roots – thus the possibility to have a home abroad without 
permanently settling down – do not contradict each other. Conceptualising belonging as 
an attachment to someone with whom one has built life abroad rather than only the 
attachment to a physical place broadens the meaning of a sense of home. Along their 
logic of the benefits of living abroad, the young adults see mobility as one of the – or 
maybe the only – route to a satisfying life.  
Abroad, however, is not a different European country. These European millennials 
took Generation Erasmus – the understanding of being the ideal EU citizens equipped 
with the credentials offered by the European free movement space – farer than the 
confined borders of the EU territory. For them, Asia is attractive particularly because it 
is not Europe and not the West. The chapters revealed that for these European 
millennials moving out and challenging themselves in Asia is a necessary step in early 
adulthood. It is a way of distinction that is no longer possible through intra-European 
movement since the EU’s celebration of free movement has rendered mobility in the EU 
something close to normative, at least for the highly-educated middle class and young 
professionals. This initial move is as often driven by curiosity and desire for cultural 
stimulation as it is by the need of or aspiration for more attractive professional 
opportunities. It is often thought of as an adventure or the once-in-a-lifetime gap year 
conceptualized by others as “rites of passage.” 
Yet, in a world where some speak of “the decline of the West” (Fischer 2018; 
Shetler-Jones 2018) and others speak of the “Asian century” (Lee 2017; Mahbubani 
2017; West 2018) these millennial Europeans’ view of the world has shifted. The 
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dissertation revealed that despite initially rather short-term plans – or no plans beyond 
the move itself at all – many end up to stay and become ‘real’ labour migrants in Asia. 
They believe in a global citizenship which allows them to live alongside others of 
diverse backgrounds and work towards a better life.  
An increasing part of the young Europeans take for granted that this process 
entails their status as labour migrants who are on par with and not so different from 
other people who migrate for fulfilling their dreams. They have come to see other 
skilled migrants of the millennial cohort as their peers, though more so in Singapore 
where foreign talents are numerous than in Tokyo where the Europeans socialise more 
with Japanese citizens of their age. These peers are highly-educated middle classes from 
around the globe who, similar to the Europeans, have motility, the means and 
credentials to move to wherever they see the chance to succeed.  
In this, they quite significantly differ from those who move within the EU territory. 
The intra-European movers do not need to qualify for working visa and are thus freer to 
choose their occupation since they do not need to comply with the regulations stipulated 
by states’ immigration policies. For the middling transnationals in Europe (King et al. 
2016; Krings et al. 2013; Parutis 2014; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014) or the 
Eurostars of the prime European cities (Favell 2008), geographical mobility is a 
personal or professional opportunity, or often both. However, the EU is attractive 
particularly because it provides a borderless territory, a perceived familiarity with ‘how 
things work’ and the spatial proximity to migrants’ home countries, factors which in 
their combination considerably encourage and facilitate migration. 
This is how we might consider the theoretical contribution of the case of 
European millennial migration to Asia. With the shift in their legal and social status and 
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the coming to terms with the fact that a substantial part of their early career and a 
crucial part of their adult life might unfold in Asia, we can also observe a qualitative 
shift in values: They are in pursuit of a good life in a sense often ascribed to lifestyle 
migrants, yet their strategies and practices reveal that they strive to attain this good life 
via an identity as mobile professionals. Neither do they draw from neoliberal scripts 
exclusively nor do they invoke an ideal cosmopolitanism which might direct their paths 
to any destination such as developing countries.  
Similar to their peers in Europe, they navigate their lives as middle-class 
professionals and identify as EU citizens, but their horizon is different. These mobile 
Europeans assess their options against a global rather than a national or regional frame 
which they deem both more rational and more rewarding than a life confined to 
European borders. At the same time, inconsistencies and ambivalent feelings abound. 
Reluctance if not avoidance to tackle issues of planning the future and eventual settling 
down underline the Europeans’ ambiguous experiences and struggles to manage their 
multiple identities.  
For many, mobility becomes an orientation. Studying Generation Erasmus’ 
“worklife pathways” in this line enables the reader to see the path dependency of the 
mobility experience. The dissertation illuminates that few migrants pursue a clear goal 
such as a specific place of residence or a linear upward career with a determined title at 
its end. Rather, their strategies and practices are influenced and directed by previous 
mobility experiences and skills they have accumulated on the way.  
Migrants invoke the cultural repertoire they have developed since their first move 
abroad as exchange students, graduate students, interns, working holiday makers or the 
like. Depending on situational and contextual needs, they draw from a set of tacit 
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knowledge, skills and experiences flexibly. To compete against others in job interviews 
abroad, to make friends in a foreign language, professional reorientation in a selective 
immigration system or to activate one’s transnational network upon repeated migration 
– all of these are moments when the young migrants use their repertoire in creative 
ways to, in Swidler’s (1986:284) words, “build lines of action.”  
The dissertation demonstrates the range of outcomes their mobile practices have. 
With every move – organisational or geographical – migrants become more confident of 
their qualifications. By doing so, migrants rely on networks they themselves have 
developed over the years, on their own foreign language proficiency and professional 
experience. Such networks certainly are not free of historical power structures and often, 
Westernness, Europeanness or whiteness are dominant categories. Yet, this feature is 
rather a sign of fading Western or white power in institutions of a globalised world than 
their unchallenged hegemony. After all, while some informants entirely focus on 
Western institutions and seek Western friends, the majority of the migrants become 
more comfortable with moving between a range of social networks and assembling 
work experience in Asian, European and third-country businesses.  
Taken together, very few regard their home countries as a given place of return. 
Instead, they craft their multiple identities by the very fact that even continued life 
abroad or an eventually repeated move is in line with the values of their generation. For 
the highly educated middle classes they meet in the Asian global cities mobility is both 
a necessity and a gift in order to forge satisfactory adult lives and the presence of 
similarly mobile friends and sometimes a like-minded spouse reassures them and 
provides some stability. These young adults understand ‘rootedness’ in an extended 
sense: They feel connected to and partly rooted in their European home, the rural village 
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or capital city in which they were born, the friendships they have made along their 
migratory pathways and their local neighbourhood in Singapore or Tokyo.  
Therefore, this migratory phenomenon is more than a “rite of passage” (e.g. Bell 
2002; Inkson et al. 1999). The migrants of this dissertation have graduated from the life 
stage of youth meanwhile. They have developed careers, started families and many 
relocated once or multiple times. However, only few left from the mobile “worklife 
pathways.” Their repertoire, once cultivated, induces them to continuously pursue 
pathways that are oriented at, if not defined by, mobility. Some have roots in several 
countries or have migrated already pre-employment. Others might be new to a migrant 
life, but earlier ‘touchpoints’ to mobility have shaped their dispositions.  
Mobility constitutes a discourse, a norm, an object of desire. It promises access to 
cosmopolitan lifestyles and to a brighter future. Most importantly, however, mobility 
allows to weave an individual life narrative at a time when these young adults were 
uncertain how to weave such a narrative in their home countries. This is at the core of 
Generation Erasmus’ striving. Their “worklife pathways” to, across and beyond Asia 
enable them to design a biography which allows to reconcile their professional 
aspirations with their cosmopolitan orientation. Proud of having reached the status of a 
professional after some years abroad, they might even pity their peers at home. Their 
migratory trajectories imply that many prefer changing the industry or the country to 
returning home. This, however, unravels these young adults’ dilemma: They less and 
less perceive life at home as mundane as they did when they left Europe in order to find 
a more stimulating life in Asia. Rather, they doubt if they could ever fit into the local 
structures again which they left as youth when they had different dispositions, 
aspirations and skills.  
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9.3 Beyond Europe: Chosen Biographies in the Global Context 
The orientation towards mobility is not only a tool to navigate and sustain ever complex 
middle-class life paths. It also puts those who actively shape their lives in precarious 
situations. Life abroad causes marginality, legal or financial insecurity at times. Thus, 
these migrants might not be, and probably will not represent the next European 
generations to come. Why that is so and how to understand the wider implications of 
these millennial Europeans’ mobility is the focus of the final section. 
The young adults choose emigration to Asia as a means for self-differentiation. At 
the same time they engage in practices of middle-class reproduction. Depending on their 
home country’s economic situation, they are concerned of a constraining labour market 
at home or they doubt that the high social welfare contributions will ever pay off in 
form of retirement benefits. More often, however, it is a combination of the two factors 
above and the belief that the European labour market and the lifestyle they imagine 
within EU borders do not satisfy their cosmopolitan or professional aspirations. In the 
light of a ‘EU in crisis’ and the economic growth of Asia-Pacific, then, Generation 
Erasmus seek alternative routes to a satisfying life. More than that, their trajectories 
prove their strategies to achieve upward mobility by outward mobility or, as I suggest 
more often is the case, to access a more stimulating life without risking downward 
mobility in the crisis-ridden EU. 
This is what distinguishes them from their peers at home but also from that type 
of ideal careerists who follow a neoliberal logic to get ahead. If it was only about a steep 
career they would have moved elsewhere or pursued different majors at university and 
career tracks altogether. The destination choices and ongoing migratory trajectories 
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reveal something else about these young Europeans’ positioning in their home countries. 
While they are highly educated and middle class, they are not the elite. Very few started 
out in prestigious companies or with highly paying jobs. Those who migrated as recent 
graduates or as students seldom had a clear specialization that would directly lead into a 
specific profession. Thus, they did not miss out on a promising career path when they 
decided to leave Europe.  
Moreover, while only mentioned in passing in the dissertation, it is important to 
recognise that some of the Europeans were not able to enter their desired migration 
destinations. Those in question ultimately had to give up in the US or Australia because 
of the perceived or actual difficulty to receive a professional work visa. Despite their 
tertiary degrees and middle-class backgrounds, these European millennials are not the 
elite of their countries. While they are able to secure positions in sophisticated Asian 
labour markets they see few chances to succeed in the ‘prime’ destinations, especially 
the US. The majority, however, never considered the typical Western global cities.  
This unravels that these young Europeans have an alternative vision of their life 
and slightly different values than the intra-European movers and previous European 
generations. In many ways, it is a standard middle-class life to which they aspire: A 
partner or family, friends and jobs with intrinsic meaning beyond providing for 
economic stability alone. Yet, they are convinced that the route to achieve such life has 
been carved out by globalizing labour markets and has become accessible through the 
internationally recognised credentials they have acquired. Furthermore, these young 
adults anticipate more stimulating social networks and lifestyle elsewhere than in 
Europe and other Western destinations which until recently constituted the prime 
destinations for highly-educated Europeans.  
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The dissertation accentuated that although migrants feel the insecurities 
surrounding their mobility very intensely at times, they seldom abandon the migratory 
life altogether. Setbacks and successes alike prompt the young adults to adopt mobility 
as an orientation; as an asset which can always yield something better, but increasingly 
also as a necessity to sustain the professional, financial status they have gained through 
mobility in the first place – or, what is important for a fair number of migrants, as a 
necessity to sustain their multiple identities. Their still relatively young age and their 
independence allow them to adjust themselves flexibly and to react to job market needs 
or attractive vacancies elsewhere spontaneously.  
The dissertation is no attempt to evaluate if these young Europeans’ rationales 
regarding opportunities at home or abroad are right or wrong. Instead, it demonstrates 
that there is a general feeling that staying in the EU, especially under its current 
circumstances, might not allow them to make the most of their lives. The young adults 
of this study are aware of the concerns expressed by the European public, the media and 
political leaders around the globe. In the globalized world and the “Asian century” (Lee 
2017; Mahbubani 2017; West 2018), they decide to reap the fruits of their upbringing in 
an integrating EU which has encouraged them to become mobile, cosmopolitan 
European citizens. 
Over the years abroad, however, the migrants have matured and have adopted a 
quite different view of the world than the one they held when they emigrated from 
Europe. They also developed and accumulated their professional skills and credentials. 
They see themselves as citizens of a globalised world across whose links they find like-
minded millennials. This narrative sustains their mobile pathways. As demonstrated, the 
majority do not pursue ideal neoliberal or careerist goals. The fact that as migrants they 
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are dependent on work visa in their countries of residence forces them to concentrate on 
some sort of officially recognised career. This gives evidence of the continued power of 
states over their migratory pathways even if rarely mentioned in these Europeans’ 
narratives. 
Over the time and with increasing confidence, work experience and social 
networks abroad, migrants creatively contest the boundaries of the definition of a 
professional career. It is worth recalling here that only one of the 70 informants 
followed the classic careerist path in banking and consulting in a US firm. Others rather 
adopted a second job in their personal field of interest or left their original profession: 
sometimes lifestyle inspired, sometimes in the form of an entrepreneurial venture with 
friends or after obtaining training in a different field. It is the combination of an 
interesting job – something in which they find intrinsic meaning – and a stimulating 
private life that guides these millennials’ lives abroad and underlines what they are 
after: a similar life to that which their peers at home are seeking. The difference is that 
these millennial migrants are convinced that both the scope of available jobs and the 
social networks and lifestyle are more varied and more stimulating outside of the 
familiar West whose golden times they deem to be over.  
In sum, Generation Erasmus perceive mobility as both liberating and unsettling. 
Their narratives elucidate uncertainty and underline that their orientation towards 
mobility is also a necessity. It is necessary in order to secure their life abroad. This does 
not mean they will never return to their home countries. But, and this is striking, they 
certainly do not want to return because of lack of other options. This would, as their 
narratives elucidate, equal personal failure. Moreover, they would lose what their life 
narrative is all about: Life abroad as a way of distinction in the first place but after years 
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abroad increasingly also as mode of life they regard as normal. Mobility, therefore, 
guides the young adults through their experiences and practices of being migrants in 
Asia and sometimes in other parts of the world. It allows them to construct a coherent 
narrative which encompasses the multiple identities they have developed with the time.  
These identities are situational and contextual. At times, migrants display a strong 
European identity. This happens when their social identity, for instance as a female 
professional in a patriarchal Japanese workplace, marginalises them. In addition to that, 
they reserve a place for intimate family ties in their heart. Deep inside, they feel 
European and also as members of the family and neighbourhood or the city in which 
they were born. Yet, everyday their reality – from their jobs to acquaintances to 
activities they associate with rest, relaxation or fun – takes place in their city of 
residence in Asia or the greater Asia-Pacific region. As to their identity as professionals, 
but also pretty much as social persons, the majority identify with an international 
community of aspiring young professionals of various national, ethnic and religious 
affiliations. In many aspects, these are the people who understand their present sorrows 
and hopes best, better than friends and family at home, the more senior co-ethnic or co-
national expatriate community or local colleagues and friends.  
However, those whose private lives or careers stagnate fear immobility. A return 
home comes close to failure since they fear losing what they acquired by living outside 
of the EU: a broader horizon, the possibility to learn from and exchange with more 
diverse approaches than those considered the norm in their home countries or the EU. 
The very fact that the few who have returned are disappointed about the life they find 
hints at a questionable outcome of the mobility experience. These people constantly 
reflect if their decision was wrong. Things are different with those who moved to 
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Europe’s global cities such as London, which they understand as another step in their 
migratory biography. A few others intend to settle in their partner’s home country by 
establishing their position in the domestic labour market. Even then, ambivalence 
towards giving up the mobile narrative and doubt of the possibility to integrate is 
current in their stories.  
After all, these migrants’ journey is not a smooth one. Despite their privileges as 
(mostly white) EU citizens, they still constantly struggle against restrictive migration 
regimes, nationalistic policies and cultural obstacles. Even the ones who seem to forge 
their “worklife pathways” without structural constraints carry an emotional burden: the 
awareness of the irreversibility of their mobile life path and with it, the impossibility to 
return to a sheltered European home and to re-establish in the local communities in 
which they grew up. Their initial longing for differentiation has led to their own and 
their childhood peers’ and communities’ definition of them as others. Moments of 
reflection on the potential consequences of their mobility are unsettling. Therefore, the 
young adults suppress their conflicting thoughts while heading towards an uncertain 
mid-life stage. 
Over the course of the dissertation I demonstrated how the young Europeans have 
internalised the logic of pursuing mobile “worklife pathways.” While they have become 
capable of doing so, they are also increasingly tied to this life narrative of mobility. 
Manoeuvring the global labour market provides a route, or an orientation for Generation 
Erasmus and other young mobile professionals. They regard the challenges of the 
unfamiliar as making the most of living in a globalised world. They appreciate their 
European roots and the values along which they have been raised. However, having 
encountered different cultures, work styles and ways of thinking they have also 
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concluded that they should draw from this diverse set of ideas and values reflexively. 
These young adults compare themselves with their peers from around the world and 
believe that they are in the same boat; that the path towards a satisfying life is a joint 
one, though certainly one only open to the highly educated middle-classes. It will thus 
be worth following if and to what extent the lines between Generation Erasmus and 
young mobile professionals from other countries start to blur. 
This is not to say that the young Europeans are the perfect cosmopolitans and that 
they have overcome racist or nationalist attitudes or ethno-cultural thinking. Yet, they 
have learned along their ways overseas that theirs is not always the right idea; that 
European citizenship and whiteness will not always lead them towards their goal; and 
that those who understand them best are sometimes Asians (or others) of different 
religious, cultural and linguistic background. As such, they have not chosen the 
smoothest route through life. Nevertheless, the path dependency means that it is difficult 
to break the chosen biography of the mobile lifepaths.  
For the majority of their peers and of the global educated middle class, such 
mobile “worklife pathways” appear much less attractive. This becomes clear if we 
acknowledge the fact that the majority of Europe’s educated millennials forge their lives 
in their home countries. Recognising mobility as a life narrative and the irreversibility 
of the pathways many migrants pursue, demands a re-thinking of the celebration of 
mobility and independence, but also of easily matching alternative professional 
mobilities with neoliberal self-management or a renunciation of one’s roots.  
All but few of the Europeans in this study take Europe with them in their hearts. 
Nevertheless, the way they grew up and the rhetoric of being internationally competitive 
and of reaping opportunities encouraged them to step out of the familiar confines of the 
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EU and, more generally, of the West. This alienated them from a settled life in Europe 
or elsewhere but it does not entail uprooting or commitment to purely neoliberal 
careerist goals. These millennials’ presence in Asia heralds one of the potential 
outcomes of European bureaucrats’ dreams of the ideal European citizen. One might 
doubt, however, whether this is what Europeanisation policies intended.  
Ultimately, the mobility phenomenon at stake hints at one distinctive new form of 
individualism. It is characterised by the response to the anxieties of entering adulthood 
in the precarious times of the early 21
st
 century but also by positive notions of openness 
towards the new, maybe even alien, something increasingly rare in the hostile attitudes 
sweeping throughout European politics and media. The shift of centres and peripheries 
in the 21
st
 century globalised world has fuelled tensions in the West and among its 
citizens. The case of Generation Erasmus is one of the possible outcomes of this 
development. Despite the challenges their mobile “worklife pathways” entail these 
young Europeans’ experiences also point to the bright sight of their pursuits of life 
overseas. 
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Appendix I: Demographic Profile, Informants Singapore 
 
  Name Nationality Sex Age* 
Years in 
Singapore** 
Place of 
residence 
in 2018*** 
1 Andras Hungarian M 35-39 4.5 Hong Kong  
2 Andre  Portuguese M 25-29 6 Singapore 
3 Artemis  Greek/American M 25-29 2.5 Singapore 
4 Bettina  German F 25-29 3 Singapore 
5 Boris  Czech M 25-29 3 USA 
6 Carol  Belge F 25-29 2.5 London 
7 Caspar  French M 35-39 6 Singapore 
8 Chantal  French F 25-29 4 London 
9 Charles  French M 30-34 4 London 
10 Christina  
German/ 
Singaporean 
F 25-29 5 Singapore 
11 Deborah  Greek F 30-34 8 Singapore 
12 Ernesto Italian M 25-29 4 Singapore 
13 Florence  French F 25-29 2 Berlin  
14 Giacomo  Italian M 25-29 3.5 Singapore 
15 Hannah French/Japanese F 30-34 9 Singapore 
16 Hector  Portuguese M 30-34 6 Singapore 
17 Hubert German M 30-34 5 
Germany 
(HC) 
18 Isabelle French   F 25-29 1.5 France (HC) 
19 John  British M 20-24 4.5 Singapore 
20 Julia  German F 30-34 7.5 Singapore 
21 Kate Greek/British F 25-29 2.5 London 
22 Linda  Dutch F 25-29 3.5 Hong Kong  
23 Lorena  Italian F 30-34 2 Milan (HC) 
24 Marcos  Portuguese M 30-34 6 Singapore 
25 Mona Italian F 25-29 5 Singapore 
26 Naomi 
Portuguese/ 
African**** 
F 25-29 3.5 Singapore 
27 Nico  Portuguese M 30-34 9 Singapore 
28 Paul  French M 30-34 4 Singapore 
  346 
29 Renato  Italian M 35-39 7 Manila 
30 Sandra  Irish/American F 25-29 1.5 Wellington  
31 Severin  French M 25-29 3.5 Singapore 
32 Stella  Italian/Swiss F 25-29 4.5 Singapore 
33 Verena  German/Greek F 25-29 3.5 Singapore 
34 Viktor  Polish M 25-29 7 Singapore 
35 Jakob Greek/Belgian M 25-29 3.5 Singapore 
 
*Age at time of (work-related) migration to Singapore 
** Total time (of employment) in Singapore so far or before having left 
*** Current city of residence, in case of minor cities/rural areas current country of residence 
**** No further specification in order to protect informant’s anonymity.  
 
 
 
Appendix II: Demographic Profile, Informants Tokyo 
 
  Name Nationality Sex Age* 
Years in 
Tokyo** 
Place of 
residence 
in 2018*** 
1 Alex Czech M 25-29 2 Dublin 
2 Alexiou  Greek M 25-29 6.5 Tokyo 
3 Anita  Romanian F 20-24 4 Tokyo 
4 Ann  Dutch F 25-29 2 Singapore 
5 Berna Italian F 25-29 2 Paris 
6 Cecile  North European F 30-34 2 
Northern Eu. 
(HC) 
7 Claire  French F 25-29 2 Singapore 
8 Dirk  German M 25-29 1 Tokyo 
9 Emilio Italian M 25-29 5 Tokyo 
10 Federica Italian F 25-29 4.5 Brussels 
11 Jeremy French M 25-29 7 Tokyo 
12 Jonatan Spanish M 25-29 7 Fukuoka  
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13 Karina Greek F 30-34 0.5 London 
14 Kerstin German F 25-29 2 Tokyo**** 
15 Leila German F 25-29 8 Tokyo 
16 Lena German F 20-24 4 Berlin (HC) 
17 Madeleine French F 20-24 4 Tokyo 
18 Marc British M 20-24 4.5 Tokyo 
19 Natascha German F 25-29 3 Tokyo 
20 Nils German M 25-29 3 Buenos Aires 
21 Olaf Baltic M 25-29 2.5 Tokyo 
22 Olga Baltic F 20-24 3 Tokyo 
23 Pauline North European F 30-34 3 Tokyo 
24 Rico Portuguese M 25-29 5 Tokyo 
25 Rita  Romanian F 25-29 5 Sydney 
26 Sophie German F 25-29 3.5 Tokyo**** 
27 Stefan French M 25-29 4.5 Tokyo 
28 Thomas French M 20-24 4.5 Tokyo 
29 Tim  Dutch M 25-29 5 Tokyo 
30 Tobi German M 25-29 4.5 Brussels 
31 Tom German M 25-29 4.5 Tokyo 
32 Torben North European M 25-29 6 Tokyo**** 
33 Vincenzo  Italian M 30-34 3.5 Tokyo 
34 Yasmin French F 25-29 6 Tokyo 
35 Yiannis Greek M 25-29 5.5 Singapore 
HC: Home country  
Informants 10 and 30 are a couple and thus moved together to a country which is neither of their home 
country. 
*Age at time of (work-related) migration to Tokyo. Study time in Japan excluded, in few cases other city 
in Japan than Tokyo. 
**Total time (of employment) in Tokyo (Japan) so far or before having left 
*** Current city of residence, in case of minor cities/rural areas current country of residence 
****These three informants temporarily returned to either their home country or worked in a third 
country before having returned to Tokyo where they live at present. 
 
 
